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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ESSAYS ON IMPACT OF MICROFINANCE ON POVERTY 
ALLEVIATION 
 
By 
 
Laila, Ume 
 
The three essay presented in this dissertation is aimed to examine the impact of 
microfinance on poverty alleviation. The first chapter analyzes the impact of 
microfinance on poverty alleviation at macro-level. Second chapter examine the impact 
of microfinance on poverty alleviation in Pakistan. The last chapter investigates the 
evidence of impact of microfinance on poverty alleviation of literature; the abstract of 
each chapter is as follows: 
Chapter 1: Impact of Microfinance on Poverty Alleviation: A Global Analysis 
Whether microfinance activities influence to alleviate poverty at macro-level? 
This paper investigates the impact of microfinance on poverty alleviation by using 
panel data which is gathered from 490 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) at macro 
level in eighty eight (88) countries.  We used panel and cross-country data on 
MFIs which are generated by microfinance information Exchange (MIX) data, the 
World Bank data and Human Development Initiative, Oxford Poverty and Global 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Databank. This study provides empirical 
evidence for statistically significant impact of microfinance on poverty alleviation. 
Moreover, microfinance is an effective tool for economic social and financial 
development at macro-level. The results suggest that comparatively higher 
proportion of feminine recipients in microfinance institutes is likely to have low 
multidimensional poverty, poverty indices and depth.     
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Chapter 2: Impact of Microfinance in Raising the Household Income and 
Ownership of Household Assets in Pakistan 
Microfinance has become very significant in providing financial services to poor 
people and enables them to improve their economic and social affairs. The main 
purpose of this paper is to evaluate the microfinance effect on household income 
and ownership of household assets in Pakistan. This paper is focused on the panel 
data which is based on district level. Hence, the study outcomes depend on 
econometric analysis, using empirical methods. Therefore, Panel Regression with 
Fixed Effect technique used to measure the microfinance effect and Multivariate 
analysis demonstrated statistically significant impact of microfinance on 
education, household income, ownership of household assets and expenditure. 
The econometric evidence discovered that microfinance is an efficient strategy for 
financial and social development. Microfinance has significant policy 
implications to improve welfare as well as poverty alleviation in Pakistan. Hence, 
this paper recommends Microfinance Institution needs more policy intervention to 
accomplish the wealth creation, fight against poverty and innovation which 
supports in asset accumulation for their potential clients.  
 
Chapter 3: Microfinance and its influence on Poverty Alleviation; A 
survey of the Literature and Recent Development 
Microfinance has established to be a very effective development tool because it 
deals with the poverty which is main target of developmental projects. This paper 
systematically reviewed the detailed literature of examining the impact of 
microfinance on poverty alleviation at micro and macro-level. We reviewed 
impacts of financial services and outcomes, non-financial services and outcomes 
as well, such as loan, savings, income, assets, expenditure, education, nutrition, 
health status, Consumption of food, expenditure on food-items, empowerment of 
women, numbers of job created and entrepreneurship. The evidence shows that 
microfinance services are important mechanism and has positive and significant 
impact on economic and social condition of poor people. This study reveals that 
mostly microfinance institutions are not sustainable so far but in near future they 
are likely to be sustainable and outreach to poorest.  
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Chapter 1 : Impact of Microfinance on Poverty Alleviation: A Global 
Analysis  
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
A high proportion of the population in third-world countries lives in rural areas, 
where agriculture is the major source of livelihood. Because of risks and higher costs 
associated with widespread population and weak infrastructure, formal financial 
institutions are often reluctant to extend credit facilities to the rural population. Rural 
areas remain underdeveloped because of poor financial facilities. But dedicated and 
committed financial institutions can facilitate economic development in rural areas.  
Recent impact studies examining the impact of microfinance on income levels 
and poverty are based on micro-levels such as the household or company (Hulme and 
Mosley, 1996; Imai, Arun and Annim, 2010a, 2010b; Khandeker, 2005; Mosley, 2001). 
Some studies investigate the impact of microfinance performance on poverty at the 
macro-level (Ahli, Lin and Maio, 2011; Ahlin and Lin, 2006, and Kai and Hamori, 2009) 
but there are only a few studies that examine the impact of microfinance on poverty at the 
macro-level, because of limited data. 
The financial sector can be a catalyst in the eradication or at least reduction of 
poverty through enhanced financial services for the poor in developing countries 
(Barboza, 2009). For sustainable economic growth, a complete package of economic 
activities should be introduced covering, for instance, small and medium enterprises 
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(SMEs) and micro-finance banks, because small and medium enterprises can play a role 
in economic development, creating goods, innovation and employment. On the other 
hand, it is essential for enterprises to have access to financial services to be sustainable 
(Cull R.D, 2007).   
Conventional banks lend to clients who have collateral; the poor have no valuable 
assets to offer as collateral, so mainstream banks seldom take the risk and usually ignore 
the application. In any case, the mainstream banks normally operate in urban areas, 
whereas most poor live in rural areas, so the underprivileged are not facilitated. 
Microfinance Institutes (MFIs) aim to bridge the gap in remote areas (C. Ahlin, 2011), 
but studies show that MFIs offer financial facilities only to a very small fraction of the 
projected demand of the poor. Moreover it has been shown that these programs can 
improve the confidence and self-respect of borrowers. Nevertheless, microfinance is not a 
magic potion. Even the most innovative and participative programs can give undesirable 
negative impacts (Armendariz De Aghion, B., 2005). One obvious impact as shown by 
earlier studies of microfinance is increased income levels, but more recent studies reveal 
that the impact can vary per income group. The more wealthy segments benefit most 
from microcredit programs, as they have higher skill levels, good references and higher 
initial resource bases. Low income earners are more vulnerable, and so benefit more from 
micro savings and micro insurance. 
Nonetheless, steps taken more recently by government and other agencies 
providing access to financial services to underprivileged sectors show positive effects. 
However, more still needs to be done; for instance, there needs to be a conducive 
economic environment created, a legal and regulatory framework is supposed to be in 
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place, and the most urgent current need is  improvement of financial intermediates in 
both rural and urban regions. It is essential to establish a well-functional financial 
institute to support a favorable business environment for sustainable economic growth 
(Hermes, 2007; Hermes, 2011). 
Various initiatives have been launched such as regulations in support of 
technological and institutional innovations, up-scaling and growth; improved industry 
infrastructure, and setting up credit enhancement facilities. The new framework 
emphasizes inclusive financial services to make stronger fundamentals by developing 
proper infrastructures needed for long-term growth (Kirkpatrick C. and 2002). A strategic 
framework, with the core objective of developing a growth-led and sound institution, 
would mainly focus on expanding outreach; promotion of branchless banking and 
alternative delivery channels; deposit mobilization; scaling-up of micro‐enterprise 
development; improvement of governance; enhancement of human and institutional 
capacities; consumer protection and financial literacy; and MFI regulatory mechanisms 
(A. Deaton, O. D. 2011; Cull R. D. 2007; H. Kai 2009; Hartarska V. and 2007; Hermes 
N., 2011 and  M. Zeller, M. S. 2006). 
MF is deemed an effective development tool because it empowers clients better 
than charity. Normally, MF recipients are self-employed entrepreneurs who, because they 
lack capital, are unable to invest in business so cannot emerge from intense poverty (Rai 
A. 2011; Stewart F. 1998; Chris Elbers, 2003). 
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One remarkable MF characteristic is convenience. MFIs hire Local Credit 
Officers (LCOs) who visit every village and each house to collect or pay out funds. Most 
times an LCO will hold a group meeting to address various activities, enabling them to 
share views, offer suggestions and give feedback (Ahlin C. 2006; Aubert C. 2009). 
Since commercial banks require a guarantee for loans while poor people are not 
able to provide the same therefore this segment cannot avail loans facility from 
conventional banks Apart from this reason there are many other reasons due to which 
these banks are not willing to facilitate poor i-e lack of experience / training of poor, high 
cost on the process of small loans illiteracy of poor and low profit margin. This situation 
raised the reason and idea of microcredit. Those have no guarantee or any assets to 
present as guarantee, for them microfinance is a way to access finance to run businesses, 
to alleviate their poverty level, get social benefits in a sustainable manner. Chemin, M. 
2008; Fruttero and Gauri, 2005; & Howard, G. 2003). 
MF has become a lasting approach for economic development of the poor, 
according to Ledgerwood (1999, pp.1). The ADB (2008) define it as “the extension of 
comprehensive financial services such as loans, money transfers, payment services, 
deposits and insurance to poor and low-income earning households and their 
microenterprises.” It further implies that MF purveys financial facilities sustainably to 
improve lives of the poor. Since the inception of MF, many hypotheses have been 
developed on market coverage and poverty-related issues.  
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Poverty is described as a situation wherein people cannot access the necessities of 
life; the poverty line is the number of poor in this situation. Poverty is a chronic issue in 
Pakistan, and is basically the root cause of many social and developmental issues such as 
lack of education, large family sizes, poor economic access, gender discrimination, 
vulnerability to dreadful environmental conditions and deterioration and exploitation of 
the natural resource base (Jamal H, 2009; Lok-Dessallien R, 2002; Morduch J, 1995; 
Ravallion M, 2011). 
The poor face many risks which derive from miserable living conditions. A 
sluggish economy has far-reaching impacts on individual household economic stability, 
directly impacting livelihoods, incomes and food access. The division of poor is uneven 
within the country, especially in rural areas. Their dismaying life, particularly as regards 
unclean drinking water and poor ventilation and sanitation systems, constantly bring 
about chronic disease. Normally, the poor have no land, capital or ways to learn earning 
skills. More females than men are victims of poverty, because of their subordinate status 
in home and society.  
According to Hulme and Mosley (1996), apart from material conditions, poverty 
is also a form of deprivation. It is important to understand poverty at the micro as well as 
the macro level to recognize MF as a weapon to fight poverty. Defining poverty as a lack 
of basic needs is insufficient; there are other major factors; so MFIs must include broad 
elements of economic development. 
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Under-nutrition is one more major feature of the current socio-economic 
landscape, as the poor have bad health, lack resistance to disease, and have vitiated 
development. Fewer poor live in urban areas; earn a living as rickshaw driver, prostitute, 
beggar or street hawker.  
Indicators on the relationship between poverty and inequality can be measured in 
a number of ways. The International Development Community formulates signs to 
understand poverty in the broader prospective; equity measures and poverty indicators 
are used progressively to capture the broad picture of conditions (Lok-Dessallien, Renata, 
2002). Equity is associated with population dispersion, so poverty takes various forms of 
deprivation, such as low income, lack of basic needs and human incapacity. Despite these 
obvious differences, poverty analysis usually uses equity indicators due to the inherent 
connection between both the above concepts. Current research concludes that in any 
country in these circumstances, poverty reduction is easier in unrestricted conditions 
(Lok-Dessallien, Renata, 2002). 
Due to variation in human development and poverty, there are two assessment 
methods for analysis: the derivational and the conglomerate perspectives; the latter 
stresses community development.  
Exclusion means degree of social connectivity (Khan 2005), so exclusion and 
inclusion are relative to the society in question. They are multi-dimensional, comprising 
income/ consumption, poverty and influence on productive activity, political participation 
and social contacts. Inclusion and exclusion are dynamic processes which happen over 
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time; they are multi-covered and operate at different levels: individual, household, 
neighborhood, community and institution (Khan, 2005). 
Exclusion tends to work more against the weak and poor (Mahmood 2009), who 
have fewer resources, with very weak claims to social entitlement, who become irrelevant 
in the social environment. They become coiled in social exclusion, which deprives them 
of any opportunity to develop ethnically and economically. Lacking capital and 
entrepreneurial skills and with low community integration, they are denied even minor 
opportunity to move forward. Ever-increasing poverty, poor health, old age, diminishing 
livelihood and nominal shelter all lead to the extinction of these impoverished people 
(Mahmoud, 2009). 
Howard and Obika (2003) verify the close relationship between household 
poverty and health. In most developed countries, medical bills and loss of wages are 
covered by social safety measures such as health insurance, employment insurance or 
social security. These are not available in most developing countries, so the impact of ill-
health on a poor household is tragic or ruinous. The poor bear all such expenses and 
income loss, although financial sources are limited. Medical bills always lead to lower 
expenditure on other items, sometimes the most important ones like food, clothes and 
education. Ill-health not only increases expenditure but also reduces earning power, 
which may have further impact on poverty. Studies show that when earning members of a 
household are ill, they endure hardship (Howard and Obika, 2003).  
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Due to the importance of such issues, some developing countries target poverty 
reduction in the urban population, and must admit housing as a vital  issue (Meng 
Bunnarith, 2004). 
Jamal (2009) says that household assets and housing structures are an important 
aspect of poverty measurement. A household is thought relatively poor if the housing 
structure is unsatisfactory or inadequate; it is viewed as unsatisfactory if unbaked bricks, 
earth, wood or bamboo are mostly used in the walls and roof.  
Housing is considered inadequate if it is congested (more than two persons per 
room, excluding those six years and below). Households are considered poor if they lack 
facilities such as electricity, potable water, kitchen, bathroom/toilet and telephone facility 
(landline or mobile). 
To fully capture poverty in endowments, non-ownership of house and non-
ownership of household assets can be added to a list of variables in measuring household 
multi-dimensional poverty (Anwar, 2005; Akhter et al. 2007; Jamal, 2009). 
The significance of my study is to examine the effect of microfinance on poverty 
alleviation. We analyze the effectiveness of microfinance in terms of borrowers, gross 
loan portfolio, GDP per capita, borrower retention rate, percent of female borrowers, and 
number of microenterprises financed on poverty alleviation across regions. This is 
significant for the development of financial institutions from a policy perspective. This 
study will help them to reexamine the outreach and sustainability of microfinance 
activities.  
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The findings of this study would be very useful for the donors of microfinance 
institutions such as development communities, government, international organization 
and all other investors, as new vision into impact of potential microfinance on poverty 
alleviation may arise.  
 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the microfinance effect on poverty 
alleviation at the macro-level. The secondary aim is to determine what percentage of 
female borrowers/ number of active borrowers affects multi-dimensional poverty and to 
determine empirically the relationship between MF and the incidence of poverty. This 
paper answers the question about the nature of the relationship between MF and 
multidimensional poverty from a macro perspective in incidence and depth.  
Some studies show evidence that MF programs have a significant impact on 
poverty alleviation at the macro-level. This study assesses the MF impact on poverty 
alleviation at the regional level through empirical evidence. We have used panel and 
cross-sectional data at the country level, where we find that a country with more active 
borrowers and a higher percentage of female borrowers has a lower incidence and depth 
of multi-dimensional poverty.    
This study seeks to contribute to the available literature. First, it offers an insight 
into MF evolution in light of the global development discourse and public policy choices 
made in this regard. It is also associated with studies that examine the MF impact on 
poverty alleviation at the macro-level, then uncovers how this evolution has played out in 
practice, on the ground, and its subsequent impact on the intervention’s clients as against 
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those left behind. The econometric methodology (panel and cross-sectional analysis), 
control variables and dummy variables are similar to some extent.  
The main difference is that Katsushi; Raghav; Ganesh and Samuel (2012) 
examine the impact of a gross loan portfolio on poverty incidence and depth. The aim of 
this paper to analyze the micro-finance effect of the number of active borrowers, the 
number of micro-enterprises financed and the percentage of female borrowers on the 
incidence and depth of multi-dimensional poverty. Secondly, the study offers an 
authoritative account of how institutional structure impacts MF effectiveness as a 
development intervention, especially as traditional NGO microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
transform into microfinance banks (MFBs).  
Our study makes major contributions in terms of Scope and Coverage. Previous 
studies analyze the impact of microfinance on incidence and depth of poverty only. None 
examine the the impact of microfinance outreach on multidimensional poverty. We 
analyze the impact of microfinance on poverty head count ratio, poverty gap and 
multidimensional poverty index. WE also examine the microfinance effect on 
components of multidimensional poverty index. The components are education, health 
and living standard. 
By coverage we cover 96 countries and sixteen years panel data to examine the 
microfinance effect of microfinance on multidimensional poverty. Our panel data is from 
the period 1998-2014.  
The findings of our study provide significant policy implication for better 
structure and outreach of MFIs that help to alleviate the poverty at global level. These 
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policy implications and recommendations not only assist in development of microfinance 
and poverty alleviation but also support women empowerment issue at global level.   
Some upper-middle income and lower-middle income nations and several African 
nations are currently drafting regulations to convert their MFIs into banking institutions 
to be regulated directly by the central bank, in the hope of expanding outreach and 
achieving financial sustainability. This study can serve as a source of lessons learned to 
these countries and others that may join later, for it provides insights into how 
development processes and outcomes, such as social mobilization, women’s 
empowerment and other aspects of individual wellbeing, are affected when institutional 
structures are transformed. Finally, the study deepens our understanding of how a local 
social economy shapes and constrains development, even when the intervention is 
market-based and self-sustaining. The role of MF in conflict-affected areas is examined 
in detail. In addition, the impact of social and economic conditions, governance and 
culturally-persistent gender disparities is discussed with respect to microfinance (  
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Appendix 1-B). 
Our paper is organized as follows. After this section, the study discusses 
econometric methodology. Section 3 presents a brief description of the study’s data. Main 
findings and robustness checks are in Section 4. The final section of the paper presents 
concluding marks.   
 
 
1.2. Econometric Model and Estimation 
 
In order to analyze empirically the significant effect of microfinance on 
alleviation of poverty, we identified the dependent variable, explanatory variables and 
econometric model to measure the true effect of microfinance institution activities at 
macro-level. The unit of analysis is country for the empirical analysis of our study. 
Furthermore, we estimate our model through panel and cross-sectional regression.  
1.2.1. Panel Regression 
 
We used panel regression to estimate the number of active MFI borrowers with a 
significant impact on the poverty head-count ratio at the country level for 1998-2013.  
We employ pooled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect to estimate the actual 
effect of MF activity on poverty. To test our first hypothesis, we estimate the following 
pooled OLS equation. 
 𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2′ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3′ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽4′𝑍𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖                                    (1) 
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Where 𝑌𝑖𝑖  is the poverty head count ratio, poverty gap and multidimensional 
poverty for MFI i in year t; 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  is the number of active borrowers per million of 
population (aged 15 to 64) of MFI; 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is a matrix of all other explanatory variables 
such as assets; gross loan portfolio (GLP); GDP per capita; percentage of female 
borrowers (PFB); number of micro-enterprises financed (NMF); borrower retention rate 
(BRR); average deposit balance per depositor/GNI per capita; loan loss rate; number of 
jobs created (NJC); and percentage of micro-enterprises financed at start-up (PMFS). 𝑙𝑖𝑖 
is a matrix of poverty control variables capturing the living standard, health status and 
education of the country; and 𝑍𝑖𝑖  is the matrix of dummy variables at regional level 
where the MFI is operating.    
There is a number of econometrical problems in this type of estimation needing 
more consideration. Firstly, it is necessary that all predictor and control variables in our 
estimation should potentially affect poverty. If some variables are omitted that could 
affect poverty and which have a correlation with explanatory variables, then the Ordinary 
Least Square might be biased (Stock & Watson, 2007, p.186). So we also examine the 
real impact through Random Effect and Fixed Effect models.   
The Random Effect model assumes that an error term has no correlation with 
predictor variables; it controls all unobserved heterogeneity effects which could reduce 
the omitted variable bias issue (Hartarska,2007; Lensink and Mersland, 2009). We also 
used the Fixed Effect model, as we have concerns about omitted variable bias in the 
Ordinary Least Square, so need to control the endogeneity problem. Fixed Effect has the 
beauty of eliminating the effect of time –invariant characteristics - so we can measure the 
net impact of explanatory variables on the explained variable. Hence, the estimated 
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coefficients of this fixed model can be unbiased due to omitted time invariant 
characteristics.  
 
 
 
We estimate the following random and fixed effect model regression that controls 
unobserved specific effects of MFIs: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2′ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3′ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽4′𝑍𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖                          (2) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑖 is the unobserved specific fixed effect of MFI, we cluster the standard 
errors to deal with potential heteroscedasticity for this study. Broadly, the main objective 
is to analyze the effect of MFIs activity on multi-dimensional poverty at the country level. 
Macro-economic variables aim to capture the supply side of MFIs that can affect poor 
people’s lives. Moreover, MFI borrowers increased rapidly in the 2000s, from which we 
analyze whether the number of active borrowers from all MFIs can affect poverty. 
For hypothesis testing that random effect is better or fixed effect estimator we test the 
Hausman test.  
 
H0= Cov (𝜇𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑖′ ) = 0    (Random Effect) 
H1= Cov (𝜇𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑖′ ) = 0    (Fixed Effect) 
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Random and Fixed effects estimator are consistent under null but random effect 
estimator is inconsistent under alternative hypothesis. Random effect estimator is 
efficient under null hypothesis. In null hypothesis the Standard error (𝜷�𝑹𝑹)  is less than 
standard error of (𝜷�𝑹𝑹).  
𝑯 = ( 𝜷�𝑹𝑹 −  𝜷�𝑭𝑹)′ [ 𝑽𝑽𝑽 � 𝜷�𝑹𝑹� − 𝑽𝑽𝑽 � 𝜷�𝑭𝑹�]−𝟏 � 𝜷�𝑹𝑹 −  𝜷�𝑭𝑹�  ~𝝌𝟐�# 𝜷�𝑭𝑹�,𝒑𝑽𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑 #  𝜷�𝑭𝑹 = # 𝜷�𝑹𝑹 (𝒏𝒑 𝒑𝒏𝒊𝒑𝑽𝒊𝒑𝒑𝒊)  
 
We also examine the impact of the number of micro-enterprises financed and the 
percentage of female borrowers on multi-dimensional poverty by region, institution and 
income levels. Hence, the mission of micro-finance commercialization, i.e. MF banks, 
NGOs and non-bank financial institutions will make MFIs more profit-oriented, efficient 
and provide financial services through loans to the poor. These loans are to improve 
household conditions, and enterprise expenses. We expect that banks and non-bank 
financial institutions could be more effective than other institutions in reducing multi-
dimensional poverty through the percentage of female borrowers and the number of 
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micro-enterprises financed. We run independent regressions for region, institution and 
national income levels to examine the MF impact on multi-dimensional poverty.  
             𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑙𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖                                           (3) 
Here,  𝑌𝑖𝑖 is the multi-dimensional poverty index at regional, institutional 
and national levels; the national level is distributed by income. We expect that 
NMF and PFB more significantly affect multi-dimensional poverty in a low-
income country than a lower-middle income country.   
1.2.2. Cross-section Regression 
 
We employ the Ordinary Least Square for all models to estimate the effect of MF 
on poverty alleviation. We conduct this analysis to check the robustness of our estimates. 
The purpose of a cross-sectional estimation is to provide the marginal effect of MF on 
poverty. We estimate the cross-section OLS model as follows:  
  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽2′ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3′ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4′𝑍𝑖∈𝑆 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖                                           (4) 
We use level-log variables for all models to estimate the impact on the percentage 
of female borrowers; for other MFI activities variables on poverty alleviation at the 
macro level, we used regional dummies. We run the above in a region to check the 
impact of MFI activity within or without a region on different poverty indicators.  
One of the main restrictions in analyzing macro-level effect is whether the MFI 
target reaches poor people (Morduch, 1999). To examine the true effect, we analyze the 
MF impact on multi-dimensional poverty by capturing the complexity of poverty and 
poverty gap showing the “depth of poverty.”  
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1.3. Endogeneity Issue    
 
We find a difficulty in endogeneity of a few explained variables. In point of fact, 
data is missing on legal origins and enforcing contract costs which indicate cross-country 
differences in financial development, since the cost of enforcing a contract, legal origin 
dummy variables and active borrowers are the main variables explaining the demand side 
of MF. Active borrowers are likely to be endogenous in the equation; non-inclusion of 
the cost of enforcing a contract and legal origin variables might generate a correlation 
between active borrowers and an error term. This can lead to an endogeneity problem - 
the omitted variable bias and bi-causal relationship between active borrowers and multi-
dimensional poverty at a country level make the coefficient inconsistent. This reverse 
causality from multi-dimensional poverty to active borrowers can rise if government 
support or other development programs offer more support to MFIs working in those 
countries.  
It is difficult to find a valid instrument to satisfy the “exclusion restriction” that 
correlates with the number of active borrowers when there is no direct relationship with, 
or effect on, poverty. In this study our unit of analysis is the district, where we employ 
three kinds of instrument: legal origin; cost of enforcing a contract; and one-year lag in 
the number of active borrowers averaged by the number of MFIs for each country.  
We estimate the relationship between the number of active borrowers and poverty 
through structural and reduced form of least squares:  
𝑔𝑃𝐸𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑙𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝐺𝑃𝑖 + 𝜋2𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝜋3𝑙𝑙𝑙1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑙 + 𝜋4𝑙𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
Where POV represents dimension of poverty (education, health, living standards, 
wealth, economic status and consumption); GLP indicates gross loan portfolio; NAB 
denotes number of active borrowers; PFB indicates percentage of female borrowers; 
BRR denotes borrower retention rates; X indicates all other explanatory variables; RD is 
a vector of regional dummy, with South Asia being the reference province.  
To test the endogeneity presence and instrument suitability we estimate the 
reduced form, LO represents Legal Origin; CEC indicates the cost of contract 
enforcement at the country level; 𝑙𝑙𝑙1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the one-year average lag of number of 
active borrowers averaged by the number of MFIs for each country; X is the vector by 
which all other independent variables are measured in the first equation; 𝜀 𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝜇 indicate 
error terms.  
Following Treisman, Daniel (2006), Beck and Demirgüç-Kun (2003) and La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997 and 1998), we used Legal Origin to 
measure the depth of financial development. Imai, Katsushu (2012) used cost of 
enforcement contract as an instrument variable.  Legal Origin helps to define the cross-
country differences in financial development. We used a dummy variable of legal origin 
in our model as an instrumental variable, to find the exogenous element of “state control 
over the judiciary and legal system adaptability” to examine how legal origin affects 
financial development.  
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Decisions of MF investors, specifically international organizations and donors, on 
investment depend on national institutions: which institution has a low cost of enforcing 
contracts that can smooth economic activities. In this case we can assume that the cost of 
enforcing a contract has a significant and negative correlation with the number of active 
borrowers, but the direct relation or effect on the cost of enforcing a contract with the 
poor may be weak as a higher enforcement cost could exclude low-income people from 
formal services and continue poverty in the short run. Hence we also used a weighted 
one-year lag of the average number of active borrowers as a third instrument.    
  
1.4. Data and Methodology 
 
There are some challenges in empirical analysis for macro data which includes (i) 
identifying a suitable measure for activities of microfinance by availability and intensity 
(ii) identify the influence of “performance” which is different from scale and outreach of 
microfinance on macro variables and its indicator; and (iii) robustness check of 
estimators related to microfinance. 
We examine the impact of MF activity on poverty alleviation using panel and 
cross-sectional data. Our main focus is to analyze the impact of financial services rather 
than the performance of MFIs.  Data for 490 MFIs from 88 countries have been created 
by MIX (the Microfinance Information Exchange, 2014), the Oxford Poverty and Human 
Development Initiative (2014), the Global Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 
Databank, OPHI, Oxford University and the WDI (World Bank, 2014); (  
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Appendix 1-C). 
MIX Market data provides reliable and transparent information on funding 
sources, operational strategies, demand, stakeholders, performance, outreach and 
sustainability of MFIs. Formation of this database was recommended by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), which provides a complete 
database on MF financial indicators at regional, country and institutional levels.  
It covers Africa; Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA); East Asia and the 
Pacific (EAP); Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); Middle East North Africa 
(MENA); and South Asia (SA). MFIs are also categorized in terms of their network 
association, legal structure and financial services, including credit and savings for the 
poor by Micro-Finance Banks, Cooperatives/Credit Unions, Financial Institutions, Non-
Governmental Organizations and Rural banks  (Christen and Drake, 2002; Cull, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch, 2009a).   
MIX data provides MF institutional data for 17 years: descriptive statistics, 
financial indicators and outreach. Descriptive statistics regarding MFIs, including fiscal 
year of formation, regulation, vision and goals of institutions, developmental strategies, 
provision of products, sources of funding, operations, opportunities for investment and 
funds of MIX Market. Financial indicators explain MFI internal information data such as 
finance structure, equity return ratio; equity; assets; revenue; profit margins; portfolio 
risks; balances; and cost. Outreach data covers client-MFI communication, with 
information on loan per borrower; savings per saver; number of active borrowers; 
percentage of micro-enterprises financed; percentage of financed micro-enterprises that 
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are start-ups; and percentage of female borrowers. It also provides detailed information 
on borrowers below or above the poverty line. 
The panel data is unbalanced as our analysis is based on the annual data between 
1998 and 2013; by region there are 512 MFIs from LAC; 454 from EECA; 221 from 
EAP; 76 from MENA; 385 from SA; and 509 from Africa. Our cross section estimates 
are based on 490 MFIs in 88 countries: 98 from LAC; 75 from EECA; 42 from EAP; 40 
from MENA; 175 from SA; and 60 from Africa.  
Before estimation we need to check data reliability and validity, because MIX 
data might have issues regarding sample selection, complete information about MFIs and 
measurement errors, even though if MIX has cross-checked data (Ahlin et al., 2011). It is 
impossible to measure the extent of data errors, but MIX offers MF activity data at the 
large level (Cull, Demi-rguic-Kunt and Morduch, 2011).  
The present study uses different empirical methods with sub-samples to verify 
potential bias due to self-selection, based on measures like the extent of MFI data validity 
(Ahlin et al., 2011). We discovered consistent and similar results regardless of sub-
samples. Moreover, we compared a dependent variable as a number of active MFI 
borrowers (from MIX data) with other independent variables: MFI branches, deposit and 
loan accounts at the country level. We found a positive and significant pair-wise 
correlation between variables and so assume that MIX data constitutes real MFI 
performance aggregated at the country level.  
To examine the effect of MF activity on poverty, we used the number of active 
borrowers: the number of individuals who have current outstanding MFI loans in each 
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country. Other variables in our model are percentage of female borrowers; borrowings; 
assets; borrower retention rate; number of micro-enterprises financed; gross loan 
portfolio; GDP per capita; percentage of financed micro-enterprises that are start-ups; 
control variables; and regional dummies. However, a robust inverse relationship between 
gross loan portfolio and poverty has already been verified in the literature. Lastly, 
poverty is controlled through different unobservable regional factors like natural disasters 
and social and economic shocks; in this regard we used regional dummies.  
The present study has an endogeniety issue, as the number of active borrowers is 
likely to be endogenous with poverty. There is a bi-causal relationship between the 
number of active MF borrowers and multidimensional poverty at the country level. To 
remove reverse causality we used three iv: legal origin; cost of enforcing a contract; and 
lag of one-year average of the number of active borrowers averaged by the number of 
MFIs for each country. For IV we collect data from the NYU global development 
network growth database, which provides information on all fixed factors, and complete 
data on macro and micro time series, social indicators, fixed factors and government 
finance. The “DRI (Development Research Institute) is devoted to rigorous, scholarly 
research into economic development and growth of poor countries. It is an independent 
and non-partisan body led by NYU Professors William Easterly  and  Yaw Nyarko, with 
a team of researchers and students”. 
1.5. Results  
 
We find empirical evidence that MF activity had a statistically significant impact 
on the poverty head count ratio, poverty gap and multi-dimensional poverty.  
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1.5.1. Panel Analysis 
 
Table 1.1 reports the number of observations of our panel sample distribution. 
The data set comprises different types of MFI in different world regions; a total of 2218 
MFIs. 
That total South Asia (SA) (403); Banks (15); Credit Unions/Cooperatives (37); 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFI) (104); Non-Governmental Organizations (228); 
Rural Banks (11); and other institutions (8) (see Source: Author’s Compilation   
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Figure 1.1). 
 In Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) there are 531 MFIs, more than in any 
other world region: Banks (314); Credit Unions/Cooperatives (458); NBFI (636); NGOs 
(607); Rural Banks (154); other institutions (49). 
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Table 1.2 table shows descriptive statistics for key variables in our study. It shows 
the mean, median, quartiles, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for interesting 
variables used in our data. N is the number of observation, Mean refers to the arithmetic 
average of explanatory and dependent variables. Q1 is first quartile, which is also 25th 
Percentile because it is larger than 25% of the observation.  Q2 is second quartile which 
is also the median and Q3 is third quartile and also called 75th Percentile because it is 
larger than 75% of the observation, respectively.  
Assets are total of all net accounts and measured in $1000’s. Borrower retention 
rate is Active borrowers at the end of the period / (active borrowers at the beginning of 
the period + new borrowers during the period) and measured in dollars. Gross Loan 
Portfolio is all outstanding loans for clients which does not include written off loans and 
measured in $100,000.  No. of Active Borrowers defined as the number of individuals 
who have currently outstanding loan with MFIs relative to million population (15-64).  
No. of Job created is employment creation which indicates the social performance 
indicator. No. of microenterprises financed defined as entrepreneurship which indicates 
the social and financial performance indicator. Percentage of female borrowers is the 
female clients of MFIs. Percent of financed microenterprises that are start-ups are those 
enterprises which are new in enterprise.   
Poverty Head Count Ratio is percentage of population living below the national 
poverty line. Poverty Gap is average of the ratio of the poverty gap at $2 per day to the 
poverty line. Proportion of people who are deprived in education, health status and living 
standard which is assessed by years of school, school attendance, child mortality, 
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nutrition, Electricity, Improved Sanitation, Drinking water, Flooring, Cooking Fuel and 
Asset Ownership. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is a" measure designed to 
capture the severe deprivations that each person faces at the same time”.   
The average and median of number of active MFI borrowers is 2.584, which is 
13.51 per million population (aged 15-64). As far as poverty variables are concerned, 
poverty head count ratio on average equals 32.44321 “living below the national poverty 
line.” Mean and median poverty gaps are 9.296271 and 6.8, and average multi-
dimensional poverty is 16.48.  
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Table 1.3 represents the correlation matrix of the MF and poverty variables; we 
see a negative correlation between poverty head count ratio with all MF activity: Assets 
(-0.0345); BRR (-0.888); Borrowing (-0.0807); NJC (-0.0912); NMF (-0.0454); NAB (-
0.01602); PFB (-0.7065); PFMS (-0.4026). This shows an increasing number of active 
borrowers with less poverty. The correlation between percentage of female borrower and 
poverty is negative, which indicates that women empowerment can also be affected by 
poverty. 
Table 1.4 captures the impact of MF, measured by the number of micro-
enterprises financed and percentage of female borrowers, on multi-dimensional poverty 
by different levels of country income. Our findings show that MF activity had a 
significant impact on multi-dimensional poverty. The result is negative and significant to 
at least 1% of significance. Generally speaking, the percentage of female borrowers has a 
larger impact on multi-dimensional poverty than the number of micro-enterprises 
financed, observed in lower-middle income country multi-dimensional poverty at 0.123%.   
Table 1.5 measures the impact of MF on multidimensional poverty by institution. 
We divided the sample by MFI legal position lines; the estimated coefficients are 
negative and significant to a 5% level. The estimated coefficient shows that more micro-
enterprises and a larger percentage of female borrowers can decrease multi-dimensional 
poverty by different channels of microfinance; meaning that MFIs with a different legal 
status have a significant impact on multi-dimensional poverty as noted by Banks, Credit 
Unions/Cooperatives, NBFI, NGOs and Rural Banks.  
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The estimated results show that MF can be a vehicle to alleviate poverty. 
Therefore it seems that multi-dimensional poverty does not reflect changes in degree of 
MFI commercialization; but rural banks and NGOs show a highly significant impact on 
poverty multidimensional poverty of the number of micro-enterprises financed and 
percentage of female borrowers.  
Table 1.6 estimates the impact of MF on multi-dimensional poverty, with the 
sample divided by region. In this model, the number of micro-enterprises financed and 
percentage of female borrowers have a significant impact on multi-dimensional poverty 
in all regions except Africa. The estimated results show that more female borrowers can 
have a negative and significant influence on multi-dimensional poverty. The more MF 
(measured by number of micro-enterprises financed), the more people can emerge from 
poverty.  
In Table 1.7, for panel regression we use three types of estimation: Pooled OLS; 
RE; and FE. The evidence shows that MF had a significant influence on poverty 
incidence. In Table 1.7 to 오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 없습니다. we have repeated the 
dependent variable (poverty head count ratio) of our regression with poverty gap and 
multi-dimensional poverty.      
1.5.1.1. Pooled OLS 
 
In Table 1.7 the log of per capita GLP is negative and highly significant; the 
coefficient indicates that the poverty head count ratio and gap fell by 0.021% and 0.020%. 
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As all predictors are in log, we find that a 10% increase in MFI borrower retention rate 
reduces poverty by 0.041% in Pooled OLS (Column 1).  
The estimated coefficient shows that more finance of micro-enterprises can 
decrease the poverty head count ratio and poverty gap by 0.048% and 0.022%. Moreover, 
the percentage of female borrowers has a larger impact on poverty head count ratio than 
other explanatory variables. The log of loan loss rate is positive and highly significant, 
and shows that if we increase the loan loss rate by 1%, the poverty incidence and gap will 
increase by 0.041% and 0.030%; meaning that MF has a positive impact on poverty. The 
estimated results showed that MF can be an effective tool to alleviate poverty.  
 
 
1.5.1.2. Random Effect 
 
We ascertain that the percentage of female borrowers is negatively correlated to 
the poverty head count ratio in both Random and Fixed Effect models. This negative 
association is statistically significant to 1% for Random Effect and 5% for Fixed Effect. 
The estimated coefficient shows that the marginal increase in percentage of female MFI 
borrowers lowers the poverty head count ratio by 0.060% for OLS, 0.061% for RE and 
0.050% for FE. The coefficients are robust over the estimation (“corrected for 
heteroscedasticity”). The results have to be interpreted carefully as the estimation 
depends on unbalanced panel. We found the same pattern of findings: the number of 
micro-enterprises financed and percentage of female MFI borrowers is negatively 
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correlated with poverty after controlling other explanatory variables and unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
Table 1.8 indicates that the number of active borrowers per million population 
(aged 15-64) had a statistically significant impact on multi-dimensional poverty via 
education, health status and living standard. Our interesting variable is that the average 
deposit balance per depositor/per capita GNI has a negative and highly significant impact 
on multi-dimensional poverty. If the average deposit balance per depositor/per capita 
GNI increases 1%, multi-dimensional poverty falls 0.045%.  
Table 1.9 to 오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 없습니다. indicate the MF impact on 
poverty in terms of head count ratio, gap and multidimensional poverty. The columns 
represent the estimation of country effect and five-year average effect. All models are 
significant at a conventional 5% level of significance, while a few models are weakly 
significant at 10%. The large impact of average deposit balance per depositor/per capita 
GNI and percentage of female borrowers has been observed as a country effect, at 0.033% 
and 0.020%. One interesting feature is that if we estimate the same model to analyze the 
5-year average effect, the impact is smaller but significant. The negative and relatively 
significant results can be interpreted as poor people having begun to benefit from the 
institutions to rise out of poverty, better their lives and improve business. Our estimation 
reports that more MFI finance for micro-enterprises can lower the poverty head count 
ratio and gap by 0.020% and 0.010%.  
In all models the results shows a negative and significant impact on poverty of the 
percentage of female borrowers, number of active borrowers and number of micro-
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enterprises financed by MFIs. Other predictor variables indicate expected signs too. 
Borrower retention rates show a negative and statistically significant impact on poverty.  
We run a Hausman test to choose between Fixed and random effects estimator. 
Our P-value is less than 0.05, which is highly significant. In this case we conclude that 
we can reject the null hypothesis and we will use fixed effect estimator for our analysis. 
Random effect estimator is no more consistent. After running the Hausman test we 
choose Fixed Effect over Random Effect. 
Table 1.8 and Table 1.10 shows the effect of Microfinance activity on multi-
dimensional poverty. As to the MF effect on the poverty gap and multi-dimensional 
poverty gap, there are consistent findings of significance and coefficient signs for all key 
variables of this study, specifically the number of active borrowers, the number of micro-
enterprises financed and the percentage of female borrowers. Where multi-dimensional 
poverty is a dependent variable, the Hausman test approves Fixed Effect.  
Overall, our findings from panel regression indicate that MF has a statistically 
significant impact on poverty. To sum up, the percentage of female borrowers and the 
number of active borrowers are negatively correlated with the incidence, gap and multi-
dimensional poverty. 
1.5.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
Findings from cross-section estimation imply strong evidence for the effect of MF 
on poverty alleviation at the macro-level. In all models (Table 1.11 and Table 1.12), we 
assess the relationship between the percentage of female borrowers, the number of active 
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borrowers and poverty. We run the Ordinary Least Square to examine the impact of the 
percentage of female borrowers with and without regional dummies on poverty.   
Table 1.11 indicates that the number of active borrowers and percentage of female 
borrowers is negatively and significantly correlated with the poverty head count ratio at 
0.041% and 0.141%, which is consistent with our hypothesis that the number of active 
MFI borrowers can affect the poverty head count ratio. The estimated coefficients are 
negative and significant at 5% and 1% levels. The estimated coefficient shows that more 
financed micro-enterprises can decrease the poverty head count ratio and gap; meaning 
that MF has a positive impact on poor people.  
Table 1.12 estimates indicate the impact of MF on multi-dimensional poverty 
with and without a regional dummy. In all models we control living standards, health 
status and education.  The estimated results showed that a higher number of active MF 
borrowers and micro-enterprises financed can have a negative and significant impact on 
multi-dimensional poverty (0.037% and 0.031%). The higher the utilization of MF 
(percentage of female borrowers), the more women will be able to make decisions in 
household financial matters; but the number of jobs created has an insignificant and 
negative impact on multi-dimensional poverty (0.00004%).    
Table 1.11 and Table 1.12 investigate the potential effect of regional dummies on 
poverty head count ratio, gap and multi-dimensional poverty. We found that key analysis 
variables remain negative and statistically significant after including the regional dummy. 
Column 2’s estimation of poverty head count ratio with regional dummies shows that 
EAP, EECA, LATC and MENA have negative and statistically significant coefficients 
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with reference to SA at a 5% level of significance. Africa shows a positive coefficient 
relative to SA, statistically significant at a 5% level of significance for multi-dimensional 
poverty, but an insignificant and positive coefficient for poverty head count ratio and 
poverty gap.    
The larger impact of the percentage of female borrowers has been observed on 
multi-dimensional poverty (0.18%). The impacts of borrower retention rate and gross 
loan portfolio are much higher than other explanatory variables in the analysis. We can 
rely too much on these results because of the explanatory variables, but the results show 
some inherent pattern of MF on poverty head count ratio, poverty gap and multi-
dimensional poverty. 
The negative and relatively significant results can indicate that poor people have 
begun to benefit from the institutions at least to maintain their business. Table 1.12 shows 
that the value of R2 for the model is 0.673, meaning that 67.3% of the variation in multi-
dimensional poverty can be explained from the policy variables; R2 always increases if 
you add independent variables in a multiple regression model.  
The estimated coefficients of a short run showed that MF has a positive and 
significant impact on poverty, at 10%. The magnitude of coefficients shows that ceteris 
paribus, if the 10% average deposit balance per depositor/per capita GNI increases, it will 
raise output by over 0.041%. The statistical significance of its variable supports 
theoretical linkages between MF and multi-dimensional poverty. The positive 
relationship implies that society has begun to benefit from MF. The sign of micro-
34 
 
enterprises financed at start-up is negative and significant at a conventional 5% level of 
significance.  
Lastly, the cross-section estimation shows the positive impact of MF on poverty 
alleviation at the macro level. We emphasize the need to check the potential effect of our 
explanatory variables on poverty; our few variables, like the number of jobs created, 
show an insignificant impact on poverty, and Africa shows a significant but positively 
correlation with poverty beyond our expectation. This suggests that MFI in Africa needs 
more attention to alleviate poverty.  
1.5.3. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 
Table 1.16 shows the instrumental variable used to remove the simultaneous 
equation problem from our model. The coefficients are robust, overcoming the 
heteroscedasticity and examining all explanatory variables with and without dummies at 
a regional level. The coefficient of the number of active borrowers is negatively and 
statistically significant at a 5% level. Our main objective with the instrumental variable 
estimation is to remove or solve the problem of endogeneity of the MF activity variable 
and poverty incidence and depth equation, that is, the number of active borrowers. In 
view of above discussion on endogeneity, this is because of a bi-causal relationship 
between MF activity and poverty.  
Table 1.17 shows the validity of our instruments; if we use only one instrument - 
legal origin - we observe that poverty reduces the impact of the number of active MFI 
borrowers. However, our weak identification test is significant, and we determine the 
requirement to increase instrumentation. 
35 
 
Table 1.16 uses three instruments for a “much higher” Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
F-statistic (“weak identification test”). Sargan’s test for over-identification shows 
whether our instrument is over-identified or not. We observe from this test that we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis. Here our null hypothesis is that our instrument has no 
correlation with the error term and is valid. For the under-identification test our p-value 
shows that we can reject our null hypothesis that our instrument is under-identified.  
From all these tests we can conclude that our instrumental variable is valid. The 
Hausman test shows that OLS is better than IV. In this case we can rely on OLS 
estimation.  
 
1.6. Robustness Checks 
 
We use a different test to investigate the robustness of our findings and examine 
our analysis in a detailed way. We run our regression to check whether our findings are 
robust for panel sample and cross-section sample when we include (i) different dependent 
variables: poverty head count, poverty gap and multi-dimensional poverty; (ii) level-level 
model for estimation (Table 1.13); (iii) interaction between percentage of female 
borrowers and legal MFI regional status (Table 1.15); (iv) interaction between legal MFI 
status and region (v) country effect (Table 1.9 and 오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 
없습니다.); (vi) five-year average effect (Table 1.9 and 오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 
없습니다.);  (vii) remove the outliers (  
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Table 1.18); (viii) MFI effect on three different dimensions of poverty (Table 
1.14). 
We obtain robust findings for cross-sectional and panel analysis, as the percentage 
of female borrowers and the number of active borrowers are negative and significant in 
all estimations. The same holds through different specifications of country effect and 
five-year average effect of MFI on poverty. The results confirm that in Africa the effect 
of MFI activity on poverty is not appealing. The robust findings prove that our results are 
consistent, as in other regions there is a negative and significant impact in all models. We 
found robust results while changing poverty measures; borrower retention rate and 
number of microenterprises financed are significant for incidence, depth and multi-
dimensional poverty. Again our main predictor, percentage of female borrowers, remains 
negative and significant with different specifications in all models. The coefficient 
estimates remain the same as well.  
Finally we check robustness for cross-section analysis with interaction terms of 
legal status and region. Hence we can see from Table 1.15 that our explanatory variables 
show the same sign and significance level with similar coefficients for regional and legal 
status variations. These variations are robust if we change the specifications.   
 
We found an instrumental variable to solve the problem of endogeneity, and used 
three instrumental variables from the supply side: legal origin; cost of enforcing an MFI 
contract at country level; and weighted one-year average lag of the number of active 
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borrowers. The same holds for instrumental variable results in Table 1.16; we always find 
a statistically significant relationship between MF outreach and poverty in Pakistan.  
1.7. Conclusion  
 
This paper examines MF effects on poverty alleviation by using a macro-level 
data set at large level, covering 490 MFIs in 88 countries. Poverty is examined through 
measures such as incidence, depth and multi-dimensional poverty. This study provides 
evidence that MFI activity can affect poverty at the macro level. We find that the 
percentage of female borrowers and the number of active MFI borrowers has a significant 
negative impact on incidence, depth and multi-dimensional poverty. By increasing the 
number of active borrowers, multi-dimensional poverty fell 0.0398%. The result is robust 
and economically significant by cross-sectional analysis. To test our claim, we used 
pooled OLS, Random Effect (country effect, 5-year average) and Fixed Effect for panel 
regression. A series of tests was also conducted to check result robustness.  
Our results also suggest that a higher number of MFI-financed micro-enterprises 
lowers poverty incidence and depth. A dummy variable on whether MFI has a regional 
effect on poverty generates similar findings. Multi-dimensional poverty provides similar 
findings as an alternate response variable. The collective results provide convincing 
evidence that increasing the number of active borrowers and the number of financed 
micro-enterprises positively affects poverty alleviation after controlling for other factors 
influencing the macro-level. 
The sign of the coefficient remains the same when we change specifications of 
our estimation, with and without dummy and replacing the predicted variable. Findings 
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from the panel estimation also support these results. Other aspects of MF or predictor 
influencing poverty alleviation include assets; borrower retention rate; and percentage of 
financed enterprises at start-up. The results also support the evidence that regional 
dummy effects are statistically significant. Interaction terms also show that the positive 
effect on poverty alleviation of the percentage of female borrowers with MFI legal status 
and region. The results reveal an MF impact on poverty alleviation worldwide; these 
findings have significant policy implications for both poverty and microfinance activities. 
This study verifies that female borrowers can play more significant role in alleviating 
poverty than male borrowers. This finding is interesting and suggests that an MFI focus 
on women might be useful for poverty alleviation.  
Based on our empirical analysis, we conclude that MFIs have a positive impact on 
national development at the macro-level.  
 
1.8. Policy Implication 
 
Below mentioned approaches in MF programs may increase outreach as well as 
impact of microfinance;  
Offering MF services valued by very poor: It includes consumption loans, 
providing alternatives for group guarantee, swift access to savings. 
Tailored Services: This can raise positive effect and it may not force poor in 
particular, flexible schedules repayment of loans, offering access to renew the loan with 
enhancement.  
39 
 
In order to avoid forcing excising clients and omitting poorer, the objective of MF 
programs should be financially sustainable till a realistic time. Because the microfinance 
institute may not achieve financial sustainability due to rapid increase of inflation, or 
high cost for support due to isolated areas.   
Introducing Integrated Programs: In general, integrated programs possess a higher 
impact over a disadvantageous and poor people as compare to providing only 
microfinance service. Minimalist programs attain large number of clients at nominal cost 
and these programs greater self-sustaining potential. Facilitating with proper approach 
may only be made in context. While additional services should be; a) Optional because 
acquiring mandatory services will be pressure on client b) should be offered to entire 
community because through this way poorest people can be facilitated also. c) Should be 
financed separately from MF program.  
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Table 1.1: Panel Sample distribution- (Base line Regression) – Number of Observation 
 
 SA LAC EECA EAP MENA AFRICA TOTAL 
Bank 15 41 142 14 5 97 314 
Credit Union / Cooperative 37 90 50 34 0 247 458 
NBFI 104 175 229 47 11 70 636 
NGO’s 228 222 34 16 60 47 607 
Rural 11 0 0 103 0 40 154 
Other 8 3 8 18 4 8 49 
Total 403 531 463 232 80 509 2218 
Source: Author’s Compilation   
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Figure 1.1: Trend and Patterns of MFI by Region 
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Table 1.2 : Descriptive Statistics  
 
 N Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 St. dev. Min. Max. 
Assets 1421 
 
177833.3 
 
1431.849          8978.679                       39151.78         4013185 
 
.0058    1.40e+08 
Borrower retention rate 1279 
 
1.4449 0 0 .6583 4.442278 0 60.4156 
Borrowings 1234 75044.32 49.2869 1720.11 10555.73 2027002 0 6.83e+07 
Gross Loan Portfolio 1226 
 
145350.4 936.072           6407.204 29446.19 3298631 0 1.15e+07 
No. of Active Borrowers 1188 2.5824 0.01289 0.0875 0.5553 13.5194 0 301.2202 
No. of Job Created 1265 
 
15631.03 0 0 0 134447.2 
 
0 2934112 
No. of Microenterprises Financed 1171 
 
24559.24 
 
0 0 0 141476.1 
 
0 2367202 
Percent of Female Borrowers 1187 
 
6.3649 1.0227               3.1487                       6.9266         12.38981 0    244.6742 
Percent of Financed Microenterprises 
that are Start-Ups 
1170 
 
.2811847 0 0 0 2.227193 0     58.5126 
Log of Average deposit balance per 
depositor / GNI per capita 
1227 172.6008 0 0.41 3.24 814.53 0    9351.056 
 Loan loss rate  1163 .8668958 .0059   .0464   .1787   13.51049 -1.5881 445.2613 
Living Standard 1109 
 
-.4842537                       -2.113351       -.4842537                       1.972865        2.243486 -2.732122    4.397959 
Education 1191 8.19e-10 -1.046961       -.4824323                       .5271533        1.3517 -1.4050 3.608253 
Health Status 1192 
 
-1.42e-09 -1.146386       -.2963885                       .9707918         1.3096 -1.6247 3.945128 
 
Multidimensional Poverty Index 1195 16.48085 
 
1.39 22.585 20.29271        .1722758 0    52.76 
Health Expenditure  1226 
 
6.138426 4.765522         5.818756                       7.132639        2.089407 
 
1.956876    18.41088 
Source: Authors’ compilation from MIX, Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2014), Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Databank. OPHI, University of Oxford and WDI datasets. 
  
48 
 
Table 1.3:  Correlations between Poverty Head Count Ratio and Microfinance Activities 
 
Variables Poverty 
Head 
Count 
Ratio 
Assets Borrower 
Retention 
Rate 
Borrowing Number of 
Jobs 
created 
No. of 
Microenterpris
es Financed 
Number of 
Active 
Borrowers 
Percent 
of 
Female 
Borrowe
rs 
Percent of 
Financed 
Microenterp
rises that are 
start-ups 
Cost of 
contract 
Enforcem
ent  
 
Weighted 
5-year lag 
of 
average 
NAB 
Poverty Head 
Count Ratio 
1           
Assets -0.0345    1          
Borrower 
Retention Rate 
-0.888    0.0363 1         
Borrowing -0.0807       0.9984 0.0308    1        
Number of Jobs 
created 
-0.0912    0.0713    0.3237    0.0433    1       
Number of 
Microenterprises 
Financed 
-0.0454    0.3596 0.5998 0.3520 0.4137 1      
Number of Active 
Borrowers 
-0.1602 0.2623 0.3208 0.2584 0.1844 0.3829 1     
Percent of Female 
Borrowers 
-0.7065 0.6420 0.3122 0.0082 0.1766 0.2318 0.6893 1    
Percent of 
Financed 
Microenterprises 
that are start-ups 
-0.4026  0.0210 0.5422    0.0600 0.1862 0.5469 0.3025 0.2513 1   
Cost of contract 
Enforcement  
-0.3961 0.2153 0.2751 0.2274 0.1733 0.2861 0.5936 0.2814 0.3354 1  
Weighted 5-year 
lag of average 
NAB 
-0.1423 0.1554 0.1145 0.1285 0.0952 0.1631 0.1738 0.1839 0.1601 0.1241 1 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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Table 1.4: Panel Analysis by Income Level: Number of Microenterprises Financed and Female Borrowers Impact on 
Multidimensional Poverty 
 
 Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Poverty 
 Low Income 
(1) 
Lower middle income 
(2) 
Upper middle income   
(3) 
Log of NMF -13.15*** 
(0.001) 
-3.23*** 
(0.000)  
-0.02** 
(0.016) 
Log of PFB -12.33*** 
(0.002) 
-14.85*** 
(0.021) 
-1.79 
(1.630) 
Constant 22.19*** 
(0.002) 
97.15*** 
(0.148) 
14.35*** 
(0.047) 
N 27 32 28 
Adj. R2 0.617 0.684 0.621 
Robust Cluster Standard Errors at country level are in Parenthesis. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10  
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Table 1.5: Panel Analysis by Institution: Number of Microenterprises Financed and Female Borrowers Impact on 
Multidimensional Poverty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust Cluster Standard Errors at country level are in Parenthesis. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10  
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Poverty 
 Bank 
(1) 
Credit Union / 
Cooperative 
(2) 
NBFI 
(3) 
NGO’s 
(4) 
Rural 
(5) 
Log of NMF -1.33** 
(0.202) 
-5.73* 
(2.614) 
-2.14*** 
(0.0016) 
-3.01*** 
(0.915) 
-9.21*** 
(0.001) 
Log of PFB -4.28** 
(1.865) 
-9.44** 
(4.001) 
-5.12* 
(2.96) 
-7.214*** 
(0.001) 
-11.34 
(6.001) 
Constant 7.96*** 
(0.000) 
3.47*** 
(0.000) 
4.25*** 
(0.000) 
5.36*** 
(0.000) 
3.87*** 
(0.001) 
N 301 442 631 600 148 
Adj. R2 0.284 0.290 0.313 0.301 0.162 
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Table 1.6: Panel Analysis by Region: Number of Microenterprises Financed and Female Borrowers Impact on 
Multidimensional Poverty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust Cluster Standard Errors at country level are in Parenthesis. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10  
 
  
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Multidimensional Poverty 
 LAC 
(2) 
EECA 
(3) 
EAP 
(4) 
MENA 
(5) 
AFRICA 
(6) 
Log of NMF -1.32* 
(0.732) 
-1.98*** 
(0.000) 
-1.22** 
(0.413) 
-0.34* 
(0.190) 
-0.09 
(0.0000) 
Log of PFB -4.28** 
(1.865) 
-3.00*** 
(0.000) 
-2.78** 
(1.549) 
-1.34* 
(0.702) 
-1.02* 
(0.0001) 
Constant 1.98*** 
(0.000) 
0.14*** 
(0.000) 
0.51*** 
(0.000) 
0.32*** 
(0.000) 
0.32* 
(0.177) 
N 512 454 221 76 482 
Adj. R2 0.1964 0.2547 0.2178 0.1168 0.2145 
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Table 1.7: Panel Regression 
 
Dependent Variable Poverty Head Count Ratio Poverty Gap 
 Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Random Effect 
(2) 
Fixed Effect 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Random Effect 
(5) 
Fixed Effect 
(6) 
Log of Number of Active 
Borrowers/Total Population 
in Million(15-64) 
-3.21** 
(1.2415) 
-3.44** 
(1.571) 
-4.00** 
(1.915) 
-2.21** 
(1.075) 
-2.12** 
(1.137) 
-1.13** 
(0.598) 
Log of  Percent of Female 
Borrowers 
-6.01*** 
(0.001) 
-6.12*** 
(0.001) 
-5.08*** 
(0.000) 
-5.01** 
(2.400) 
-4.11** 
(2.081) 
-4.02*** 
(0.000) 
Log of Borrower Retention 
Rate 
-4.13*** 
(0.001) 
-3.33** 
(1.612) 
-3.52** 
(1.401) 
-3.32** 
(1.501) 
-2.21** 
(1.011) 
-2.34** 
(1.002) 
Log of  Number of 
Microenterprises Financed 
-4.84** 
(2.011) 
-4.33** 
(1.958) 
-3.89** 
(1.988) 
-2.22** 
(1.052) 
-2.12** 
(1.002) 
-1.45* 
(0.792) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio 
Per capita 
-2.11*** 
(0.002) 
-2.64** 
(1.212) 
-1.21 
(1.260) 
-2.00** 
(1.001) 
-1.88** 
(0.864) 
-0.81** 
(0.302) 
Log of GDP Per capita -11.01*** 
(0.003) 
-13.44** 
(6.512) 
-11.92** 
(6.000) 
-7.00*** 
(0.000) 
-9.14* 
(4.42) 
-9.12** 
(4.012) 
Log of Assets -3.25* 
(1.685) 
-2.35** 
(1.001) 
-3.48** 
(1.631) 
-2.41** 
(1.113) 
-1.85** 
(0.509) 
-1.08** 
(0.330) 
Log of Average deposit 
balance per depositor / GNI 
per capita 
-4.04*** 
(0.005) 
-4.26*** 
(0.001) 
-4.33** 
(1.991) 
-3.01* 
(1.611) 
-2.34** 
(1.001) 
-3.61** 
(1.621) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 4.12*** 
(0.001) 
3.84** 
(1.632) 
3.93** 
(1.411) 
3.66** 
(1.512) 
2.33** 
(1.010) 
2.32** 
(1.003) 
Log of  Number of Job 
Created 
-0.13 
(0.141) 
-0.01 
(0.034) 
-0.00 
(0.008) 
-0.00 
(0.003) 
-0.00 
(0.004) 
-0.00 
(0.003) 
Log of  Percent of Financed 
Microenterprises at Start-up  
-1.69** 
(0.704) 
-1.59** 
(0.651) 
-1.00** 
(0.302) 
-0.86** 
(0.200) 
-0.66** 
(0.203) 
-0.13* 
(0.070) 
Log of Living Standard -3.11** 
(1.450) 
-2.59** 
(1.200) 
-2.00** 
(1.001) 
-1.93** 
(0.630) 
-1.41** 
(0.630) 
-1.16* 
(0.630) 
Log of Health Status -2.00** 
(1.000) 
-1.94** 
(0.839) 
-1.44** 
(0.531) 
-1.22** 
(0.600) 
-1.00** 
(0.403) 
-0.80** 
(0.311) 
Log of Education -5.11*** 
(0.000) 
-4.70*** 
(0.000) 
-4.30*** 
(0.000) 
-3.00*** 
(0.000) 
-2.131** 
(1.031) 
-1.337** 
(0.691) 
53 
 
Africa -0.00 
(0.008) 
- - -0.00* 
(0.001) 
- - 
EAP -0.02* 
(0.018) 
- - -0.01* 
(0.009) 
- - 
EECA -13.11*** 
(0.000) 
- - -7.31*** 
(0.001) 
- - 
LATC -4.41** 
(2.001) 
- - -2.54** 
(1.401) 
- - 
MENA -13.44*** 
(0.012) 
- - -8.11*** 
(0.000) 
- - 
Constant 84.36*** 
(0.001) 
101.25*** 
(0.001) 
149.15*** 
(0.001) 
42.35*** 
(0.000) 
39.21*** 
(0.002) 
51.29*** 
(0.000) 
No. of Observation 905 905 905 905 905 905 
Adj. R2 0.791 0.713 0.693 0.725 0.695 0.603 
 Notes: This table analyzes the impact of Number of Active Borrowers, Gross loan portfolio, GDP Per Capita, Percentage of Female Borrowers, 
Number of Microenterprises financed, Number of Job created, Average deposit balance per depositor / GNI per capita, Loan Loss rate, Total assets, 
Borrower retention rate and percent of Microenterprises financed that are start-ups on poverty head count ratio and poverty Gap in terms of 
national level. All other variables are deﬁned as in Table 1. Coefficients are obtained from Polled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect. Figures 
in parenthesis shows robust standard error clustered at country level. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved 
Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control 
variable. Regional dummies are included in all regressions.  All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six 
regions for the time period of 1998-2013. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 factor to make 
easy to read the coefficients.  ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 1.8: Panel Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Poverty 
 Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Random Effect 
(2) 
Fixed Effect 
(3) 
Log of Number of Active Borrowers/Total 
Population in Million(15-64) 
-4.07** 
(1.890) 
-4.12** 
(2.000) 
-5.94** 
(2.312) 
Log of  Percent of Female Borrowers -7.01*** 
(0.000) 
-7.15*** 
(0.000) 
-7.45*** 
(0.000) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate -5.07** 
(2.013) 
-5.02** 
(2.321) 
-5.51** 
(2.250) 
Log of  Number of Microenterprises Financed -4.39** 
(2.121) 
-4.06** 
(1.812) 
-4.12** 
(2.030) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per capita -2.11** 
(1.132) 
-2.41** 
(1.321) 
-1.76** 
(0.706) 
Log of GDP Per capita -10.02** 
(5.550) 
-11.13** 
(5.055) 
-14.00** 
(7.089) 
Log of Assets -3.31** 
(1.311) 
-3.41** 
(1.397) 
-3.44** 
(1.601) 
Log of Average deposit balance per depositor / 
GNI per capita 
-4.54*** 
(0.001) 
-4.13*** 
(0.002) 
-4.44** 
(1.981) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 4.07*** 
(0.002) 
3.61** 
(1.591) 
3.82** 
(1.399) 
Log of  Number of Job Created -0.00 
(0.008) 
-0.00 
(0.009) 
-0.00 
(0.009) 
Log of  Percent of Financed Microenterprises at 
Start-up  
-1.11** 
(0.351) 
-1.84** 
(0.069) 
-1.07 
(1.098) 
Log of Living Standard -4.12** 
(2.001) 
-3.70** 
(1.214) 
-3.00** 
(1.241) 
Log of Health Status -2.00** 
(1.045) 
-2.00** 
(1.012) 
-1.73** 
(0.690) 
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Log of Education -6.77*** 
(0.000) 
-5.40*** 
(0.000) 
-4.05*** 
(0.000) 
Africa -0.00 
(0.094) 
- - 
EAP -0.04** 
(0.020) 
- - 
EECA -14.04*** 
(0.000) 
- - 
LATC -4.22** 
(2.014) 
- - 
MENA -15.00*** 
(0.000) 
- - 
Constant 103.69*** 
(0.0012) 
121.33*** 
(0.0041) 
101.49*** 
(0.0079) 
No. of Observation 1011 1011 1011 
Adj. R2 0.691 0.647 0.612 
Notes : This table analyzes the impact of Number of Active Borrowers, Gross loan portfolio, GDP Per Capita, Percentage of Female Borrowers, 
Number of Microenterprises financed, Number of Job created , Average deposit balance per depositor / GNI per capita, Loan Loss rate,  Total 
assets, Borrower retention rate and percent of Microenterprises financed that are start-ups on Multidimensional Poverty. All other variables are 
deﬁned as in Table 1. Coefficients are obtained from Polled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect Figures in parenthesis shows robust standard 
error clustered at country level.. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, 
Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control variable. Regional dummies are included 
in all regressions.  All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six regions for the time period of 1998-2013. 
Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 factor to make easy to read the coefficients.  We include 
Regional dummies in our estimation. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 1.9: Panel Regression Country and Five-Year Average Effect 
 
Dependent Variable:  Poverty Head Count Ratio Poverty Gap 
 Random Effect 
(Country Effect) 
Random Effect 
(5-Year Average Effect) 
Random Effect 
(Country Effect) 
Random Effect 
(5-Year Average Effect) 
Log of Number of Active 
Borrowers/Total Population in 
Million(15-64) 
-1.13** 
(0.000) 
-2.14** 
(1.003) 
-0.11** 
(0.031) 
-1.17** 
(0.390) 
Log of  Percent of Female 
Borrowers 
-2.00** 
(1.051) 
-2.21*** 
(0.000) 
-1.74** 
(0.732) 
-1.01*** 
(0.000) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate -1.49** 
(0.621) 
-1.36** 
(0.495) 
-1.21** 
(0.040) 
-0.76** 
(0.041) 
Log of  Number of 
Microenterprises Financed 
-2.00* 
(1.011) 
-2.44** 
(1.541) 
-1.00** 
(0.308) 
-1.11** 
(0.326) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per 
capita 
-1.08** 
(0.244) 
-1.16** 
(0.321) 
-0.55*** 
(0.000) 
-0.75*** 
(0.000) 
Log of GDP Per capita -17.11** 
(8.004) 
-18.91** 
(9.577) 
-13.00** 
(6.004) 
-15.04** 
(7.003) 
Log of Assets -1.42** 
(0.541) 
-1.36* 
(0.780) 
-0.10** 
(0.000) 
-0.12** 
(0.440) 
Log of Average deposit balance 
per depositor / GNI per capita 
-3.31*** 
(0.001) 
-3.22*** 
(0.002) 
-3.12** 
(1.089) 
-3.02*** 
(0.003) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 3.18*** 
(0.003) 
3.42** 
(1.487) 
3.36** 
(1.214) 
3.22** 
(1.412) 
Log of  Number of Job Created -0.00 
(0.011) 
-0.00 
(0.018) 
-0.00 
(0.035) 
-0.00 
(0.028) 
Log of  Percent of Financed 
Microenterprises at Start-up  
-1.16** 
(0.301) 
-1.45** 
(0.064) 
-0.121** 
(0.063) 
-0.74** 
(0.357) 
Log of Living Standard -1.00** 
(0.410) 
-0.99** 
(0.401) 
-0.82** 
(0.310) 
-0.69** 
(0.269) 
Log of Health Status -0.90** 
(0.000) 
-0.80** 
(0.405) 
-0.60** 
(0.270) 
-0.45** 
(0.206) 
Log of Education -1.65*** 
(0.000) 
-1.40*** 
(0.000) 
-1.11*** 
(0.000) 
-1.00*** 
(0.000) 
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Africa - - - - 
EAP - - - - 
EECA - - - - 
LATC - - - - 
MENA - - - - 
Constant 102.77*** 
(0.004) 
93.15*** 
(0.000) 
85.12*** 
(0.001) 
35.65*** 
(0.002) 
No. of Observation 1011 280 1011 280 
Adj. R2 0.691 0.642 0.653 0.611 
Notes: This table analyzes the country and Five-Years average effect of Number of Active Borrowers, Gross loan portfolio, GDP Per Capita, 
Percentage of Female Borrowers, Number of Microenterprises financed, Number of Job created , Average deposit balance per depositor / GNI per 
capita, Loan Loss rate, Total assets, Borrower retention rate and percent of Microenterprises financed that are start-ups on Poverty Head Count ratio 
and Poverty Gap. All other variables are deﬁned as in Table 1. Coefficients are obtained from Polled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect. 
Figures in parenthesis shows robust standard error clustered at country level. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by 
improved Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as 
Control variable. Regional dummies are included in all regressions.  All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight 
countries six regions for the time period of 1998-2013. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 
factor to make easy to read the coefficients.  We include Regional dummies in our estimation***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 1.10:  Panel Regression Country and Five-Year Average Effect 
 
Dependent Variable: Multidimensional Poverty 
 Random Effect 
(Country Effect) 
Random Effect 
(5-Year Average Effect) 
Log of Number of Active Borrowers/Total 
Population in Million(15-64) 
-1.43** 
(0.892) 
-2.43** 
(1.114) 
Log of  Percent of Female Borrowers -2.33*** 
(0.000) 
-2.72** 
(1.364) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate -1.68** 
(0.941) 
-1.71** 
(0.000) 
Log of  Number of Microenterprises 
Financed 
-2.31* 
(1.184) 
-3.01** 
(0.812) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per capita -1.49*** 
(0.000) 
-1.67*** 
(0.000) 
Log of GDP Per capita -18.07** 
(9.000) 
-21.11*** 
(0.000) 
Log of Assets -1.11** 
(0.600) 
-1.63* 
(0.931) 
Log of Average deposit balance per 
depositor / GNI per capita 
-3.00*** 
(0.003) 
-3.29*** 
(0.009) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 3.78*** 
(0.002) 
3.12** 
(1.433) 
Log of  Number of Job Created -0.00 
(0.009) 
-0.00 
(0.007) 
Log of  Percent of Financed 
Microenterprises at Start-up  
-0.95** 
(0.413) 
-2.11** 
(1.005) 
Log of Living Standard -1.61** 
(0.810) 
-1.40** 
(0.501) 
Log of Health Status -1.15** 
(0.561) 
-1.00** 
(0.425) 
Log of Education -1.81*** 
(0.000) 
-1.59*** 
(0.0000) 
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Africa - - 
EAP - - 
EECA - - 
LATC - - 
MENA - - 
Constant 99.34*** 
(0.0021) 
73.256*** 
(0.0034) 
No. of Observation 1011 390 
Adj.R2 0.613 0.691 
Notes: This table analyzes the country and Five-Years average effect  of Number of Active Borrowers, Gross loan portfolio, GDP Per Capita, 
Percentage of Female Borrowers, Number of Microenterprises financed, Number of Job created , Average deposit balance per depositor / GNI per 
capita, Loan Loss rate, Total assets, Borrower retention rate and percent of Microenterprises financed that are start-ups on Multidimensional 
Poverty. All other variables are deﬁned as in Table 1. Coefficients are obtained from Polled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect. Figures in 
parenthesis shows robust standard error clustered at country level..  Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved 
Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control 
variable. Regional dummies are included in all regressions.  All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six 
regions for the time period of 1998-2013. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 factor to make 
easy to read the coefficients.  We include Regional dummies in our estimation***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 1.11: Cross Sectional Regression  
 
Dependent Variable:  Poverty head count-ratio Poverty Gap 
 Without Regions With Regions Without Regions With Regions 
Log of Number of Active 
Borrowers/Total Population in 
Million(15-64) 
-4.13** 
(2.057) 
-2.02** 
(1.030) 
-2.01** 
(1.013) 
-1.15** 
(0.441) 
Log of  Percent of Female Borrowers -14.15*** 
(0.000) 
-12.59*** 
(0.000) 
-10.17*** 
(0.000) 
-7.20*** 
(0.000) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate -9.01*** 
(0.000) 
-5.74*** 
(0.000) 
-7.41*** 
(0.000) 
-4.37** 
(2.000) 
Log of  Number of Microenterprises 
Financed 
-2.49** 
(1.001) 
-1.44** 
(0.000) 
-1.03** 
(0.442) 
-0.17** 
(0.021) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per capita -3.01*** 
(0.000) 
-2.00*** 
(0.000) 
-1.45*** 
(0.000) 
-0.58*** 
(0.000) 
Log of GDP Per capita -13.71** 
(6.321) 
-10.77** 
(5.310) 
-10.22** 
(5.100) 
-7.37* 
(3.873) 
Log of Assets -3.43** 
(1.650) 
-2.00** 
(1.039) 
-1.17** 
(0.521) 
-0.114* 
(0.050) 
Log of Average deposit balance per 
depositor / GNI per capita 
-4.22*** 
(0.000) 
-3.27*** 
(0.008) 
-3.21*** 
(0.000) 
-3.01*** 
(0.009) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 5.12*** 
(0.000) 
3.19** 
(1.489) 
3.99*** 
(0.000) 
3.14** 
(1.489) 
Log of  Number of Job Created -1.04 
(1.055) 
-0.00 
(0.663) 
-0.00 
 (0.002) 
-0.00 
(0.007) 
Log of  Percent of Financed 
Microenterprises at Start-up  
-1.33** 
(0.492) 
-0.17** 
(0.062) 
-0.11** 
(0.049) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
Log of Living Standard -1.03** 
(0.471) 
-1.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.79** 
(0.371) 
-0.63** 
(0.299) 
Log of Health Status -0.91** 
(0.421) 
-0.69** 
(0.342) 
-0.56** 
(0.251) 
-0.40** 
(0.199) 
Log of Education -1.97*** 
(0.000) 
-1.30*** 
(0.000) 
-1.46** 
(0.681) 
-1.06** 
(0.504) 
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Africa - 14.22 
(15.336) 
- 10.66 
(10.391) 
EAP - -1.11** 
(0.371) 
- -3.18** 
(1.491) 
EECA - -12.09** 
(5.812) 
- -6.03** 
(3.141) 
LATC - -16.99** 
(8.000) 
- -9.10* 
(4.530) 
MENA - -11.35*** 
(0.000) 
- -3.17*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 124.25*** 
(0.0041) 
90.87*** 
(0.0054) 
41.75*** 
(0.0025) 
29.22*** 
(0.0012) 
No. of Observation 384 384 384 384 
Adj. R2 0.641 0.693 0.542 0.587 
Note: Dependent variables are the poverty head count ratio and poverty gap. Figures in parenthesis shows robust standard error clustered at 
country level. All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six regions for the time period of 1998-2013. 
Coefficients are obtained from multiple linear regressions. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 
1/1000 factor to make easy to read the coefficients. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved Sanitation, 
Provision of Electricity, Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control variable.  We 
include Regional dummies in our estimation***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 1.12: Cross Sectional Regression  
 
Dependent Variable:  Multidimensional Poverty 
 Without Regions With Regions 
Log of Number of Active Borrowers/Total 
Population in Million(15-64) 
-3.77** 
(1.890) 
-2.01** 
(0.994) 
Log of  Percent of Female Borrowers -18.00*** 
(0.001) 
-13.95*** 
(0.000) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate -11.54*** 
(0.000) 
-3.23*** 
(0.000) 
Log of  Number of Microenterprises 
Financed 
-3.14** 
(1.579) 
-1.60** 
(0.805) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per capita -4.64*** 
(0.000) 
-1.84*** 
(0.000) 
Log of GDP Per capita -12.63** 
(6.021) 
-7.20** 
(3.361) 
Log of Assets -2.07** 
(1.041) 
-1.00** 
(0.402) 
Log of Average deposit balance per 
depositor / GNI per capita 
-4.12*** 
(0.000) 
-3.16*** 
(0.008) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 4.77*** 
(0.000) 
3.69** 
(1.342) 
Log of  Number of Job Created -0.00 
(0.004) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
Log of  Percent of Financed 
Microenterprises at Start-up  
-2.62** 
(1.301) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
Log of Living Standard -1.89** 
(0.871) 
-1.00** 
(0.451) 
Log of Health Status -1.10** 
(0.501) 
-0.93** 
(0.411) 
Log of Education -2.31*** 
(0.000) 
-2.01*** 
(0.000) 
Africa - 15.10** 
(7.0120) 
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EAP - -1.36** 
(0.521) 
EECA - -13.01** 
(6.431) 
LATC - -19.04** 
(9.331) 
MENA - -9.77*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 84.14*** 
(0.0025) 
61.21*** 
(0.0016) 
No. of Observation 390 390 
Adj. R2 0.614 0.673 
 Note: Dependent variable is the Multidimensional Poverty. Figures in parenthesis shows robust standard error clustered at country level.  Few 
variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six regions for the time period of 1998-2013. Coefficients are 
obtained from multiple linear regression. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 factor to make 
easy to read the coefficients. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, Drinking 
Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control variable. We include Regional dummies in our 
estimation***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 1.13: Cross Sectional Regression 
 
Dependent Variable:  Poverty head count-ratio Poverty Gap 
 Without Regions With Regions Without Regions With Regions 
Number of Active Borrowers/Total 
Population in Million(15-64) 
-0.08** 
(0.0371) 
-0.01** 
(0.003) 
-0.02** 
(0.010) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
Percent of Female Borrowers -2.01*** 
(0.000) 
-2.03*** 
(0.000) 
-1.01*** 
(0.000) 
-0.05*** 
(0.000) 
Borrower Retention Rate -1.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.13*** 
(0.000) 
-1.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013** 
(0.000) 
Number of Microenterprises Financed -0.34** 
(0.171) 
-0.01** 
(0.005) 
-0.00** 
(0.004) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
Gross Loan Portfolio Per capita -0.02*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
GDP Per capita -2.00** 
(1.0001) 
-1.07** 
(0.491) 
-1.04*** 
(0.000) 
-0.16** 
(0.066) 
Assets -0.07** 
(0.0310) 
-0.01** 
(0.004) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
-0.00* 
(0.000) 
Average deposit balance per depositor / 
GNI per capita 
-0.04*** 
(0.000) 
-0.03*** 
(0.000) 
-0.03*** 
(0.000) 
-0.03*** 
(0.000) 
Loan Loss Rate 0.05*** 
(0.000) 
0.03** 
(0.010) 
0.03*** 
(0.000) 
0.03** 
(0.011) 
Number of Job Created -0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
Percent of Financed Microenterprises at 
Start-up  
-0.13** 
(0.049) 
-0.00** 
(0.001) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
Living Standard -0.00** 
(0.003) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
Health Status -0.00** 
(0.001) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
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Education -0.19*** 
(0.000) 
-0.01*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
Africa - 1.91 
(1.901) 
- 1.555 
(1.389) 
EAP - -0.01** 
(0.007) 
- -0.01** 
(0.003) 
EECA - -0.10** 
(0.049) 
- -0.02** 
(0.011) 
LATC - -1.06** 
(0.500) 
- -1.00* 
(0.500) 
MENA - -1.94*** 
(0.000) 
- -1.00*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 163.36*** 
(0.0021) 
73.87** 
(0.0013) 
39.42* 
(0.0011) 
21.19* 
(0.0010) 
No. of Observation 384 384 384 384 
Adj. R2 0.641 0.687 0.541 0.587 
Note: Dependent variables are the poverty head count ratio and poverty gap. Figures in parenthesis shows robust standard error clustered at 
country level. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six regions for the time period of 1998-2013. Coefficients are obtained from multiple 
linear regressions. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 factor to make easy to read the 
coefficients. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, Drinking Water, Asset 
Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control variable.  We include Regional dummies in our 
estimation***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 1.14: Cross Sectional Regression for three dimensions of Poverty  
 
Dependent Variable: Living Standard Education Health status  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Log of Number of Active Borrowers/Total 
Population in Million(15-64) 
2.65*** 
(0.000) 
2.09** 
(1.011) 
1.91** 
(0.833) 
Log of  Percent of Female Borrowers 4.05* 
(2.136) 
3.71** 
(1.832) 
2.00** 
(0.845) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate 1.11** 
(0.445) 
2.31** 
(1.102) 
1.03** 
(0.356) 
Log of  Number of Microenterprises Financed 0.98* 
(0.523) 
1.91** 
(0.943) 
1.11** 
(0.439) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per capita 1.03** 
(0.397) 
0.94** 
(0.341) 
0.63** 
(0.285) 
Log of GDP Per capita 9.07* 
(4.483) 
6.42** 
(3.112) 
5.36** 
(2.471) 
Log of Assets 1.45*** 
(0.005) 
2.12** 
(1.018) 
1.86** 
(0.671) 
Log of Average deposit balance per depositor / 
GNI per capita 
1.72* 
(0.912) 
1.00* 
(0.571) 
0.72 
(0.822) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate -3.02** 
(1.326) 
-4.13** 
(1.989) 
-3.70** 
(1.652) 
Log of  Number of Job Created 0.17 
(0.199) 
0.14 
(0.163) 
0.00 
(0.011) 
Log of  Percent of Financed Microenterprises at 
Start-up  
1.03** 
(0.312) 
0.51** 
(0.231) 
0.76** 
(0.251) 
Africa - - - 
EAP - - - 
EECA - - - 
LATC - - - 
MENA - - - 
Constant 79.99*** 
(0.0102) 
41.01*** 
(0.0125) 
101.32*** 
(0.0032) 
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No. of Observation 954 954 954 
Adj. R2 0.502 0.536 0.597 
Notes : This table analyzes the impact of Number of Active Borrowers, Gross loan portfolio, GDP Per Capita, Percentage of Female Borrowers, 
Number of Microenterprises financed, Number of Job created , Average deposit balance per depositor / GNI per capita, Loan Loss rate,  Total 
assets, Borrower retention rate and percent of Microenterprises financed that are start-ups on Multidimensional Poverty. All other variables are 
deﬁned as in Table 1. Coefficients are obtained from Polled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are provided in parentheses. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, 
Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control variable. Regional dummies are included 
in all regressions.  Few variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six regions for the time period of 1998-
2013. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 factor to make easy to read the coefficients.  
Regional dummies are included in the estimation.*p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0.10  
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Table 1.15: Cross Sectional Regression Interaction between poverty and legal status/region 
Dependent Variable:  Poverty head count-ratio 
 (1) (2) 
Log of Number of Active Borrowers/Total Population 
in Million(15-64) 
-1.61** 
(0.782) 
-2.02** 
(1.000) 
Log of  Percent of Female Borrowers -11.14*** 
(0.001) 
-12.38*** 
(0.001) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate -4.13*** 
(0.001) 
-5.81*** 
(0.000) 
Log of  Number of Microenterprises Financed -0.84** 
(0.301) 
-1.86** 
(0.811) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per capita -1.71** 
(0.821) 
-1.91** 
(0.921) 
Log of GDP Per capita -10.01** 
(4.991) 
-11.51** 
(5.651) 
Log of Assets -1.73** 
(0.841) 
-2.19** 
(1.085) 
Log of Average deposit balance per depositor / GNI 
per capita 
-2.11*** 
(0.001) 
-2.33*** 
(0.003) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 2.14** 
(0.901) 
2.64** 
(1.021) 
Log of  Number of Job Created -0.00 
(0.322) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
Log of  Percent of Financed Microenterprises at Start-
up  
-0.09** 
(0.031) 
-0.27** 
(0.121) 
Log of Living Standard -0.87** 
(0.411) 
-1.03** 
(0.499) 
Log of Health Status -0.41** 
(0.199) 
-0.92** 
(0.381) 
Log of Education -1.01*** 
(0.000) 
-1.41*** 
(0.000) 
Africa 11.02* 
(5.599) 
12.39** 
(5.992) 
EAP -1.01** 
(0.492) 
-1.38** 
(0.572) 
EECA -10.01*** 
(0.000) 
-10.31*** 
(0.001) 
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LATC -15.33*** 
(0.001) 
-15.79*** 
(0.001) 
MENA -9.51** 
(4.641) 
-9.98** 
(4.793) 
Bank -0.15*** 
(0.000) 
-0.12*** 
(0.000) 
Credit Union -0.66*** 
(0.001) 
-0.45*** 
(0.000) 
NBFI -0.09* 
(0.049) 
0.05* 
(0.0006) 
NGO’s 0.06* 
(0.0001) 
0.04* 
(0.028) 
PFB*Bank -0.17** 
(0.006) 
 
PFB*Credit Union -0.50** 
(0.019) 
 
PFB*NBFI -0.09** 
(0..037) 
 
PFB*NGO’s 0.08* 
(0.041) 
 
PFB*Africa  -0.21** 
(0.099) 
PFB*EAP  -0.97** 
(0.462) 
PFB*EECA  -0.13** 
(0.052) 
PFB*LATC  -0.28*** 
(0.0002) 
PFB*MENA  -0.229** 
(0.113) 
Constant 45.25*** 
(0..0121) 
43.66*** 
(0..0453) 
No. of Observation 384 384 
Adj. R2 0.631 0.657 
 Note: Dependent variables are the poverty head count ratio and poverty gap. Robust Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Few variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight 
countries six regions for the time period of 1998-2013. Coefficients are obtained from multiple linear regression. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 
1/1000 factor to make easy to read the coefficients. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child 
Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control variable.  Regional dummies are included in the estimation***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Table 1.16: Cross Sectional Regression for IV 
Dependent Variable:  Poverty head count-ratio Poverty Gap 
 IV IV 
 Without Regions With Regions Without Regions With Regions 
Log of Number of Active 
Borrowers/Total Population in 
Million(15-64) 
-5.91** 
(2.4324) 
-5.22** 
(2.3302) 
-5.22** 
(2.3302) 
-2.73** 
(1.0205) 
Log of  Percent of Female 
Borrowers 
-16.01*** 
(0.0012) 
-15.31*** 
(0.0058) 
-15.31*** 
(0.0058) 
-13.51** 
(6.211) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate -10.15*** 
(0.0075) 
-10.02*** 
(0.0073) 
-10.02*** 
(0.0073) 
-6.72** 
(2.9133) 
Log of  Number of 
Microenterprises Financed 
-4.19** 
(1.6324) 
-3.39** 
(1.2075) 
-3.39** 
(1.2075) 
-1.786** 
(0.5229) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per 
capita 
-3.91** 
(1.6042) 
-3.92** 
(1.6648) 
-3.92** 
(1.6648) 
-1.21** 
(0.3036) 
Log of GDP Per capita -14.26** 
(6.2221) 
-14.35** 
(6.7731) 
-14.35** 
(6.7731) 
-11.98* 
(6.0622) 
Log of Assets -4.81** 
(1.9663) 
-4.01** 
(1.7331) 
-4.01** 
(1.7331) 
-2.96* 
(1.5569) 
Log of Average deposit balance 
per depositor / GNI per capita 
-4.79*** 
(0.000) 
-3.84*** 
(0.008) 
-3.42*** 
(0.000) 
-3.39*** 
(0.009) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 5.09*** 
(0.000) 
3.73** 
(1.689) 
4.01*** 
(0.000) 
3.92** 
(1.812) 
Log of  Number of Job Created -2.39 
(2.5904) 
-1.99* 
(0.6221) 
-1.99* 
(0.6221) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
Log of  Percent of Financed 
Microenterprises at Start-up  
-2.97** 
(1.1003) 
-2.01** 
(0.8226) 
-2.01** 
(0.8226) 
-1.24** 
(0.4452) 
Log of Living Standard -1.81** 
(0.7001) 
-1.512** 
(0.5112) 
-1.512** 
(0.5112) 
-1.99** 
(0.4508) 
Log of Health Status -1.716** 
(0.6333) 
-1.13** 
(0.3362) 
-1.13** 
(0.3362) 
-1.53** 
(0.3412) 
Log of Education -2.313** 
(1.0961) 
-2.712** 
(0.9925) 
-2.712** 
(0.9925) 
-1.911** 
(0.6771) 
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Note: Dependent variables are the poverty head count ratio and Gap. Figures in parenthesis shows robust standard error clustered at country level. 
All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six regions for the time period of 1998-2013. Coefficients are 
obtained from multiple linear regressions. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 factor to make 
easy to read the coefficients. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, 
Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control variable.  We include Regional dummies 
in our estimation***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 
Africa - - - 14.00 
(5.3312) 
EAP - - - -2.72** 
(2.0202) 
EECA - - - -13.18** 
(6.0445) 
LATC - - - -18.19* 
(9.9152) 
MENA - - - -13.36*** 
(0.425) 
Constant 117.33*** 
(9.8005) 
47.99*** 
(5.215) 
47.99*** 
(5.215) 
36.87*** 
(4.171) 
No. of Observation 418 418 418 418 
Adj. R2 0.517 0.586 0.586 0.614 
F-Statistic 8.13 16.85 16.85 25.22 
Under Identification Test 9.63(0.012) 6.60(0.01) 6.60(0.01) 5.36(0.00) 
Weak Identification Test 12.95(0.000) 11.96(0.00) 11.96(0.00) 13.52(0.00) 
Over Identification Test 0.04(0.99) 0.17(0.91) 0.17(0.91) 0.44(0.89) 
Hausman Test 7.63(0.24) 4.11(0.46) 4.11(0.46) 5.79(0.96) 
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Table 1.17: FIRST STAGE REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NAB) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Number of Active Borrowers 
Legal British -0.08* 
(0.050) 
Legal French -0.02*** 
(0.000) 
Legal Socialist -0.01** 
(0.003) 
Legal German -0.06** 
(0.011) 
Legal Scandinavian -0.05** 
(0.010) 
Cost of Contract Enforcement -0.94** 
(0.221) 
Lag of weighted 1-year lag of average NAB 1.63** 
(0.512) 
Log of  Percent of Female Borrowers -4.31** 
(1.891) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate -3.69** 
(1.318) 
Log of  Number of Microenterprises Financed -0.091** 
(0.031) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per capita -0.31** 
(0.072) 
Log of GDP Per capita -5.01** 
(2.011) 
Log of Assets -0.912** 
(0.212) 
Log of Average deposit balance per depositor / GNI per capita -0.42*** 
(0.000) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 0.39*** 
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(0.001) 
Log of  Number of Job Created -0.000 
(0.021) 
Log of  Percent of Financed Microenterprises at Start-up  -0.009** 
(0.001) 
Log of Living Standard -0.712** 
(0.216) 
Log of Health Status -0.321** 
(0.099) 
Log of Education -0.114** 
(0.029) 
Africa 5.00 
(4.991) 
EAP -3.871** 
(1.445) 
EECA -7.229** 
(3.003) 
LATC -9.79* 
(4.908) 
MENA -4.925*** 
(0.025) 
Constant 0.085*** 
(0.006) 
No. of Observation 390 
Adj. R2 0.663 
 Note: Dependent variables are the poverty head count ratio and poverty gap. Robust clustered standard errors at country level are in parenthesis.  Few variables 
are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six regions for the time period of 1998-2013. Coefficients are obtained from multiple linear 
regression. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 factor to make easy to read the coefficients. Living standard, 
Health and Education which are measured by improved Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and 
Years of Schooling are used as Control variable.  Regional dummies are included in the estimation.*p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0.10  
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Table 1.18: Robustness Check for Outliers   
Dependent Variable: Poverty Head Count-ratio Poverty Gap Multidimensional poverty 
index 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Log of Number of Active Borrowers/Total 
Population in Million(15-64) 
-2.81** 
(1.351) 
-2.18** 
(1.010) 
-3.91** 
(1.894) 
Log of  Percent of Female Borrowers -6.05* 
(3.036) 
-4.71** 
(2.175) 
-7.002** 
(3.410) 
Log of Borrower Retention Rate -4.11** 
(1.992) 
-3.31** 
(1.451) 
-4.87** 
(2.412) 
Log of  Number of Microenterprises Financed -4.12* 
(2.170) 
-1.921** 
(0.951) 
-4.11** 
(2.025) 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio Per capita -2.01** 
(1.002) 
-1.85** 
(0.910) 
-1.94** 
(0.951) 
Log of GDP Per capita -11.01* 
(5.322) 
-6.91** 
(3.421) 
-10.38** 
(5.110) 
Log of Assets -2.65** 
(1.305) 
-2.24** 
(1.021) 
-3.01** 
(1.410) 
Log of Average deposit balance per depositor / 
GNI per capita 
-3.11*** 
(0.008) 
-3.39*** 
(0.009) 
-3.19*** 
(0.008) 
Log of Loan Loss Rate 3.73** 
(1.791) 
3.24** 
(1.49) 
3.19** 
(1.412) 
Log of  Number of Job Created -0.100 
(0.111) 
-0.001 
(0.1250) 
-0.0009 
(0.0115) 
Log of  Percent of Financed Microenterprises at 
Start-up  
-1.14** 
(0.302) 
-0.73** 
(0.345) 
-1.01** 
(0.489) 
Log of Living Standard -2.81** 
(1.390) 
-1.71** 
(0.832) 
-4.00** 
(1.982) 
Log of Health Status -1.83** 
(0.891) 
-1.00** 
(0.471) 
-1.97** 
(0.956) 
Log of Education -4.47* 
(2.240) 
-2.95* 
(1.480) 
-6.21* 
(3.115) 
Africa -0.00** 
(0.003) 
-0.00** 
(0.006) 
-0.00* 
(0.004) 
EAP -0.01** -0.00** -0.03** 
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(0.004) (0.007) (0.009) 
EECA -13.42* 
(6.791) 
-6.91* 
(3.502) 
-15.31* 
(7.670) 
LATC -3.83** 
(1.895) 
-2.17** 
(1.071) 
-4.11** 
(2.012) 
MENA -13.01* 
(6.512) 
-8.00* 
(4.101) 
-14.93** 
(7.421) 
Constant 79.99*** 
(0.0102) 
41.01*** 
(0.0125) 
101.32*** 
(0.0032) 
No. of Observation 875 875 876 
Adj. R2 0.615 0.681 0.697 
Notes : This table analyzes the impact of Number of Active Borrowers, Gross loan portfolio, GDP Per Capita, Percentage of Female Borrowers, 
Number of Microenterprises financed, Number of Job created , Average deposit balance per depositor / GNI per capita, Loan Loss rate, Total 
assets, Borrower retention rate and percent of Microenterprises financed that are start-ups on Multidimensional Poverty. All other variables are 
deﬁned as in Table 1. Coefficients are obtained from Polled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are provided in parentheses. Living standard, Health and Education which are measured by improved Sanitation, Provision of Electricity, 
Drinking Water, Asset Ownership, Child Mortality, Nutrition and Years of Schooling are used as Control variable. Regional dummies are included 
in all regressions.  Few variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on eighty eight countries six regions for the time period of 1998-
2013. Assets, Gross loan Portfolio and number of active borrowers has been scaled by 1/1000 factor to make easy to read the coefficients.  
Regional dummies are included in the estimation.*p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0.10  
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Appendix 1-A : Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition Rationale  Expected Sign Data Source 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio Per capita 
GLP Per 
capita 
All outstanding principals 
due for all outstanding 
client loans. This includes 
current, delinquent, and 
renegotiated loans, but not 
loans that have been 
written off. It does not 
include interest receivable. 
Independent 
Variable; captures 
the micro-credit 
outreach 
 
- 
 
Mix Market: 
(2014) 
 
 
GDP Per capita GDP Per 
capita 
A measure of the total 
output of a country that 
takes the gross domestic 
product (GDP) and divides 
it by the number of people 
in the country. The per 
capita GDP is especially 
useful when comparing one 
country to another because 
it shows the relative 
performance of the 
countries. 
measure the total 
output of the 
country 
 
 
- 
WDI (2014) 
NAB NAB The number of individuals 
or entities who currently 
have an outstanding loan 
balance with the MFI or 
are primarily responsible 
for repaying any portion of 
the Loan Portfolio, Gross 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach  
- Mix Market: 
(2014) 
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relative to million 
population (15-64) 
Individuals who have 
multiple loans with an MFI 
should be counted as a 
single borrower  
Assets Assets Total of all net asset 
accounts 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach 
- Mix Market: 
(2014) 
 
Borrower Retention 
rate 
BRR end-of-period active 
borrowers / (beginning-of-
period active 
borrowers / new borrowers 
during the period). 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach 
- Mix Market: 
(2014) 
 
Number of 
Microenterprises 
Financed 
Log of  
NMF 
Number of 
microenterprises financed 
by the institution. 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach 
- Mix Market: 
(2014) 
 
Number of start-up 
microenterprises 
financed 
Log of 
NMEF 
Number of 
microenterprises at an early 
stage in the life cycle of an 
enterprise. 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach 
- Mix Market: 
(2014) 
 
Number of Jobs 
Created  
Log of  
NJC 
Employment creation non-
enterprises 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach 
- Mix Market: 
(2014) 
 
Percent of female 
borrowers 
Log of  
PFB 
Number of Active 
Borrowers who are women 
/ Number of Active 
Borrowers 
 
 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach 
- Mix Market: 
(2014) 
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Average Deposit 
Balance per 
Depositor / GNI per 
Capita 
 
 
Log of 
ADBPDG
PC 
Average Deposit Balance 
per Depositor / GNI per 
capita 
 
 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach 
- Mix Market: 
(2014) 
 
Loan Loss Rate Log LLR (Write-offs - Value of 
Loans Recovered)/ Loan 
Portfolio, gross, average 
 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach 
- Mix Market: 
(2014) 
 
Living standard Log of LS It is measured by Improved 
Sanitation, Drinking 
Water, Flooring, Cooking 
Fuel and Asset Ownership. 
  OPHI (2014) 
Heath Status Log of HS It is measured by mortality 
and nutrition 
  OPHI (2014) 
Education Log of 
Education 
It is measured by years of 
schooling and School 
Attendance 
  
 
 
OPHI (2014) 
 
Legal origin  
 
 Identifies the legal origin 
of the company law or 
commercial code of each 
country(English, French, 
Socialist, German, 
Scandinavian). 
Dummy variable as 
instrument variable 
 Source: La Porta, 
et al. (1999). 
Cost of Contract 
Enforcement 
 It measures the efficiency 
of the judicial system in 
resolving a commercial 
dispute. Cost is recorded as 
a percentage of the claim, 
assumed to be equivalent 
Instrument Variable  World Bank 
Group 
(2014) 
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to 200% of income per 
capita. No bribes are 
recorded. Enforcement 
costs are all costs that 
Seller (plaintiff) must 
advance to enforce the 
judgment through a public 
sale of Buyer’s movable 
assets, regardless of the 
final cost to Seller.  
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Appendix 1-B: List of Countries and Region by Income Level. 
 
Low income Lower middle income Upper middle income 
Country  Region Country  Region Country  Region 
Afghanistan SAΩ Armenia EECAπ Albania EECA 
Benin Africa Cameroon Africa Azerbaijan EECA 
Burkina Faso Africa Congo, Rep. Africa Bosnia and Herzegovina EECA 
Burundi Africa Egypt, Arab Rep. MENAψ Brazil LAC 
Cambodia EAP∞ El Salvador LAC Bulgaria EECA 
Central African 
Republic 
 Africa Georgia EECA China EAP 
Chad Africa Ghana Africa Colombia LAC 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Africa Guatemala LAC Costa Rica LAC 
Gambia, The Africa Guyana LAC Dominican Republic LAC 
Guinea Africa Honduras LAC Ecuador LAC 
Haiti LAC India SA Jordan MENA 
Kenya Africa Indonesia EAP Kazakhstan EECA 
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Madagascar Africa Kosovo EECA Lebanon MENA 
Malawi Africa Kyrgyz Republic EECA Macedonia, FYR EECA 
Mali Africa Moldova EECA Mexico LAC 
Mozambique Africa Mongolia EAP Montenegro EECA 
Myanmar EAP Morocco MENA Namibia Africa 
Nepal SA Nicaragua LAC Panama LAC 
Niger Africa Nigeria Africa Peru LAC 
Rwanda Africa Pakistan SA Romania EECA 
Sierra Leone Africa Papua New Guinea EAP St. Lucia LAC 
Tajikistan EECA Paraguay LAC Serbia EECA 
Tanzania Africa Philippines EAP South Africa Africa 
Togo Africa Senegal Africa Thailand EAP 
Uganda Africa Sri Lanka SA Tunisia MENA 
Zimbabwe Africa Swaziland Africa Turkey EECA 
    Syrian Arab Republic MENA Venezuela, RB LAC 
    Ukraine EECA     
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    Uzbekistan EECA     
    Vietnam EAP     
    Yemen, Rep. MENA     
Source: Authors’ compilation from OPHI (2014) and WDI datasets. 
ΩSA:  South Asia. 
∞EAP:  East Asia and Paciﬁc. 
€LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean. 
πEECA: Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
ψMENA: Middle East and North Africa. 
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Appendix 1-C:  List of Countries for Panel Data 
 
No.  Countries No.  Countries 
1 Afghanistan 46 Macedonia, FYR 
2 Albania 47 Madagascar 
3 Argentina 48 Malawi 
4 Armenia 49 Mali 
5 Azerbaijan 50 Mexico 
6 Bangladesh 51 Moldova 
7 Benin 52 Mongolia 
8 Bolivia 53 Montenegro 
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina 54 Morocco 
10 Brazil 55 Mozambique 
11 Brunei Darussalam 56 Myanmar 
12 Bulgaria 57 Namibia 
13 Burkina Faso 58 Nepal 
14 Burundi 59 Nicaragua 
15 Cambodia 60 Niger 
16 Cameroon 61 Nigeria 
17 Central African Republic 62 Pakistan 
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18 Chad 63 Palestine 
19 China 64 Panama 
20 Colombia 65 Papua New Guinea 
21 Congo, Dem. Rep. 66 Paraguay 
22 Congo, Rep. 67 Peru 
23 Costa Rica 68 Philippines 
24 Dominican Republic 69 Rwanda 
25 East Timor 70 Saint Lucia 
26 Ecuador 71 Samoa 
27 Egypt, Arab Rep. 72 Senegal 
28 El Salvador 73 Serbia 
29 Ethiopia 74 Sierra Leone 
30 Gambia, The 75 South Africa 
31 Georgia 76 Sri Lanka 
32 Ghana 77 Swaziland 
33 Guatemala 78 Syrian Arab Republic 
34 Guinea 79 Tajikistan 
35 Guyana 80 Tanzania 
36 Haiti 81 Thailand 
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37 Honduras 82 Togo 
38 India 83 Tunisia 
39 Indonesia 84 Turkey 
40 Jordan 85 Uganda 
41 Kazakhstan 86 Ukraine 
42 Kenya 87 Uzbekistan 
43 Kosovo 88 Venezuela, RB 
44 Kyrgyz Republic 89 Vietnam 
45 Lebanon 90 Yemen, Rep. 
    91 Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 1-D: The dimension, indicators, deprivation thresholds and weights of MPI 
Dimension Indicators Deprived if Related to  Relative 
Weight 
Education Years of Schooling No household members has completed five 
years of schooling 
MDG2 1/6 
Child School Attendance Any school-aged child is not attending 
school up to class 8. 
MDG2 1/6 
Health Child Mortality Any child has died in the family MDG4 1/6 
Nutrition Any adult or child for whom there is 
nutritional information is malnourished.  
MDG1 1/6 
Living 
Standard 
Electricity The household has no electricity.  1/18 
Improved Sanitation The household’s sanitation facility is not 
improved (according to MDG guidelines), 
or it is improved but shared with other 
households.  
MDG7 1/18 
Safe drinking water  The household does not have access to safe 
drinking water (according to MDG 
guidelines) or safe drinking water is more 
than a 30-minute walk from home, sound 
trip.  
MDG7 1/18 
Flooring The household has a dirt, sand or dung 
floor.  
 1/18 
Cooking Fuel The household cooks with dung, wood or 
charcoal. 
MDG7 1/18 
Assets Ownership The household does not own more than 
one radio, TV, telephone, bike, motorbike 
or refrigerator and does not own a car or 
truck.  
MDG7 1/18 
Source: OPHI (2014) 
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Chapter 2 : Impact of Microfinance on Poverty Alleviation in 
Pakistan 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Poverty in Pakistan has been constantly increasing independence in 1947, except 
for the period 1980-1988, when poverty in Pakistan declined in both urban and rural 
areas. Multiple factors contributed to this reduction; two major factors helping to reduce 
extreme poverty were the Green Revolution in the agricultural sector, and an increase in 
employment from a boom in housing and construction sectors. Past experience shows 
that that the sector most able to stimulate growth while reducing poverty is that of 
housing and urban development. Microfinance is fundamentally a unique development 
tool helping to reduce poverty and helping self-sustainability (Soulama, 2005). 
Recent studies examined the impact of microfinance on poverty alleviation at the 
micro-level, using household survey data (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Imai, Arun and 
Annim, 2010a, 2010b; Khandker, 2005; Mosley, 2001). Jamal (2009) says that household 
assets and housing structures are an important aspect of poverty measurement: a 
household is classed as relatively poor if the housing structure is unsatisfactory or 
inadequate. Housing structure is viewed as unsatisfactory if unbaked bricks, earth 
materials, wood or bamboo are mostly used for walls and roof. A housing unit is 
considered inadequate if it is over-congested (number of persons per room) e.g. more 
than two persons per room (excluding minors, six years and under). Households that lack 
essential facilities such as electricity, potable water, kitchen, bathroom/toilet and 
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telephone facility (landline or mobile) are regarded as poor. The World Bank said in their 
2001 report that “vulnerability measures…. the likelihood that a shock will result in a 
decline in well-being.”  It is not easy to reach poor people 
Microfinance (MF) is a development approach for the poor. It gives access to 
small monetary services such as credit, small savings and insurance, which people are 
unable to access from formal banking and other financial systems (Morduch, 1999, 
p.1570).  
A prospective client can apply for a small loan to start, for example, their own 
small business such as a small grocery store, agriculture, micro-enterprise or fishery, and 
helps them exercise entrepreneurship skills (Mosley & Arun, 2003). In Pakistan’s rural 
areas, there may be only a rudimentary financial system, which does not service poor 
people. A microfinance institution (MFI) allows local people to benefit from financial 
services, allowing them to save money and expand a business. MF is a recent and unique 
development tool which is very helpful in alleviating poverty, maintaining self-
sustainability, empowering women (Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2006; Khandker, 
1998) and facilitating poor people by group lending to increase community development 
(Osmani, 2007). 
In group lending, credit is provided to a group comprising a minimum of five 
people, maximum about twenty, for which every member is jointly responsible for 
repayment of a loan. Group members are usually family members, friends and neighbors 
(Gine and Karlan, 2007). This is considered a strong program for empowerment of 
women (Rankin, 2002):   
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In Bangladesh, Central America and in Bolivia, MF programs have a positive and 
significant impact on poor households by increasing incomes and household conditions 
(Lalitha, 2008). Studies have found a positive impact of MF programs for poor people at 
the macro-level. MF schemes have been very efficacious in developing the local 
economy by offering financial services to low-income households and individuals (Miller 
and Martinez, 2006; Stephens and Tazi, 2006). 
MF helps the economic and social development of a household or individual, 
enabling income and living standard improvement (Khandker, 2005). There are some 
mixed findings for overall MF program impact on poverty alleviation. The main matter 
for review in this research is the effectiveness and challenges of the MF program in 
poverty alleviation (Khandker, 2005, Morris and Barnes, 2005; Kan, Olds and Kah, 2005; 
Goetz and Gupta, 1996).   
MFIs offer financial services, authorizing and empowering women instead of 
charity. Usually, MFI clients do not have the resources to start their own business even if 
they are self-employed entrepreneurs; so they are unable to overcome the poverty trap.  
MF is a very effective development tool, providing small loans without collateral 
(Soulama, 2005; Brau and Woller, 2004). 
For decades MF has been seen as a powerful tool in the fight against poverty 
around the globe. MFIs not only help the poor by offering capital, but also help to 
increase their business, which successively improves personal income, family health, 
nutrition and education (Colman, 2005; Morduch, 2000).  
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However, there are also studies that are negative about the economic fruits of MF 
(Hoque, 2004; Coleman, 2006). A study on Bangladesh by Hossain (1988) says that MF 
has positive effects for some social aspects like empowerment and self-
confidence. Khandker and Pitt (1998) state that MFI programs encourage the poor to 
invest in human capital by giving a choice of schooling (public vs private). But other 
studies argue that MF’s effect on social indicants is questionable (Kabeer and Neoponen 
2005).  
Studies by Mayoux (1999) and Keyane and Wydick (2001), inter alia, say that 
women’s access to credit, the loan repayment rate and the total amount loaned to women 
are the most attractive factors for policy architects and donor agencies. However these 
factors are very restrictive. For instance, the rate of repayment cannot be used as a tool to 
measure efficient loan use, because revenue is not necessarily earned through fruitful 
investment. It is possible - and evident from various researches - that poor people 
(particularly women) borrow money from one MFI to adjust due debts to another MFI 
(Burra, 2005; Goldin Institute, 2007). Further, Goetz and Gupta (1996) report that when a 
loan is approved for a woman, in a number of cases the male associated with that woman 
takes the loan in breach of conditions, which raises questions about the reliability of an 
assessment of how many women, are served. 
Development of human capital plays a vital role in the alleviation of poverty, 
which is a major concern of this century (Krueger and Lindahl, 2000; Bils and Klenow, 
2000). However, according to Barro and Jong-Wha (2000), in rural areas of developing 
countries, education facilities are inadequate, with poor or unavailable infrastructure and 
services such as furniture, buildings, teachers, course material etc. Besides the low 
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education levels, budget constraints and the demand for children’s time for other 
activities also affects education. These factors may be affected by MF access. 
Financial services such as loans, deposits, remittances etc enable a household to 
benefit from productive avenues, ease lifestyles where income is seasonal, and help 
mitigate risk (Sharma & Zeller, 1997). Conning and Udry (2007) say that, in general, 
poor households have only limited access to the formal financial market, with problems 
of lack of information, incentive and contract enforcement. Furthermore, since in a 
default the human capital can neither be seized nor used as security, a poor person can 
only finance education from savings or the household budget rather than with a loan. 
Deficiencies of financial markets emphasize a combined causation of human capital 
development and revenue creation. While there are eventual investment returns from 
education, these problems generate poverty traps (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). With 
alternative lending technologies, MFIs help a rural population through loans and 
sometimes deposits (Armendariz de Aghaion and Morduch, 2005; Maldonado and 
Gonzalez-Vega, 2003). 
Such innovations enable the poor to guarantee their position in society and enable 
them to earn an income.  
The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the effect of an MF program in 
improving household conditions and living standards in Pakistan. The secondary 
objectives are to ascertain whether MF helps to raise income and improve a woman’s role 
in entrepreneurship and decision-making.   
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We aim to determine empirically the relationship between MF and a family’s 
living standards and to formulate recommendations for MF and poverty alleviation; to 
evaluate the extent to which MF can be a tool for education, health and social status 
improvement; to distinguish specific ways in which MFIs have helped basic survival 
needs of the poor people; and to understand if and how MF enables poor people to use 
assets to cross a minimum economic threshold. 
This study offers answers to the questions: how does MF help improve education 
and health? How beneficial are MFI programs for poor people?  
One of the features of MF is the joint liability approach, which is different from 
more conventional financial services. In joint liability, a group of people, especially 
women, together apply for a loan; the whole group has a mutual responsibility for 
repayment. The aim of MFI financial services is to offer small loans to clients who have 
low income, helping them to improve their living conditions, and giving them funds to 
improve their education and health. Furthermore, MF is a distinctive tool for 
development and poverty alleviation (Business Week, 2005). 
Many studies have found positive and significant impacts of MF on the world’s 
poor. Such programs can be successful strategies to improve financial services (Miller 
and Martinez, 2006; Stephens and Tazi, 2006). Implementation of these programs helps 
the poor in development and betterment of their living standards. It also helps raise their 
income and boost the local economy (Khandker, 2005).  
Most qualitative studies or case studies show that MFI developmental programs 
are effective tools to alleviate poverty, helping increase individual and household 
95 
 
incomes; this leads to better nutrition and health, education levels, empowerment of 
women and ownership of household assets. Khandker (2005) says that MFI programs 
improve living standards by helping to alleviate hunger.  
Such programs perk up health access for the poor and permit better health 
precautionary measures; this has been shown in some research. Further, these programs 
have a positive impact on school enrollment (Morduch, 2008) and it has been shown that 
these programs improve the confidence and self-respect of borrowers. MF programs 
mainly involve female leadership; it is claimed that it helps to reduce gender inequity 
issues and empower women in society by providing chances to women in every field 
(Goetz and Gupta, 1995). 
Studies show mixed results on the influence of MFI programs on poverty 
alleviation. The primary research question of this study is: “What is the effectiveness and 
ineffectiveness of microfinance programs in alleviating poverty”? A few studies have 
shown that MF programs reduce overall poverty and especially decrease extreme poverty 
levels (Khandker, 2005), while a few studies offer contradictory conclusions (Morris and 
Barnes, 2005; Kan, Olds and Kah, 2005; Goetz and Gupta, 1996) and some researchers 
have various findings (Copestake, Bhalotra and Johnson, 2001; Morduch, 1998). 
 
Other studies have focused on the influence of MFI programs on poverty 
alleviation at district levels through descriptive analysis. In this paper, the effect of MF is 
measured on raising household income and living standards in Pakistan of 94 district 
consumers, using empirical evidence. In comparing our empirical analysis with the 
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literature, results are also described from the fixed effect panel regression, where poverty 
alleviation is the dependent variable. In this study, a district level data set is used. The 
following hypotheses have been formulated for the objectives of the study through 
district level data: that there is a significant relationship between MF and living standards; 
that MF leads to increases in household productive assets; that MF reduces the 
vulnerability of poor people; that MFI finance reduces household poverty; that MF 
finance provides opportunities to poor people to develop effective and significant links 
with society; and that MF create employment opportunities for poor people.  
This study focuses on the impact of MF on Pakistan’s multi-dimensional poverty. 
Specifically, we look into MF influences on family living standards, household 
conditions, economic security and primary health care. 
A focus on extreme poverty and the world’s poorest has sharpened to an 
unprecedented level since the 1990s (Morduch and Haley, 2002). Global development 
institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
international financial institutions (IFIs), particularly the World Bank, have elevated 
poverty alleviation to the policy forefront (World Bank, 2013). The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), ratified at the Millennium Summit by all 189 United 
Nations member countries, have been influential in translating the lofty goal of poverty 
eradication into measurable targets that can be monitored at country and regional levels. 
But progress on the MDGs has been uneven. While the first MDG, which calls for 
a halving of extreme poverty by 2015, has been achieved, 1.2 billion people continue to 
live in extreme poverty. Similarly, while there have been dramatic improvements in 
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access to healthcare, primary education and basic housing facilities such as sanitation and 
potable water, wide disparities remain between and within countries. It is therefore 
unlikely that most MDGs will be achieved by the 2015 deadline (United Nations, 2013). 
Consequently, debate on the best interventions to alleviate poverty has heated up. 
At the same time, the development narrative seems to have converged on the idea that 
development should be about poverty reduction, but also be mindful of “the voices of the 
poor” (Narayan-Parker, 2000). This last is a reference to the bottom-up participatory 
processes that allow for beneficiary involvement in the design, implementation and 
monitoring of interventions that affect them (Rankin, 2002). In other words, successful 
interventions must reduce poverty and reduce inequality by empowering the marginalized, 
especially poor women. 
In the 1990s, as this development concept began to gain currency, Bangladeshi 
economist Muhammad Yunus was able to popularize a rural development scheme that 
involved lending small amounts of money to some of the poorest women and men in a 
village near Dhaka, Bangladesh. Although Yunus’s scheme was not the first of its kind 
(Roodman, 2012), he soon became the iconic face of what became known as micro-credit. 
The actual purpose of micro-credit was to help the poor run a small business; 
however loans carried a comparatively high market interest rate. Despite the high cost of 
funds, the reported repayment rate was 96% (Younus and Jolie, 1998). 
Micro-credit was then renamed micro-finance (MF) with the addition of services 
such savings, insurance and lately mobile banking. MF was soon deemed to be an ideal 
tool for development and poverty alleviation. However, its popularity soon became a 
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challenge and for a long time MFIs have been under pressure to ensure financial sustainability, 
ending subsidies and establishing commercial viability. These purposes have created confusion 
regarding an MFI’s legitimate mission. The target of attaining financial strength dilutes the core 
purpose of poverty alleviation and empowerment (Cull et al, 2008). 
Although microfinance supports poor by, improving their living standard, health, 
education, boost up their earnings.  Nevertheless, other reports argue that there is 
insignificant role of microfinance in poverty alleviation. However, other studies have 
shown that microfinance has no significant role towards poverty reduction. Hence these 
diverse arguments compelled researchers to address below mentioned questions  
How Microfinance intervention is effective for poverty alleviation globally?  
What is the difference between poverty reduction and repayment of loan?  
What is status of women after microfinance?  
How MF satisfy what it claims? 
How MF works as a tool for poverty reduction? 
Addressing above and other similar questions have motivated author to conduct 
research. It is widely observed that women sustain an imbalanced weight of poverty. In 
most of the economies women are normally employed in informal sectors on very 
nominal wage (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). Feminist contend that there would be no 
efficient and effective development if the role of women is neglected in the process of 
development (Islam, 2006).  Hence, gender equality can be essential factor for effective 
development (World Bank - WB, 2002). According to report of WB (2002) and Beijing 
Platform for Action BPFA, 1995 the access of women for financial resources is effective 
strategy for alleviation of poverty, therefore in order to encourage productivity the donor 
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agencies are focusing women for providing MF services. Surely, women’s ratio seems 
high for taking part in MF programs. This study would examine its impact on Poverty 
Alleviation.  
The main aim or concept of this study is to examine the impact of microfinance 
on poverty alleviation. We used different measures for poverty which are head count ratio, 
gap and multidimensional poverty in terms of education, health and living standard.  
The conceptual framework is a linkage of microfinance Institution intervention to 
alleviate poverty from society. We present viscous circle of poverty alleviation how 
financial product and services can effect on multidimensional poverty like education, 
health and livings standard. We have also highlighted the indicators of microfinance 
products and services which are credit, savings, investment and transfer of payments. We 
applied all these indicators for measuring the microfinance activities in different way in 
our analysis to examine the cause and effect of microfinance and poverty. These are 
illustrated in Figure 2.5  
 
We also identified the problem of monetary services of MFIs and how it effects 
on outcomes. The problems are high interest rate, insufficient loan, hard repayment 
policy and misuse of loan which can negatively effect on poverty alleviation. In this 
regard we recommend some policy implication in our study which can very useful for 
MFIs to overcome these problems and develop their product and services strategies. In 
this study our research questions are based on this conceptual framework that how these 
interventions of MFIs can alleviate poverty across all regions? Our aim is to study the 
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how microfinance activities could enhance the mechanisms and lead towards improved 
living standard, health, social well-being and improved educational status.    
This study uses various research methods and employs a multi-disciplinary 
conceptual framework to address these issues by analyzing Pakistan’s MFI sector. There 
are a numbers of reasons for choosing Pakistan as a case study.  
First, Pakistan’s MFIs offer two dominant institutional models: Microfinance 
Banks (MFBs), which are more commercially oriented, and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). It is notable that presently in the MF sector the market is almost 
equally divided. This gives an ideal opportunity for a comparative study between MFBs 
and MFIs (NGOs), and this type of study may offer a source for reliable inquiry into 
trade-offs between two MF objectives: development and financial sustainability.  
Second, while Pakistan is a fresh entrant in this sector as compared to India and 
Bangladesh, but is usually referred to as a “regional leader” in establishing the latest MFI 
version. The Economist Intelligence Unit, in its annual sector review, says that Pakistan is 
among the very few economies that have formulated a Microfinance Regulatory Framework 
for MFBs and that Pakistan has the most favorable conditions for MF (EIU, 2012: 31). 
Similarly, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (a research Centre at the World Bank) 
stated in 2011 that Pakistan’s MFI sector is a “Laboratory for Innovation.”  
In view of the above, one question arises: does all this indicate better results for 
Pakistan’s poor, with prospective access to financial services, empowerment and poverty 
alleviation? The present study attempts to answer this by comparing commercialized MFBs with 
the traditional NGO model in terms of practice, outreach, mission and client experience.  
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Third, since Pakistan is currently experiencing serious economic and political crises 
with external and domestic security issues, development has been sluggish while poverty is 
increasing. So it is widely believed that MF, as a market-based intervention, is less 
susceptible to these political and economy barriers to development (Swain and Floro, 2008). 
Extensive research on MF and conflict asserts that by supporting 
reconstruction/establishment of local business, MF as micro-credit can jump-start a 
country’s economy during and after conflict (Doyle, 1998; Nagarajan and McNulty, 2004; 
Manalo, 2003; and Nagarajan, 2002). In this study we include a short case study on the 
experience of MF in Karachi (a city is nominated as Pakistan’s financial hub).   
This paper progresses as follows: Section II reviews the econometric model that 
we use to analyze the effect of MFIs on education levels, incomes and living standards. 
Data and methodology are explained in Section III and empirical analysis results are 
presented in Section IV. The study ends with discussion and concluding remarks.   
2.2. Econometric Model 
 
In this study, our main purpose is to identify the different forms of the MF effect 
on poverty, which is Pakistan’s major problem, especially in rural areas. One principal 
reason for poverty is the absence of job opportunity. A poor person needs financial 
support for self-employment and poverty alleviation. MFIs provide monetary services 
like loans and savings to people with low income, people who are excluded 
from conventional commercial financial services. Enabling access to these services is a 
way to allow poor people to grow the local economy by developing entrepreneurship and 
102 
 
social empowerment for their community, supplying them with incomes and bargaining 
power.  
So-called multi-dimensional poverty has four dimensions: education, health, 
living standards and wealth. In looking at Pakistan’s multi-dimensional poverty at the 
district level, for education we examine the MF effect on years of schooling, using 
indicators of enrollment rates and school attendance; health consultation is the only 
indicator for health because there are only limited data; household materials and 
electricity show living standards, and asset ownership is used as a wealth indicator.  
There are two dimensions of monetary poverty: income and consumption. 
Consumption is the more important; with limited variables, we used only two indicators 
for consumption: food consumption and the number of daily meals at the district level.   
The main purpose of this study is to explain empirically the correlation between 
the predicted variable, poverty, and predictor variables - number of active borrowers, 
number of active savers, value of savings and gross loan portfolio. We check if a 
predictor variable has any effect on response variable; if so, we look for size and 
direction of the effect. For validity and for an unbiased estimate, we control both 
observable confounding and unobservable confounding variables. “The General Linear 
Model is commonly estimated using the ordinary least square, and has become one of the 
most widely used analytic techniques in social sciences.” (Cleary P. D. and Angel R., 
1984) To envisage a function that connects the predicted variable (𝑌) with predictor 
variables (𝑙1,𝑙2,𝑙3, … … . . ,𝑙𝑛) is OLS. We used multiple linear regression models to 
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control the observable confounding variables. Further, we estimate our model through 
panel and cross-sectional regression.  
2.2.1. Panel Regression 
 
In our panel analysis we test the impact of microfinance on monetary and 
multidimensional poverty at a district level in Pakistan.   
We estimate the following pooled OLS for the period 2006-2014: 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙′𝛽 + 𝑔𝛼 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖                                            (1) 
Here 𝑌𝑖𝑖 represents indicators of multidimensional poverty, measured by the 
number attending school; higher education completed; gross enrollment rate at the 
primary level; net enrollment rate at the primary level; gross enrollment rate at the 
primary level (Katchi Abadis); net enrollment rate at the primary level (Katchi Abadis); 
household roofing material (wood/bamboo); health consultations. It also indicates the 
monetary dimension of poverty, measured by consumption and income indicators; 
number of meals taken daily; food consumption; and household income. All variables are 
in log; 𝑙′are explanatory variables in this paper, representing MF indicators:  
Act boro = active borrower of microfinance. 
Act sav = number of active savers. 
Val saving = value of saving of borrowers. 
GLP= Gross loan portfolio. 
Adult literacy population = adult literacy population 15 years and older. 
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Dist. of household electricity = % distribution of households by electricity used 
for lighting. 
Distribution material = % distribution of households by roofing material by 
RCC/RBC. 
P = Provincial dummy. 
T = Time dummy. 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 = Error term assumed to be white noise. 
To overcome estimation problems such as omitted variables bias which can arise 
in Pooled OLS estimation, we should estimate the random and fixed effect model. We 
employed a fixed effect regression model to control the unobservable variables that are 
constant over time but different across units. In our data we have 94 districts for 8 years 
(2006-2014). The districts are the same in each year.  
Therefore, by using Panel Regression with a Fixed Effect technique, the 
estimation model for this study can be shown:   
𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝑙′𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖𝑖     for i = 1, 2,… N and t = 1, 2,… T                                      (2) 
Where Yit indicates the dependent variable for i district for the t time period, 𝑙′is 
the vector of control variable and 𝜇𝑖𝑖  represents the stochastic error term. 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝑙′𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖                                             (3) 
 We decomposed the error term into three components,  𝜇𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖 where 
𝑣𝑖  shows the unobserved components that change across districts but over time are 
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constant; 𝑇𝑖 shows unobserved factors that vary over time but are constant across districts; 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 indicates all unobserved aspects or factors that change across units of our study and 
time. We deal with potential heteroscedasticity by using clustered standard errors.  
 
2.2.2. Cross-section Regression 
 
We use OLS for our cross-sectional estimation to examine the MF effect on 
multi-dimensional and monetary poverty. The purpose of this estimation is to capture the 
marginal effect of the number of active borrowers, active savers and savings value on 
education, health, living standards and consumption. We carried this estimation for 
robustness check and our regression model for cross sectional analysis is  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑙′𝛽 + 𝑔𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖 
Here, 𝑌𝑖  is multi-dimensional poverty and monetary poverty; 𝑙′  indicates all 
explanatory variables which represents the microfinance indicators and 𝑔 represents the 
provincial dummy. 
We applied log-log for all estimations to analyze the long-term impact of the 
number of active borrowers on multi-dimensional and monetary poverty at district levels 
in Pakistan.  
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2.3. Data and Methodology 
 
In social research, methodological techniques and ways of analysis are important. 
The place of secondary research is very high in the social sciences and this research 
technique is most often used to analyze correlation between variables and impact 
evaluation. This paper involves econometric analysis of the MF program or scheme 
outreach at district levels to alleviate poverty in Pakistan. We estimate the impact of MF 
programs on income, living standards and asset ownership. The study emphasizes the 
secondary “numerical data” and presents different statistical methods for hypothesis 
testing. Hence, analysis in this paper depends totally on empirical estimation. The various 
tools and techniques of data collection for this study are described in this section. 
Our data set is organized at a district level for econometric investigation. We used 
micro-level data for the study, from the Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN), the 
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS), the Pakistan Social and Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (PSLM) and the Human Development Index (HDI). Our panel 
estimates are based on annual data for 94 districts in four Pakistani provinces, including 
both urban and rural areas, in 2006-2014. Some policy variables are taken from 
Pakistan’s four provinces Development Report (PDR). 
The unit of research is the district; the people are clients of the MF Institution or 
bank; the data covers MF outreach at the institutional level; and socio-economic 
indicators show people’s welfare. The Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN) provided 
complete information on 12 MF providers, which include the largest MFI. PMN has 
strong association with CGAP, the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) and the 
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micro-banking bulletin. It provides data on the scale of MF, outreach, insurance, target, 
financial performance and sustainability of MF Banks and MFIs. The data is available on 
a quarterly basis covering MFI outreach since 2006.  
The Federal Bureau of Statics, a department of the Ministry of Finance, provides 
the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM). This gives social 
and economic indicators, population − based estimates, through which it is easy to 
measure social welfare at provincial and district levels. PSLM surveys poverty and 
development issues at a district level but also examines Millennium Development Goals 
indicators; it offers indicators like income, health, education, living standards, household 
assets, welfare, sanitation and physical environment. PSLM gathers data from the 
Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) on food consumption, savings levels, 
employment status and sources of income.  
MF is the main predictor variable, and MFI outreach at a district level is measured 
by the number of active borrowers, savings values, active savers and gross loan portfolio.  
Income, household condition, education and household assets are dependent variables in 
this study, which captures the poverty level. Education, health and living standards are 
used to measure multi-dimensional poverty. Years of schooling and attendance are 
indicators for education; health condition is the indicator for health; electricity, sanitation, 
potable water, cooking fuel and household assets are living standards indicators 
(Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003). Two household conditions have been used as a 
proxy to control for household living standards. 
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There are some data limitations on our study. First, our panel is based on district 
levels, and data on some very important variables measuring the incidence and depth of 
poverty are unavailable at the district level. PMN offers data from MFIs about MFI 
outreach, which might be of a lesser quality compared to other large datasets, although 
PMN check data quality and reduce measurement errors from a data set. To remove error 
from the dataset, we run the trends of institutional data set and remove the outlier from 
our data. PMN does not providing data on client poverty levels, which is very big 
limitation to our study. PSLM data is reliable, but the main problem is availability. There 
are many significant variables which are good measures of poverty, but they are not 
available at district levels in the PSLM dataset.  
Our data is gathered from the PMN, which provides quarterly district level data, 
and from the PSLM, which provides bi-yearly data at a district level. In this case, our 
data is mismatched by period; to remove this issue we filled missing values through 
linear interpolation. This technique is not suitable for PSLM data because of a large 
variation in data. PSLM data contradicts the linear interpolation assumption that it moves 
in a linear line. We used stochastic regression to deal with missing values; this imputation 
helps to reduce the bias. In stochastic regression we assume that both imputed and 
observed values are same.  
We run the regression to create the missing values.  
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇 
Here Y is the three dimensions of poverty (education, health and living standards), 
indicators of household social and economic status. 𝛽0  is intercept, 𝛽1 𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝛽2  are the 
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parameters of the explanatory variables. District and time are explanatory variables in the 
model. We used mean values for imputation of missing values in the model which may 
cause a large significance level and low standard errors which state over-fitting data. 
 
2.4. Econometric Results 
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Table 2.4 captures the impact of MF as measured by gross loan portfolio, active 
borrowers and savings value for different levels of education. In all models the results are 
positive and significant to at least a 5% level. Some models are significant at a 
conventional level of significance of 5%, while the others have weak significance at 10%. 
Generally speaking, gross loan portfolio and active borrowers have relatively larger 
impact on education levels than savings value, varying from 0.011% to 0.036%.  
In Table 2.5 larger impact of active borrowers has been observed on net 
enrollment rates at primary level (including Katchi Abbadis), 0.036%. Interestingly, if we 
include Katchi Abbadi, the impact is relatively larger than not including Katchi Abbadi in 
our analysis. Not surprisingly, the impact of parent education proxied by adult literacy 
rates for different education levels is much higher than any other explanatory variable in 
the analysis. Two household conditions have been used as a proxy to control for 
household living standards. The impact of these conditions is noted as positive and 
significant. While we cannot rely too much on these results because of proxies, they do 
show some inherent pattern of MF on educational levels. The positive and relatively 
significant results can be interpreted as showing that households have started to get 
benefit from these institutions, at least in improved educational levels.  
Table 2.6 measures the impact of MF on housing conditions. The estimated 
coefficients are negative and significant at a 5% level. The estimated coefficient shows 
that higher savings values can lower the proportion of households who use wood/bamboo 
for roofs. This means that MF has a positive impact on household living standards. The 
estimated results showed that MFIs can be a vehicle for improving household living 
conditions.  
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Table 2.6 estimates the impact of MF on health. In this model, health is proxied 
by the proportion of households who have consulted a physician. In rural areas, because 
of the meager income of most households, most do not consult qualified physicians. In an 
emergency they usually use informal consultants such as Hakeem or Jarrah. The 
estimated results showed that improvement of household income can have a positive and 
significant impact on health. The more MF is used (measured as savings value), the more 
people will consult a qualified physician. However, active borrowing has an insignificant 
positive impact on health.   
Table 2.7 shows the impact of MF, measured by active borrowers and savings 
value, on economic status and the number of daily meals. The results are positive on 
household income and the number of meals per day in both models. The results are 
positive and significant to at least a 1% level of significance.  
Mostly models are significant at a conventional level of significance (5%). while 
the others are highly significant at a 1% level. This clearly shows that active borrowers 
have a relatively larger impact on household income, daily meal numbers and 
expenditure on house repairs than savings value; the impact varies from 0.011% to 
0.039%. 
In Table 2.8  larger impact of active borrowers has been observed on loan 
repayments, at 0.039%. The impact of livestock ownership on household income and 
number of daily meal is much higher than other explanatory variables in the analysis.  
The variables of home ownership and household assets (furniture, transport and 
appliances) are noted as positive and significant. Although we cannot rely too much on 
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these results because of explanatory variables, they do show some inherent pattern of MF 
on household income and number of meals taken daily.  
The positive and relatively significant results can be interpreted as showing that 
households have started to benefit from these institutions, at least with improved incomes. 
Table 2.8 demonstrates that the value of R2 for the model is 0.642. This means that 64.2 % 
of the variation in improved home ownership can be explained from policy variables. R2 
always increases if you add independent variables in a multiple regression model.  
The estimated coefficients of a short run showed that MF has a positive and 
significant impact on home ownership at a 1% level. The magnitude of its coefficients 
shows ceteris paribus, that if the 1% of active borrowers increases, that would raise 
output by more than 0.014%. The statistical significance of its variable supports 
theoretical linkages between MF and home ownership. This positive relationship implies 
that society has started to benefit from MF. The sign of the value of saving is positive and 
significant at a conventional 1% level of significance.  
Table 2.7 evaluates the impact of MF on livestock ownership. The estimated 
coefficients are positive and significant at a 1% level of significance. Estimated 
coefficients are positive and highly significant at a 1% level of significance. The 
estimated coefficients assess that more savings value can increase livestock ownership 
rates. This clearly shows that the MF program has a significant and positive influence on 
household asset ownership. The estimated results show that MF can be a vehicle for 
improving household asset ownership.  
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Table 2.7 estimates the influence of the MFI programs on diet. Here, food is 
proxied by the proportion of households that spend money on cereal, milk, eggs, meat 
and fruit. Most rural households with a meager income cannot afford three meals a day, 
but are restricted to two daily meals and cannot afford fruit. The estimated results showed 
that improvement in household income may have a positive and significant dietary 
influence.  
With higher use of MF (as measured by savings value), more people will be able 
to have three meals a day. Active borrowing has a significant positive impact on 
consumption of food.   
2.5. Robustness Checks 
 
We carried out a number of tests on the robustness of our analysis. We ran 
regression by panel sample and reran the estimation through cross-sectional sampling to 
check on robustness of our results Table 2.9 and Table 2.10. We ran the long-term MF 
effect on poverty alleviation in Pakistan at a district level. The outliers can be statistical 
analysis-driven. In our study we have already omitted all obvious outliers from our data; 
we want to examine whether results will remain consistent after using different methods 
for treating outliers. The table shows the robustness check for outliers, where we rerun a 
regression with the 6th to 94th percentiles; this sample and observations differ as we drop 
below the 5th and above the 95th percentile for poverty variables. We see that the 
coefficients are similar to the cross sectional analysis.  
We got robust results for our analysis as we reran our estimations with level-level 
model for panel analysis; active borrower numbers and savings values are statistically 
114 
 
significant. We repeated our analysis cross-sectional and found the same result, that there 
is a positive MF impact on Pakistan’s poverty alleviation at a district level Table 2.9 and 
Table 2.10 .  
2.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
It can be concluded that the relationship between microfinance and poverty 
alleviation is substantial and positive for Pakistan. We have examined a number of 
factors which are obstacles in the way of the MF role in poverty eradication, such as 
misconceptions about the place of women in Pakistan’s economy, high interest rates, lack 
of approach to the poor by MFIs, lack of awareness and corruption. 
In this paper the analytical framework identifies major factors influencing MF 
effectiveness. The regression approach is chosen for analysis of effects, being best suited 
to resources, available information and timeline of study. The focal point of the study is 
to analyze MF impacts specific to Pakistani household conditions and living standards. 
Secondly, data is used to compare living standards and conditions of household who are 
MF clients with the conditions of non-client households whose other characteristics are 
similar. 
The generalized Hausman Test shows that the order of reception of MF by 
eligible villagers may not be random in data. So a Village Fixed effect model is adopted, 
providing regular and consistent estimates without considering the order for reception of 
service. MF’s effect on living standards and household conditions is shown.  
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The main reason for high rural poverty is few job opportunities. MFI’s focus on 
the agriculture sector creates job opportunities and helps to lower rural poverty. 
A constructive and positive change is found in the lives of those who receive MFI 
funding, which has improved living standards, given access to clean water, improved 
sanitation and increased home ownership. 
The study shows that in the livestock and enterprise sector, more women receive 
MF than men. This is a positive indicator that MFIs focus on a considerable part of the 
needy population for loan disbursement, helping women to become independent and 
increasing the employed labor force, so eradicating poverty. 
One measurement of poverty involves sanitation systems. Rural sanitation is 
usually unhygienic and unhealthy. We know that MFIs focus on the rural agriculture 
sector, but there has been no apparent improvement found in rural sanitation systems. 
Agriculture loans are usually dispersed to land owners in rural areas, where 
farmers are usually tenants who need access to MFI services to improve living standards. 
Overall, disbursement in the agriculture sector is satisfactory. The discussion above 
shows that generally, MFI facilities are efficiently serving the poor, helping improved 
education access and living standards for borrowers.  
To sum up, our analysis clarifies that the relationship of MFI services with family 
living standards is significant and positive, The relationship between MFIs and the family 
has become remarkably clear and apparent, having been neglected when only 
conventional banking systems existed.  
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If MFIs provide financial services, the poor can raise themselves out of poverty, 
which implies not only individual change but also social change. There seems no doubt 
that the aim of achieving an educated and healthy society can be realised, a society 
without bias and discrimination. The objectives that nobody should go to bed hungry, no 
one should die because of improper or no medication, that all children should be taught to 
read and write and become mainstays of society, can be achieved.  
This study concludes that the MFIs are efficient users of limited resources in 
disbursement and there is a significant positive relationship between MFI programs and 
alleviating poverty in Pakistan. 
Moreover, this study offers recommendations for MFIs to improve their schemes 
for borrowers; for example, the size of a loan should be increased to satisfy necessities.  
MFIs should guide borrowers towards better business operations and proper loan 
usage; they should take measures to reduce interest rates so that a poor borrower can 
more easily repay a loan. 
There are certain limitations to this study, because of data restrictions, but 
examination is recommended of institutional impacts as well as observing the 
contribution of both commercial banks and MFIs to poverty alleviation. It is strongly 
recommended that both government and non-government MFIs should formulate 
concrete policies for operational improvement and program impact in both urban and 
rural areas of Pakistan. Such programs will improve living standards and household 
conditions. 
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2.7. Policy Implication 
 
There is confirmed demand of Credit in poor household of Pakistan. But currently 
MFIs are not able to meet it because present arrangements are neither flexible nor 
designed according to needs of poor. Thus poor turns to informal sources of finance despite 
higher cost of funds and lesser reliability, because these sources satisfy their needs better than 
MFIs. Therefore in order to meet demand of poor by MFIs it necessary for MFIs to be 
flexible and redesign their model according to the needs of poor.   
With regard to commercialization even the access to finance agenda has not been 
served by commercial entities because a concern for profit- making has resulted in 
moving the market upstream, away from the poorest, those living in rural and remote 
areas, and women. Commercialization has in fact weakened the microfinance sector’s 
original emphasis on the poor and women by taking resources and focus away from 
traditional microfinance institutions, that is, the MFIs towards MFBs, which openly admit 
to placing profits before people. This implies that the existing policy of promoting 
commercialization in the sector is misplaced and needs serious reexamination.  
For the Pakistani microfinance sector this will be a difficult path to take since the 
current thrust is promoting commercialization in the sector. There needs to be a 
systematic assessment of the benefits and costs of commercialization. For instance, 
allowing gold backed loans to take over MFB microcredit portfolios is a marked departure 
from the very idea of microcredit. The use of this product has serious implications from 
both a gendered and non-gendered perspective. Increasing the debt levels of already 
vulnerable households while taking gold as collateral, which has a high emotive and 
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financial value in Pakistan, is highly problematic as discussed above and the policy needs 
careful reconsideration 
The introduction of micro-savings, micro-insurance and branchless banking has 
expanded the product lines of microfinance institutions considerably. But these products 
have not been designed with the needs of the poor in mind and have been unable to either 
expand the opportunities of the poor or reduce their constraints.  
For instance, MFBs are allowed to take deposits from the public at large, which 
often means that they prefer to attract a higher-end clientele for their deposits, neglecting 
the needs of the poor in the process. MFIs, on the other hand, are unable to use deposits to 
fund their operations and use client savings mainly as a precaution against default, which 
means that the savings they collect are for the most part involuntary. Similarly, credit life 
insurance offered to microcredit borrowers is primarily a risk reduction strategy for the 
institutions.  
In cases where health insurance is offered borrowers are unclear about the 
conditions of use and at present health insurance does not include outpatient services. 
Weather-indexed insurance in rural areas is still in a pilot phase and needs to be expanded 
after a careful examination of its impact on rural households. But the main policy 
implication here is that there needs to be a serious reassessment of the existing 
microfinance product line keeping the needs of the borrowers as the central focus rather 
than institutional risk-return profiles. 
Finally, the violent conflict, the economic collapse, frequent power breakdowns, 
and the increased incidence of natural disasters have reduced business margins at the 
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bottom of the economic pyramid and in the words of the poor “credit is no longer a choice 
but a necessity”. At the same time, as since economic prospects become worse over time, 
access to credit is no longer an opportunity to build bigger and better businesses but rather 
just a temporary Band-Aid for the poor. 
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Figure 2.1: Microcredit Provision (Active Borrowers by Peer Group) 
 
Source : Pakistan Microfinance Connect ( Jan-March 2014) 
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Figure 2.2: Microcredit Provision (Gross Loan Portfolio) 
 
 
 
Source : Pakistan Microfinance Connect ( Jan-March 2014) 
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Figure 2.3: Microcredit Provision (Active Borrowers by Lending Methodology) 
 
 
 
Source : Pakistan Microfinance Connect ( Jan-March 2014) 
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Figure 2.4: Microcredit Provision (Active Borrowers by Rural/Urban) 
 
 
Source : Pakistan Microfinance Connect ( Jan-March 2014) 
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Figure 2.5: Conceptual Framework 
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Table 2.1: Microcredit Outreach 
 
 Quarter Change 
 2014 Q1 2013Q4 Units % 
Number of Branches/ 
Units 
2313 2157 156 7.23 
Number of Districts 
covered 
94 94 0 0.00 
Penetration Rate (%) 10.94 10.34  0.61 
Active Borrowers 2999,186 2832,715 166,471 5.88 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
(PKR Millions) 
57,068 52,092 4,976 9.55 
Number of Loans 
Disbursed 
766,942 892,013 -125,071 -14.02 
Disbursements (PKR 
Millions) 
18,841 23,940 -5099 -21.30 
Average Loan Size (PKR) 24,566 26,838 -2,272 -8.47 
Number of Savers 5,854,688 5,977,426 -122,738 -2.05 
Value of Savings (PKR 
Millions) 
34,450 34,784 -334 -0.96 
Average Saving Balance 
(PKR) 
5884 5819 65 1.12 
Number of Policy Holders 3,179,341 3,031,202 148,139 4.89 
Sum Insured (PKR 
Millions) 
42,344 40,271 2,073 5.15 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Connect (Jan-March 2014) 
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Table 2.2: Classification of Microfinance Providers 
 
Classification  
of  MFPs 
Characteristics Examples                                                            
 
 
Formal Full service, Broad Spectrum Bank of Khyber 
Full Service MF specialists First Microfinance Bank 
Restricted service MF Broad Spectrum NRSP 
Restricted Service MF specialist Kashf Foundation 
Apex Institutions PPAF 
Informal Community-based services ROSCAs, Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations(ASCAs) 
Commercial Services Money lenders, Stores 
Family & friends Mr.&Mrs. Hassan of Mingora 
Source: Poverty and Social Impact Assessment 
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Table 2.3  Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Unit Obs Mean       Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of active borrower  Ratio 466 18433.44 27124.83 8 222800 
Gross loan portfolio   468 2.34E+08 3.51E+08 652 2.52E+09 
Active savers  Number 401 48686.44 308232.1 0 5982607 
Value of saving  Pak. Rupees 400 1.12E+08 4.95E+08 0 8.31E+09 
Education  Number 311 103.0708 22.71491 20 128 
Health  Number 301 6.049231 2.90E+00 0 18 
Wealth  Number 319 12.26154 13.10013 0 68 
Drinking water  Number 332 18.81695 1.86E+01 0 79 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Connect and Pakistan Bureau of Statistics  
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Table 2.4: Panel Fixed Effect regression of active borrowers and value of savings by Educational Status 
 
Note: Dependent variables are the Number of students attended the school (AS), enrollment rate of primary school level (ERPL) and Completion of High School Education 
(HSEC). Robust clustered Standard errors at district level are in parenthesis.  All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on ninety four districts for the time period 
of 2006-2013. Coefficients are obtained from fixed effect panel approach. Time dummy and district dummy are included in the estimation.***p<0.01; **p<0.05;*p<0.10  
  
 EDUCATIONAL DIMENSION 
 
log (AS) log(HSEC) log(ERPL) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log GLP 0.022***  0.033**  0.021**  
 (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.009)  
Log Act Borr/Total Population  0.012** 
 
0.021** 
 
0.013** 
 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 Log Val Sav 
 
0.011** 
 
0.014** 
 
0.0155** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
log ALP15 0.684** 0.649** 0.794** 0.812** 0.394** 0.360** 
 
(0.038) (0.045) (0.053) (0.051) (0.055) (0.061) 
log HBEL 0.035** 0.040** 0.028** 0.033** 0.063** 0.060** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
log HBMR 0.022** 0.022** 0.028** 0.025** 0.021** 0.022** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Dummy Variables 
      
       Provincial Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Constant 1.144** 1.194** 0.395*** 0.283** 2.716** 2.716** 
 
(0.135) (0.157) (0.189) (0.179) (0.197) (0.220) 
No. Of Observation 254 238 254 238 254 238 
Adj R2 0.772  0.753  0.772  0.753  0.772  0.753  
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Table 2.5:  Panel Fixed Effect regression of active borrowers and value of saving by Educational status of slum area 
 EDUCATIONAL DIMENSION 
 log(NEPL) log(GERPLKA)  log (NERPLKA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log GLP 0.019**  0.026**  0.039**  
 (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.016)  
Log Act Borr/Total Population 0.014** 
 
0.022** 
 
0.036** 
 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 log(Value of Saving) 
 
0.016** 
 
0.018** 
 
0.019** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
log(Adult Literacy Population 15 years and older) 0.401** 0.355** 0.440** 0.417** 0.452** 0.449** 
 
(0.051) (0.057) (0.058) (0.069) (0.059) (0.071) 
log(Distribution of Households By Electricity for Lighting) 0.070** 0.062** 0.087** 0.082** 0.081** 0.084** 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) 
log(Distribution of Households By Material used for Roof 
By RCC/RBC) 0.019*** 0.013 0.028** 0.026** 0.034** 0.028** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Provincial Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.680** 2.721** 2.372** 2.360** 1.781** 1.827** 
 
(0.179) (0.206) (0.207) (0.247) (0.211) (0.254) 
No. Of Observation 254 238 254 238 254 238 
Adj R2 0.612 0.604 0.612 0.604 0.612 0.604 
Note: Dependent variables are the Net enroll rate at Primary Level (NEPL), Gross Enroll rate Primary Level Katchi Abadis (GERPLKA) and Net enroll rate at 
Primary Level katchi Abadis (NERPLKA). Robust clustered Standard errors at district level are in parenthesis.  All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation 
is based on ninety four districts for the time period of 2006-2013. Coefficients are obtained from fixed effect panel approach. Time dummy and district dummy 
are included in the estimation.***p<0.01; **p<0.05;*p<0.10 
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Table 2.6:  Panel Fixed Effect regression of Active Borrowers and Value of savings by health condition, household condition, 
Economic Status and Number of meals taking per day 
 
log(HC) log(HMUFR) log(ES) log(MTPD) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log GLP 0.012**  -0.022 0.017**  0.014**  
 (0.009)  (0.0356) (0.011)  (0.005)  
Log Act Borr/Total Population 0.01053** 
 
 0.012**  0.021**  
 
(0.0051) 
 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  
log(Value of Saving) 
 
0.014** -0.099**  0.011**  0.014*** 
  
(0.005371) (0.02081)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
log(Higher School Education 
Completed) 0.1010 0.125** 
     
 
(0.0511) (0.05000)      
log(Households By Other for 
Lighting) 0.0044* 0.0040* 
     
 
(0.0036) (0.0038)      
log(1 Room in Household)   -0.037**     
   (0.0178)     
log(livestock ownership)    0.684*** 0.649*** 0.794*** 0.812*** 
    (0.038) (0.045) (0.053) (0.051) 
log(ownership of house)    0.035*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 
    (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
log(ownership of household 
assets)    0.022*** 0.022** 0.028*** 0.025*** 
    (0.001) (0.018) (0.005) (0.012) 
Dummy Variables 
  
     
Provincial Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
 
3.038** 5.273** 1.144*** 1.194*** 0.395*** 0.283** 
  
(1.21771) (0.3451) (0.135) (0.157) (0.189) (0.179) 
No. Of Observation 253 237 209 254  238  254  238  
Adj R2 0.618 0.593 0.513 0.628  0.609  0.628  0.609  
Note: Dependent variables are the Health consultation (HC) which shows the health status and distribution of household material used for roof by Wood / Bamboo (HMFUR) which represents the 
household condition, Economic Status (ES) and Number of meals taking per day (MTPD) which represents the living status / food consumption of people. Robust clustered Standard errors at 
district level are in parenthesis.   All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on ninety four districts for the time period of 2006-2013. Coefficients are obtained from fixed effect panel 
approach. Time dummy and district dummy are included in the estimation.***p<0.01; **p<0.05;*p<0.10 
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Table 2.7: Panel Fixed Effect regression of active borrowers and value of savings by Economic Status and food 
consumption, Food Consumption and ownership of livestock 
 
Note: Dependent variables are the Economic Status (ES), Number of meals taking per day (MTPD) which represents the living status / food consumption of people, consumption 
of Food (FIC) and Ownership of Livestock (LO). Robust clustered Standard errors at district level are in parenthesis.  All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on 
ninety four districts for the time period of 2006-2013. Coefficients are obtained from fixed effect panel approach. Time dummy and district dummy are included in the 
estimation.***p<0.01; **p<0.05;*p<0.10 
 
 
log(ES) log(MTPD)  log(FIC) Log(LO) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Log GLP 0.094***  0.058**  0.0610**  0.0567** 
 (0.0301)  (0.0263)  (0.0267)  (0.0255) 
Log Act Borr/Total Population 0.012** 
 
0.021** 
 
0.01053***  0.037*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.0051)  (0.0178) 
log(Value of Saving) 
 
0.011** 
 
0.014***  0.014*** 0.099*** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.005)  (0.005371) (0.02081) 
log(livestock ownership) 0.684*** 0.649*** 0.794*** 0.812*** 0.01043** 0.022**  
 
(0.038) (0.045) (0.053) (0.051) (0.0049) (0.009)  
log(ownership of house) 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.1010** 0.125** 0.028** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.0511) (0.05000) (0.014) 
log(ownership of household 
assets) 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 
   
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)    
log(household income)     0.00449*** 0.0040***  
     (0.0036) (0.00387)  
Dummy Variables 
    
   
Provincial Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.144*** 1.194*** 0.395*** 0.283***  3.038*** 5.273*** 
 
(0.135) (0.157) (0.189) (0.179)  (1.21771) (0.3451) 
No. Of Observation 254 238 254 238 253 237 209 
Adj R2 0.628  0.609  0.628  0.609  0.618 0.593 0.513 
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Table 2.8: Panel Fixed Effect regression of active borrowers and value of savings by ownership of house, attendance of 
primary school and repayment of existing loans 
 log(HO) log(APS) Log(REL) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
Log GLP 0.532***  0.0639**  0.0665**  
  (0.155)  (0.0266)  (0.0265)  
Log Act Borr/Total Population 0.014** 
 
0.022*** 
 
0.039*** 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
log(Value of Saving) 
 
0.016*** 
 
0.018*** 
 
0.019*** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
log(monthly wage) 0.401*** 0.355*** 0.440*** 0.417*** 0.452*** 0.449*** 
 
(0.051) (0.057) (0.058) (0.069) (0.059) (0.071) 
Provincial Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.680*** 2.721*** 2.372*** 2.360*** 1.78** 1.827*** 
 
(0.179) (0.206) (0.207) (0.247) (0.211) (0.254) 
No. Of Observation 254 238 254 238 254 238 
Adj R2 0.642  0.640  0.688  0.669  0.715  0.672  
 
Note: Dependent variables are the Ownership of House (HO), Attendance of Primary School (APS) and repayment of existing loans (REL). Robust clustered Standard errors at 
district level are in parenthesis.  All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on ninety four districts for the time period of 2006-2013. Coefficients are obtained from 
fixed effect panel approach. Time dummy and district dummy are included in the estimation.***p<0.01; **p<0.05;*p<0.10 
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Table 2.9: Cross Sectional Regression  
 Educational Dimension 
Dependent Variable:  Log AS log(HSEC) log(ERPL) log(NEPL) Log (GERPLKA) log (NERPLKA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of GLP Per capita 0.0192** 
(0.0089) 
0.0121** 
(0.0052) 
0.0272** 
(0.0122) 
0.0136** 
(0.0059) 
0.0142** 
(0.0064) 
0.018*** 
(0.0030) 
Log Act Borr/Total 
Population 
0.0256** 
(0.0119) 
0.0191** 
(0.0087) 
0.0147** 
(0.0069) 
0.0159* 
(0.0085) 
0.0214** 
(0.0101) 
0.0314* 
(0.0161) 
Log of VS 0.0177** 
(0.0081) 
0.0256** 
(0.0121) 
0.0296** 
(0.0141) 
0.0131** 
(0.0059) 
0.0256* 
(0.0132) 
0.0125** 
(0.0061) 
log(1 Room in 
Household) 
-0.0156*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0315*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0278* 
(0.0131) 
-0.0368** 
(0.0179) 
-0.0159** 
(0.0071) 
-0.0102** 
(0.0048) 
log(livestock 
ownership) 
0.5123** 
(0.2492) 
0.486** 
(0.2130) 
0.493** 
(0.2310) 
0.265** 
 (0.1291) 
0.198** 
(0.0910) 
0.315** 
(0.1498) 
log ALP15 0.323** 
(0.1521) 
0.351*** 
(0.0004) 
0.440** 
(0.2002) 
0.178** 
 (0.0810) 
0.342** 
(0.1693) 
0.436** 
(0.1972) 
log(ownership of 
house) 
0.0256*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0412*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0514*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0314*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0146*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0241*** 
(0.0007) 
log(monthly wage) 0.4171*** 
(0.0007) 
0.3795*** 
(0.0021) 
0.2167*** 
(0.0031) 
0.1163*** 
(0.0107) 
0.2516*** 
(0.0015) 
0.3165** 
(0.1399) 
log(Households By 
Other for Lighting) 
0.0871*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0741** 
(0.0299) 
0.0612*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0359**  
(0.0161) 
0.0161*** 
(0.0072) 
0.0214** 
(0.0092) 
Provincial Dummy - - - - - - 
Constant 2.112*** 
(0.0147) 
2.116** 
(0.8206) 
3.165** 
(1.1012) 
2.998** 
(1.1059) 
4.065** 
(1.9175) 
3.698** 
(1.639) 
No. of Observation 86 84 81 86 88 83 
Adj R2 0.411 0.331 0.421 0.355 0.246 0.316 
Note: Dependent variables are the Number of students attended the school (AS), enrollment rate of primary school level (ERPL), Completion of High School Education (HSEC), 
Net enroll rate at Primary Level (NEPL), Gross Enroll rate Primary Level Katchi Abadis (GERPLKA) and Net enroll rate at Primary Level katchi Abadis (NERPLKA). Robust 
clustered Standard errors at district level are in parenthesis.  .  All variables are in natural logarithm. Estimation is based on ninety four districts for the time period of 2006-2013. 
Coefficients are obtained from fixed effect panel approach. Time dummy and district dummy are included in the estimation.***p<0.01; **p<0.05;*p<0.10  
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Table 2.10: Cross Sectional Regression for Multidimensional poverty and monetary poverty 
 Health and Living standard Income and Food Consumption 
Dependent Variable:  log(HC) log(HMUFR) Log(LO) log(HO) log(ES) log(MTPD) log(FIC) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log of GLP Per capita 0.0121*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0133** 
(0.0057) 
0.0141** 
(0.0063) 
0.014** 
(0.0062) 
0.023** 
(0.0099) 
0.016** 
(0.0068) 
0.0325** 
 (0.0157) 
Log Act Borr/Total 
Population 
0.0114** 
(0.0049) 
0.0353** 
(0.01657) 
0.0123** 
(0.0052) 
0.0245** 
(0.0101) 
0.0142** 
(0.0052) 
0.0315** 
(0.0091) 
0.0136*** 
(0.0004) 
Log of AS 0.0101** 
(0.0042) 
0.0133** 
(0.0054) 
0.0100** 
(0.0030) 
0.0163*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0201** 
(0.0091) 
0.0123** 
(0.0052) 
0.0221*** 
(0.0006) 
log(1 Room in 
Household) 
-0.0125*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0225*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0315*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0258** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0412*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0321*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0365** 
(0.01423) 
log(livestock 
ownership) 
0.5327** 
(0.2436) 
0.4195** 
(0.1952) 
0.3961** 
(0.1823) 
0.4720** 
(0.1922) 
0.2953** 
(0.1021) 
0.6321** 
(0.2921) 
0.4023** 
(0.1825) 
log ALP15 0.3127** 
(0.1398) 
0.1776** 
(0.07139) 
0.1581** 
(0.06122) 
0.2420** 
(0.0980) 
0.1943** 
(0.0811) 
0.2611** 
(0.1219) 
0.1856** 
(0.0813) 
log(ownership of 
house) 
0.0154** 
(0.0061) 
0.0213** 
(0.0891) 
0.0134** 
(0.0051) 
0.0314** 
(0.0131) 
0.0215** 
(0.0083) 
0.0156** 
(0.0053) 
0.0221*** 
(0.0100) 
log(monthly wage) 0.4136*** 
(0.0001) 
0.3321*** 
(0.0002) 
0.4224*** 
(0.0011) 
0.4196** 
(0.1932) 
0.3321*** 
(0.0001) 
0.3169*** 
(0.0011) 
0.4013** 
(0.1958) 
log(Households By 
Other for Lighting) 
0.0014** 
(0.0005) 
0.0042** 
(0.0016) 
0.0051** 
(0.0017) 
0.0011** 
(0.0002) 
0.0116** 
(0.0043) 
0.0214** 
(0.0101) 
0.0314** 
(0.0131) 
Provincial Dummy - - - - - - - 
Constant 1.256* 
(0.6580) 
4.215** 
(2.007) 
3.695* 
(1.9925) 
5.364* 
(2.7883) 
2.787** 
(1.2013) 
6.325* 
(3.5321) 
2.325* 
(1.1988) 
No. of Observation 77 81 73 89 81 81 81 
Adj R2 0.451 0.464 0.343 0.445 0.454 0.531 0.455 
Note: Dependent variables are the Health consultation (HC) which shows the health status and distribution of household material used for roof by Wood / Bamboo (HMFUR) 
which represents the household condition, Economic Status (ES) , Number of meals taking per day (MTPD) which represents the living status / food consumption of people, 
consumption of Food (FIC) and Ownership of Livestock (LO). Robust clustered Standard errors at district level are in parenthesis.  All variables are in natural logarithm. 
Estimation is based on ninety four districts for the time period of 2006-2013. Coefficients are obtained from fixed effect panel approach. Time dummy and district dummy are 
included in the estimation.***p<0.01; **p<0.05;*p<0.10 
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Appendix 2-A: Variable Definitions  
 
Variable  Definition Rationale  Expected Sign Data Source 
Active Borrowers ACTB The numbers of individuals 
who currently have an 
outstanding loan balance 
with a microfinance 
institution (MFI), or are 
responsible for repaying 
any portion of the gross 
loan portfolio divided by 
the total population of 
district 
Independent 
Variable; captures 
the micro-credit 
outreach 
 
+ 
 
 
 
PMN ; Micro 
Watch & PBS 
(2014) 
Active Savers AS The number of individuals 
who currently have placed 
funds with an MFI. This 
number applies only to 
savings held by an MFI, not 
to those savings held in 
other institutions by the 
MFI's clients. 
measure the 
microcredit 
outreach 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
PMN ; Micro 
Watch 
(2014) 
Value of Savings VOS The total value of funds 
placed in an account with 
an MFI that are payable to 
a saver. 
Captures the 
microcredit 
outreach  
+ PMN ; Micro 
Watch 
(2014) 
Gross Loan Portfolio  FLP All outstanding principal 
for all outstanding client 
loans, including current, 
delinquent, and restructured 
loans, but not loans that 
Measure the 
microcredit activity  
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
PMN ; Micro 
Watch 
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have been written-off. It 
does not include interest 
receivable. It does not 
include employee loans. 
(2014) 
monthly wage MW Percentage Distribution Of 
Monthly Household 
Income 
Dependent 
Variable; widely 
accepted as good 
proxy for Poverty  
 PSLM (2014) 
Economic Status ES Percent distribution of 
households by the 
perception of the economic  
Situation of the household 
Dependent 
Variable; widely 
accepted as good 
proxy for Poverty 
 PSLM (2014) 
Adult Literacy 
Population 15 years 
and older  
ALP Population aged 15years 
and older that is literate 
expressed as percentage of 
the population aged 15years 
and older. 
Measure the 
educational 
population 
 PSLM (2014) 
Higher School 
Education 
Completed 
HSEC Percentage distribution of 
population that has 
completed higher  
 level education 
Captures the 
education status  
 PSLM (2014) 
Attendance of 
Primary School 
(APS) Population that has ever 
attended primary school 
Measure the 
educational level  
 PSLM (2014) 
Net enroll rate at 
Primary Level (age 
6-10) 
(NEPL), Net enrolment rate at the 
primary level (age 6-10) 
Measure the 
educational level  
 PSLM (2014) 
Gross Enroll rate 
Primary Level 
Katchi Abadis  
(GERPLK
A 
Number of children 
attending primary level 
(classes 1-5) divided by 
number of children aged 6 
– 10  
years multiplied by 100. 
Measure the 
educational level at 
slum area  
 PSLM (2014) 
143 
 
Enrolment in katchi  
Abadis is included. 
Net enroll rate at 
Primary Level katchi 
Abadis  
 
(NERPLK
A) 
Net enrolment rate at the 
primary level (age 6-10) 
Enrolment in katchi  
Abadis is included. 
Measure the 
educational level at 
slum area  
 PSLM (2014) 
Number of students 
attended the school 
AS Population that has ever 
attended the school 
Capture the school 
attendance  
 PSLM (2014) 
Gross enrollment 
rate of primary 
school level  
(GERPL) Number of children 
attending primary level 
(classes 1-5) divided by 
number of children aged 6 
– 10  
years multiplied by 100. 
Capture the 
educational level 
 PSLM (2014) 
Completion of High 
School Education  
 
(HSEC). Percentage distribution of 
population that has 
completed High School 
Education 
Measure the level of 
education  
 PSLM (2014) 
Households By 
Material used for 
Roof By RCC/RBC 
HBMUR Percent Distribution Of 
Households By Material 
Used For Roof by 
RCC/RBC 
Capture the 
household condition 
 PSLM (2014) 
1 Room in 
Household 
1RH Percentage Distribution Of 
Households By Number Of 
Rooms- By one Room 
Measure the size of 
house 
 PSLM (2014) 
Health Consultation HC Percentage distribution of 
population under 5years 
fallen sick  
Or injured 
Capture the health 
status 
 PSLM (2014) 
Consumption of 
Food 
FC Monthly per capita 
consumption  of 
expenditure on  
Measure the 
consumption  
 PSLM (2014) 
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 major food items 
Number of meals 
talking per day 
(MTPD)  measure the food 
consumption 
 PSLM (2014) 
livestock ownership OL Percent Distribution Of 
Households By Livestock 
Ownership 
Measure the wealth 
status 
 PSLM (2014) 
ownership of house OH Percent Distribution Of 
Households By Housing 
Ownership 
Capture the wealth   PSLM (2014) 
ownership of 
household assets 
OHA Percent Distribution Of 
Households By Household 
Asset Ownership 
Capture the wealth 
status 
 PSLM (2014) 
distribution of 
household material 
used for roof by 
Wood / Bamboo  
(HMFUR) Percent Distribution Of 
Households By Material 
Used For Roof by Wood/ 
Bamboo 
Capture the 
household condition 
 PSLM (2014) 
Households By 
Other for Lighting 
HBOFL Percent Distribution Of 
Households By other than 
Electricity, Gas/Oil and 
Candle Fuel Used For 
Lighting 
Capture the 
household condition 
 PSLM (2014) 
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Appendix 2-B: Map of Microfinance Outreach 
 
 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Network (2014) 
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Chapter 3 : Microfinance and its influence on Poverty Alleviation; A 
survey of the Literature and Recent Development 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Microfinance (MF) aims to facilitate low-income and self-employed people through 
financial assistance. These financial services generally include credit, savings, insurance and 
payment services. MF seeks to enable the access to small-sized loans and deposits for the poor, 
neglected by the banks; therefore it facilitates financial services in both rural and urban solidities 
where there is an inability to access financial services for their welfare from the conventional 
systems of the financial sector.   
There is a big debate about the impact on poverty alleviation of microfinance programs 
and their activities. Poverty is a social and economic issue, and is not just about a lack of income; 
but there is a noteworthy difference between a rise in income and a reduction in poverty. The 
main aim of MF is to provide a variety of financial services to poor people through credit, 
savings and insurance, to sustain well-being and to improve incomes and living standards. These 
financial services can also be beneficial in strengthening health status, food consumption, 
education, women empowerment, and entrepreneurship.  
Despite the doubts of some commentator about the effect of MF on poverty, a number of 
studies have proved that MF is working successfully in many situations. Those who argue that 
MFI performance does not fully meet expectations must nevertheless admit the positive effects. 
Studies into various microfinance institutions (MFIs) demonstrate that the most common effects 
of these financial services are the evening of consumption levels and wealth redistribution for 
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households. Microfinance experts have begun to look at the development of economic security 
instead of income growth as a first step towards poverty reduction because it decreases the 
overall vulnerability of beneficiaries.  
MF does not only enable the poor to deal with the necessities of life and safeguard 
against risks, but it also empowers women by helping their economic participation, so MF 
actually works towards gender equity. MF’s objective is not only to support the poor on an 
individual level, but also it plays a fundamental role on the institutional level. Generally, the poor 
are excluded from the financial sector, so to bridge this gap in a financially sustainable way, 
MFIs can be an integrated component of any country’s financial system, reaching capital markets 
to finance lending portfolios and enabling them to considerably expand their reach to a 
maximum number of poor people.  
In general, savings are highly demanded by the poor, playing a vital role in protecting the 
individual from a cash flow shortage as well as fulfilling an insurance function. So facilitating 
savings is imperative. Further, increasing deposits (in the shape of customer savings) strengthens 
client financial discipline and eventually serves as a financial support for MFIs. However, 
savings alone have a relatively minor impact on development: savings may protect against 
unforeseen distress or provide “shelter for a rainy day” but savings do not themselves create 
significant wealth if credit is not available. 
There is clear evidence of a potential synergy between MF and other programs for basic 
needs for clients. Benefits resulting from basic education, health and microfinance are interlinked; 
it is found that if all these factors are delivered together, the effect of each will be amplified. All 
marginal costs relating to health and education could be significantly lessened if MF 
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infrastructure is already present. Basic client health is possibly a crucial intervention, but to 
reinforce the impact on the poor, it should be associated with MF. Expanding primary education 
has a wide range of impacts on poverty alleviation targets (fertility, health, nutrition and income).  
In recent years MF has attracted noteworthy attention from academic circles and policy 
makers. However, there are many still unanswered questions (see The Economic Journal, 
Hermes and Lensink, 2007). Two major issues have drawn attention.  
First, how does an MF program affect the social and economic condition of the poor in 
developing countries? These programs play a significant role as they operate in developing 
countries and MF is an effective tool to alleviate poverty.   
Secondly, in what ways are MFIs sustainable in the long run and what is the relationship 
between outreach and sustainability? This is also a major and relevant issue because emphasis on 
poverty alleviation is costly, and those costs may decrease the capacity for financial suitability 
and vice versa. 
There are ten contributions towards new empirical verification regarding these two issues; 
five of the ten deal with the first issue, the other five address the relationship between financial 
sustainability and outreach and poverty alleviation strategies. Can MFIs keep funding their own 
operations without impact on their objective of helping the poor? 
In the theory context there are many circumstances relating to MF that involve how 
microfinance affects social and economic outcomes: for example, use of various poverty 
measures; impact on the less poor versus the poorest; female borrowers versus male borrowers; 
group lending versus individual lending; diverse impacts on different economies and different 
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loan purposes. This study observes whether the MF impact on outcome variables is affected by 
the above variations or not. In particular, this study offers the following contributions.  
First: addressing the question of heterogeneity and providing general conclusions on 
empirical grounds for the effect of MF interventions.  
Second: based on our meta-analysis outcome, a guide for future studies examining the 
area having particular importance is proposed. For example, further study is essential for 
hypothesis formulation and development of the validity of empirical studies. The research should 
identify the necessity for further primary studies of MF implications, applying different metrics 
for MF apart from microcredit.  
Third: furnishing proof of the literal impact of MF beyond publication selection bias. The 
selection bias of publications occurs due to the inclination of editors, reviewers and researchers 
to select studies with specific outcomes (for instance, statistically significant outcomes coherent 
with theoretical predictions). It is viewed as a threat for empirical economics (Stanly, 2008). In 
point of fact, without rectification of publication bias, literature that shows a significant 
empirical impact may be misleading. For MF, this prejudice can actually tend to degrade results 
that negatively report on the effect of MF implications. Hence, amid discrepancies regarding MF 
impacts, this study presents a dependable solution in response to heterogeneity in the literature. 
In conclusion, this research is a vital step in dealing with the existing deadlock over MF effects 
(positive, negative or non-existent). It also clarifies the impact of inconsistent literature over the 
quality of reported effects of MF. 
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Our paper is formed as follows: the next section shows the microfinance impact on 
poverty alleviation as evidenced in the extant literature. Section 3 offers a brief review of 
sustainability and outreach in the literature. Assessment through a methodological approach is 
offered in Section 4, and the paper ends with concluding observations. 
3.2. Assessment of Impact of Microfinance 
 
3.2.1. Positive Impact 
 
MF advocates argue that poverty reduction can take place with the help of access to 
finance (Dunford, 2006; Littlefield, Morduch, & Hashemi, 2003). Financial services help achieve 
a continual increase in revenue through increased business investment, a rise in accumulated 
assets, evening consumption, fewer illnesses, less vulnerability and reduced crop failure and 
drought; but access to finance is more important and plays a significant role in poverty reduction. 
Further, this can contribute to improved health, education and housing for the poor. 
Access to finance may also help the betterment of female economic and social conditions and 
support women’s empowerment. Because of MF’s positive and vital role in poverty reduction, 
many governments, individuals and NGOs support MFIs.  
Generally, the core poor do not want to take risks and borrow money for investment, so 
they receive only limited benefits from microfinance schemes. The core poor are usually not 
included by other group members in group lending programs because of the assumption that the 
core poor increase credit risks (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Marr, 2004).  
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These programs are also usually structured in ways that tend to exclude the core poor. For 
instance, it may be necessary to demonstrate savings prior to disbursement of a loan; a minimum 
loan amount must be agreed; there must be a covenant of registration of a firm prior to loan 
approval (Kirkpatrick and Maimbo, 2002; Mosley, 2001).  
In addition, MFI staff tend not to include the core poor because they assume a higher 
chance that the loan may not be repaid (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). 
Finally, MF critics doubt the claims of positive effects on women. A number of MF 
programs are focal points for women; various research reports confirm that female borrowers 
have a higher pay-back ratio than male borrowers. Women also use most of a loan on 
improvement of their children’s education and health (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). It is clear that 
females play a vital role in poverty alleviation. However, MF critics observe that women are 
often compelled to give the loan funds to their men; the men misuse the loan, which increases the 
burden upon women, leading to defaults and nonpayment of the loan (Goetz & Gupta, 1996). 
3.2.2. Microfinance and Health 
 
We argue likely positive impacts of microfinance on psychological well-being, economic 
development and empowerment, while also eventually giving health benefits. Analysis of the 
relationship between MF and health is quite tricky, with many complicating factors. So to 
comprehend and demonstrate the relationship between MF and health, evidence is assessed 
below.  
One study reveals a positive MF effect on welfare, food consumption and health, 
particularly for women customers of the Wisdom MFI in Ethiopia (Doocy, Teferraet al, 2005). 
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Similarly findings from another study conducted in Kerala, India, suggest that microcredit helped 
empower women by improving health status, encouraging their decision-making and raising 
confidence to start a new business which uses their skills.  
However, there is no evidence of a correlation between health risk exposure and 
participation in MF programs that deal with health (Mohindra, Haddad et al, 2008). No 
correlation was observed between self-assessed health or exposure to health risks and 
participation in MF health schemes (Mohindra, Haddad et al, 2008). A study conducted in the 
Dominican Republic showed that customers did not show any significant improvement assessed 
against eleven health indicators (Dohn, Chavez et al, 2004).  
The above evidence demonstrates a blend of impacts of microfinance on health, partly 
attributed to the limited amount of available data on the impact of MF on health. Also, most 
interventions are designed towards financial development and are less concerned with social and 
health development. Another reason might be the timeframe of the assessment, as health 
outcomes are better assessed in the longer term, and surveys conducted immediately after an 
intervention give very little information on health outcomes. Whatever the reasons are, it is plain 
that it is very difficult to assess the impact of MF on health. For instance, it is not enough to 
conclude simply that MF intervention leads to economic development, empowerment and 
increased social capital for all participants. Rather, it depends to a great extent on other factors as 
well as MF programs and participants.   
Assessing client benefits also depends on how the client aims to use that loan; different 
studies show varying findings. For instance, one study shows that MF resulted in a 67% income 
rise of clients while they also built household assets (CRECER Bolivia); another shows that 
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some customers earned profits of $150-225, while one quarter’s profits were under $10 
(McNelly and Dunford, 1999). So it can be safely assumed that health benefits are also highly 
variable. Similarly, social empowerment is not always linked with MF: a study in Kerala noticed 
no improvement in participant decision-making (Mohindra, Haddad et al, 2008). The association 
between income, social wealth, women’s empowerment and health status is also unstable. A 
HOPE study shows that a higher income does not guarantee improved health spending in 
Ecuador and Honduras (Smith 2002).  
An IMAGE study shows a correlation between MF training schemes on HIV and social 
mobilization in South Africa. The study had a sound baseline as well as a follow-up assessment 
methodology, with random clinical testing during the baseline. After two years, the study found a 
reduction in intimate partner violence among clients, with nominal evidence on the use of 
contraceptives (condom), HIV incidence and sexual behavior. 
3.2.3. Criticism on Microfinance Programs 
 
MF has also received strong criticism, with critics particularly claiming that access to 
finance does not significantly reduce poverty; that MF does not reach the poorest (Scully, 2004); 
and that poor people are ignored by MF schemes (Simanowitz, 2002). The reasons given are that 
the poorest usually do not want a loan because they usually lack confidence in themselves or 
believe that these loans are too risky (Ciravegna, 2005).  
 MF Institutes which focus more on savings than credit affect a minority of the poor. 
These MFIs have an insignificant impact on poverty alleviation, and so are less favored to 
achieve millennium goals within target dates.  
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3.3. Issues of Microfinance 
 
The above disagreements about MF’s significance in poverty reduction have sparked 
many empirical assessments. In this context, much research has addressed following issues.  
Does MF serve the core poor or does it only develop the well-being of the better-off poor?  
What factors are most important (empowerment of women, increase in income, increase in assets 
etc)? 
Is the payback more than the cost of MF programs (Chemin, 2008; Dunford 2006): how 
subsidized should MFIs be? 
However these considerations can be problematic. First, it is not essential that any change 
in economic/social condition of MF recipients be due to MF access. Better-off agents can be 
more stimulated to apply for MF, while poorer agents may not apply for MF, so there may be 
self-selection prejudice: in income comparison for both groups, between income before an MF 
loan and income after an MF loan, can lead to the possibly misleading conclusion that MF 
finance was responsible for improved income.  
Secondly, MFIs may expand into comparatively well-off regions for better opportunities 
for MF growth. Certainly, this can create a biased comparison between Treatment and Control 
Group (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Karlan 2001).  
The above studies into the impact of MF on poverty and complications in measuring the 
impact show that arguments are far from final and we need further research into the issue.  
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Dalla Pellegrina (2011) suggests two major innovations in assessment of the impact of 
MF. First, Dalla Pellegrina indicates that most impact research focuses on MF loans without 
comparison with the impact of credit from other financial sources. He says that comparison 
between MF loans and credit from other financial sources is in fact important because it provides 
evidence of the net impact by MF. This paper also examines the effects of micro-credit on 
investment, unlike some research that analyzes consumption, education, income, health etc.   
Dalla Pellgrina claims that to improve living standards long-term, borrowers need to 
invest in development of productive activity. Using data from a large World Bank survey of 
approximately 1,800 households in rural Bangladesh (1991-92), Pellgrina claims that MF loans 
are generally for working capital (usually for non-agricultural activity), while bank borrowings 
help finance the purchase of fixed assets (mainly related to agricultural activity). Bank loans are 
vital in engendering long-standing productive operations. Pellgrina points out that MF may have 
a lesser impact than bank loans as regards the effect on long-term investment; he states that MF 
may not encourage the establishment of a fixed assets group lending system. Such characteristics 
may lead the poor to invest in those projects which can yield a short-term income. 
Becchetti and Castriota (2011) view the effect of MF as a healing device after natural 
disaster. Their study aimed to assess the role of MF loans in supporting the victims of the 2004 
tsunami in Sri Lanka. Researchers collected data from 305 randomly selected MF borrowers. 
The tsunami tragedy led to a typical “quasi-natural experiment” to investigate the effect of MF 
by dividing borrowers into a treatment and a control group, randomly selected. The treatment 
group comprised people affected by the tsunami; the control group comprised those not affected.  
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With a rich dataset of before and after the tsunami, researchers found that MF availability 
was a major rationale for income convergence between recipients. However this process was 
badly interrupted by the tsunami, until people were again offered MF to help bridge the income 
gap between the tsunami-affected and the unaffected. Both researchers claim that there was a 
very fast recovery process. Becchetti and Castriota also found no positive role of MF loans over 
donations or governmental subsidies to improve real income.  
The research offers strong evidence for MF as a recovery tool. This research is highly 
comprehensive in its coverage of post-disaster conditions, so its outcomes may help governments 
and NGOs involved in such situations.  
The final contribution in the literature review on MF impact portrays the latest 
methodology for measurement of MF impacts on recipient well-being. A research paper by 
McIntosh, Villaran, and Wydick (2011) includes a retrospective analysis of the correlation 
between MF and household improvement. 
The authors claim that the methodology gauges changes in welfare after, for instance, 
getting microfinance; cross-sectional methodological questions and analysis identify past 
borrowing events that were unforgettable, important, distinct and extraordinary in household 
welfare. The observers develop a retrospective panel dataset to determine the influence on the 
treatment group. The method suggested by McIntosh, Villaran, and Wydick in the study of 
events is widely employed in finance literature. McIntosh et al applied their methodology in 
Guatemala to study 218 households which received MF in different years.  
The research tests the impact of a loan on dwelling enhancement. The outcomes suggest 
that MF raises the likelihood of dwelling enhancement, even though they are relatively modest 
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impacts. This paper has contributed notably in terms of its new methodology which may help 
researchers in assessing MF impact, as it does not involve huge costs and time for the more usual 
multiple cross-sectional surveys which are generally required.  
The literature review demonstrates specific conclusions about the effect of MF on 
poverty alleviation. The results show a positive MF impact on poverty alleviation in Pakistan. 
There is overwhelming evidence to validate a productive impact of MF financial services on 
health status, nutritional conditions, diminution in vulnerability, improved education and income 
increases. Normally, the impact of MF programs can be assessed by an analysis of changes in 
income or well-being of the treated group. However getting accurate information and 
determining all income sources may be difficult, as the respondent may provide false statements; 
this makes it difficult to establish a casual effect of what might happen if a loan is not disbursed. 
Nevertheless, the economic analysis can more precisely assess the impact.  
Assessment of social impact is also essential for an organization’s internal learning 
process, as an MFI should be fully attentive about the full range of changes relating directly or 
indirectly to MFI work, and use those changes to increase overall performance. Social impact is 
associated with human capital: health, nutrition, social network and education. Analysis and 
assessment of all of these issues is essential to arrive at a factual image of MF 
impact.Sustainability and Outreach of Microfinance 
As discussed, the poor are generally neglected by the banking sector, while MFIs claim a 
social mission in providing financial services to the poor. Conventional banks lend to those with 
collateral, whereas the poor have no valuable asset for collateral, so mainstream banks refuse the 
risk. Also, banks usually operate in urban areas, while most poor are rural, so the underprivileged 
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are not facilitated. MFIs aim to bridge the gap by working in remote areas; but studies show that 
MF provides financial facilities to only a tiny fraction of the projected demands of the poor.        
MFIs cannot offer a deep outreach as required to meet the demands of the rural poor. 
Running a rural MF project is expensive. The high transaction costs and small client base are 
why conventional banks operate in comparatively densely-populated areas.  
Some studies show that the poorest can perk up their socio-economic conditions, and 
these studies recognize numerous common issues for MF work for the poorest. Even a well-
designed program can fail positively to affect the poorest unless it has exact targeting and a good 
relevant product design. Experience shows that without a targeting tool, the poor may feel that 
the programs are not for them, or they do not have the correct clothing etc; so they may exclude 
themselves or be missed. So MFIs must design their programs to meet the needs of the poorest. 
Microfinance institutes fail if the design of their projects is solely to satisfy those who 
demand MF for saving. The key 2015 objective of the Microcredit Summit is to reach out to 175 
million poor, but MF seems not on target. So it is important that MFIs have breadth and depth of 
outreach. Products must be cost effective and designed appropriately for the needs of poor 
people. As stated above, MF provision is very expensive in information and transaction costs. 
Many current MF programs are financially unsustainable, operating on subsidies from donor 
agencies. The problem of MFI financial sustainability generated an important dispute between 
the approaches of the financial system and poverty lending in the 1990s (Robinson, 2001).  
Financial systems focus on the financial strength of MF programs, stressing that MFIs 
should be financially sound enough to bear the cost of funds from interest on outstanding loans 
and cost cutting of operational activities. The poverty lending approach mainly stresses poverty 
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reduction by offering subsidized credit. Proponents of the latter argue that since MF beneficiaries 
are very poor, they cannot afford high-priced funds, so the financial sustainability approach 
defeats the goal of helping the poor.   
Advocates of the financial services approach argue that there is no empirical evidence 
that recipients cannot pay high interest rates and no evidence of a negative correlation between 
MFI financial sustainability and client poverty levels. Their view is mainly supported by the 
argument that if MFIs are financially unsustainable, then large-scale long-term outreach to the 
deprived cannot be assured. 
It appears that the contest leaders are supporters of financial sustainability, and most 
parties in the MF debate have accepted this approach. As a result, policy architects, donors and 
other fund injectors recently shifted the focus to financial sustainability. The emphasis on 
effectiveness and financial sustainability is augmented because of factors such as MF 
technological advances; government policies on MF; increased competition between MFIs; and 
increased interest from investors and banks due to the commercialization of MF (Rhyne and 
Otero, 2006).  
There is presently an enormous range of financial sustainable MFIs (Deutsche Bank, 
2007). One estimate is of about 150 financially sustainable MFIs in the world (only 1-2% of all 
MFIs), most of them well known, relatively large and organized; about 8% of all MFIs are near 
profitability. These MFIs emphasize profitability/sustainability and are viewed as profit-making 
organizations. Almost 20% of MFIs, including Non-Government Organizations, are not 
financially sustainable so far but are approaching sustainability in the near future. The other 70% 
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of MFIs are small start-up ventures, rather than financial sustainability mainly operate on 
subsidies. 
With the focus shift to financial sustainability, certain reservations have arisen for the 
reach of microfinance in breadth (the number of MF recipients) and depth (socio-economic 
status of MF recipients). As mentioned above, exponents of the other approach (poverty lending) 
contend that emphasizing financial sustainability incurs client costs. Loans to the poor can be 
expensive, so missing the goals of sustainability and outreach. This has not been studied much 
and available literature is largely unreliable. 
An academically authentic study (Cull et al, 2007) looks at outreach and financial 
performance. This paper is based on macro data on 124 MFIs in 49 countries. The researchers 
used econometric methods to examine any trade-off between profitability and outreach depth of 
MFIs. The outcomes show that MFIs which focus on individual rather than group loans have 
better profitability but a lower proportion of female and poor clients in the total lending portfolio 
as compared with MFIs which mainly focus on group loans. The results also show that, unlike 
group-based MFIs, individual-based MFIs progressively focus on richer clients, so Cull et al. 
claim a significant relationship between MF program outreach and sustainability.  
Research underlines that institutional design is important in determining size and 
existence of this trade-off, and the same is important from a policy prospective. Keeping in view 
that there is no strong evidence for the existence of a trade-off between outreach and 
sustainability, a deep and extensive study on this issue is greatly recommended.  Hermes et al 
(2011) used data of 435 MFIs between 1997 and 2007, and claims the existence of a trade-off. 
More specifically they used MFI cost-effectiveness to estimate sustainability through a stochastic 
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frontier analysis, with an average loan balance and percentage of women borrowers to measure 
the outreach dept.  
MFIs do not only have a social mission of enabling the poor to maintain their lives well; 
they also aim to be profitable and so offer financial services in a financial feasible way. MFIs 
work on a melding of commercial and social objectives. With more focus on institutional and 
financial performance, the prospects for maximizing poverty impact and for outreach depth are 
compromised.  
Studies call for equilibrium between financial and social missions, because the extant 
focus on financial objectives means only the few having a high need for MF services are targeted. 
For a better balance, there is a need for services to maintain poverty impact as well as economic 
and financial performance. 
Some studies calculate that only 5% of MFIs around the world are financially sound and 
sustainable; IMF (2005) claims only 1%; this is a big issue for the MF sector.  
For financial sustainability, MFIs need to control operating and funds costs, reduce non-
performing loans and write-offs, and curb the inflation from income earned in the shape of fees 
and markups. The 2005 IMF report says that self-sustainable MFIs are likely to be efficient in 
performance when larger. Further, MFIs do not focus on the very poor, because targeting the 
less-poor increases efficiency indicators and loan sizes; MFIs targeting the very poor are more 
likely to be dependent on donation. This is where there is a compromise: if MFIs aim to achieve 
sustainability and also reach the poorest, MF programs must be managed professionally, 
subsidies eliminated, and intensive credit control systems and proper monitoring must be in place. 
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MFI sustainability is also important from the client perspective, because clients may reduce or 
even cut off their regular loan repayments if they doubt that the MFI will survive.  
Factors contributing sustainability include proper identification of client need, regular 
repayment ability, realistic forecast of business cash inflow, realistic interest rates, proper loan 
amounts according to genuine client need, and considering savings as a prerequisite. Putting 
these in place along with a focus on the poorest will enable to achievement of financial and 
social objectives. When assessing MFI performance, it is essential to assess social and financial 
performance, as both are needed for successful operation of MFIs.  
Barboza, G. and Trejos, S. (2009) observed that Micro Credit (MC) programs offer 
finance to the poor with innovative mechanisms, such as group lending with joint liability, 
effectively accounting for the existence of asymmetric information in less developed financial 
markets. MC programs have successfully achieved objectives such as positive impact on poverty 
alleviation and impressive recovery rates of loans to the poor; these are what government 
agencies and conventional financial institutes have failed to achieve. Socially-responsible donors 
or lenders play a vital role in helping poverty reduction and funding Micro Credit Programs. 
3.4. Assessments through Methodological Approach 
 
3.4.1. Non-Randomized Approach 
 
Most studies investigate MF impact on the above first three issues. Although there have 
been a number of assessments of MF impact on Poverty alleviation, there is yet surprisingly 
small empirical evidence concerning this issue. One key problem in the assessment of MF 
impact is how to gauge its share of poverty alleviation. Many studies compare an MF treatment 
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group with access to an MF facility against a control group without this facility. In most cases, 
the assessments use non-randomized approaches.  
Published studies offer mixed evidence for non-randomized MF program effect on 
poverty. Pitt and Khandker (1998) study the effect of MF in Bangladesh from 1991-92 data in a 
household survey. This is one of the most influential studies in this area. The results reveal that 
MF access leads to an increase in expenditures and consumption, particularly if the microfinance 
is borrowed by women. A follow-up study (Khandker, 2005) uses 1991–92 and 1999 panel data, 
showing that the extremely poor are more benefited than the moderately poor. But the outcomes 
of both reports are rejected by Roodman and Morduch (2009), whose report shows that the 
instrument variable may not produce the required results and that the outcome can be triggered 
by an endogeneity problem (‘simultaneous equation and omitted variable bias’). Chemin (2008) 
worked on same Bangladesh survey and applied the “propensity score matching technique.” He 
argues a positive impact of MF on spending, school enrollment and labor supply. 
However, a study by Copestake, Dawson, Fanning, McKay, and Wright-Revolledo (2005) 
doubts the impact of MF. This study is grounded on data from a survey in Peru into a 2002 
village banking program, applying a mix of evaluation techniques (includes in-depth qualitative 
interviews and difference-in-difference method); the research concludes that the poor are “better 
off” than the poorest, gaining more from MF. 
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3.4.2.  Randomized Approach 
 
Studies regarding MF impact have now shifted to Randomized Approaches with 
randomized controlled tests, because of a number of methodological defects in Non-Randomized 
Approaches. In Randomized Approaches the Control Group and Treatment Group are identical 
in all dimensions and every aspect, bar one difference: the Treatment Group has MF facilitation, 
while the Control Group does not.  
Both groups comprise a random allocation of individuals. The treatment is randomized 
deliberately, that is by MF program, which opens new branches randomly in big city slums 
(unexploited in the past). This can also be because of natural phenomena such as volcanic 
disruption, which harms a few MF recipients. Variations in response variables like health, 
education, consumption and investment can be associated with treatment 2. The findings were 
also mixed from randomized experiments, with some evidence suggesting a strong impact for 
those groups which are generally not focused on by MFIs.  
Banerjeey et al (2009) base their study on the first randomized assessment of the impact 
of a launch of MC in a new market. Research was conducted in Hyderabad (India’s fifth largest 
city); of 104 neighborhood slum areas, 52 were selected randomly for an MF branch. A survey 
showed that this intervention boosted MFI borrowings, increased the establishment of profitable 
small business and increased consumption and investment. However, after fifteen-eighteen 
months of the program, while the MC enabled households to start new ventures, there was no 
impact on overall expenditures, but substantial effects on durable goods and significant 
reductions in “temptation goods” were observed. The impacts are heterogeneous: Households 
already running a durable goods business during the program increased their earnings.  
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Meanwhile clients who tended to be business owners reported reductions in consumption 
of nondurables, and they consistently bore fixed cost for entrepreneurship, whereas clients with a 
low propensity for business ownership reported an increase in spending on non-durables. 
Researchers found no effect on education, health and women’s decision-making.  
Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) report that, through MF, households may be richer, and 
yielding “income effect” this should raise consumption levels while holding constant all other 
factors, enhancing demand for leisure, education and child health. However, the study adds that 
operating a microenterprise may require time by yielding “substitution effects” which may offset 
the impact of better earnings. For instance, should a borrower need more time for a micro-
business, they may prefer to keep children at home rather than school, to help the business.  
3.4.3.  Criticism over the Randomized Approach 
 
Many other studies are in process (Roodman & Morduch, 2009). There is also criticism 
of the exercise of randomized controlled tests so far (Deaton, 2009; Rodrik, 2008). Moreover, it 
might be that barely generalized highly imperative remarks elicit the outcome of an experiment. 
Hence the findings of this study show that the operation of a specific MF program where people 
are extremely poor, such as an African slum, results do not demonstrate that this program would 
be effective elsewhere or have any effect on poor people from other parts of sub-Saharan Africa.  
Context matters. In this regard, advocates of randomized techniques offer a solution, a 
repetition of trials in various different contexts, to examine whether it works. However the 
number of repetitions of any specific experiment is still undefined. Also, repeated experiments 
incur costs and take time; there may be no financial support for rerunning trials, because 
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generally important journals do not publish repeat research (Rodrik, 2008; Easterly, 2009; 
Roodman & Morduch, 2009).  
Roodman and Morduch (2009) conclude that both “randomized and non-randomized” 
techniques could be used to assess the impact of MF, as both have strengths and weaknesses. 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have examined present significant MFI challenges affecting the role of 
MF in poverty alleviation, such as an over-emphasis on financial stability and failure of a 
number of MFIs to facilitate the poorest of society. Hence it is necessary that MFIs must 
properly understand the requirements of the poor, and design services and schemes to meet those 
needs (Morduch, 2004). To achieve development goals, MFIs must ensure financial 
sustainability as well as outreach to the poorest. We have observed that “impact of MF on 
poverty alleviation” is discussed a lot and it has not been easy to reach any final conclusion 
(Hulme & Mosley, 1996).  
Nevertheless, if an MF program is designed in consideration of the needs of the poor, 
then implemented and monitored closely, it will produce positive impacts not only on borrowers 
but also their family and the whole community. Zohir and Matin (2004) recommend a deep 
assessment of societal impacts in order to understand the exact role of MF in development. An 
analysis of livelihood security is one such tool to gauge the wider impact, measuring how the 
program affects the livelihoods of recipients and beneficiaries. 
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3.6. Policy Implication & Recommendations  
 
Poverty Alleviation is the duty of not only the society as well as Government; but it is 
primary responsibility of Poor themselves to get rid of from this malady. Governments are 
responsible for removing economic and social barriers to eradicate poverty and hunger but the 
result may be fragile if poor does not put active efforts to fight against poverty and improve 
living standards. Thus the driving force from poor is essential ingredient in all countries to 
achieve the goal of eliminating poverty.  
The state is responsible to help in arrangements of those tools that enable poor for 
learning to avoid risks of falling in poverty. State also provide them resources and direction to do 
business and earn enough amount for improvement of living standard  
It is worth mentioning that the core objective of MF is not to make poor dependent but 
independent that enable them to create an income generator for consistent inflow of income to 
feed their family. The objective of poverty alleviation must be visionary and consistent: The goal 
of Poverty reduction should not be limited for improving standard of livelihood only but it also 
produce prospects for improving educational level of poor as well as sense of law  abidance so 
that they can play constructive role in nation.  
The situation demands the introduction of a novel and pioneering micro-credit product or 
service. Following policy recommendations can be useful for improving for improvement of MF 
services as well as outreach and were deduced from the findings of this paper. 
Despite increasing demand, the remote areas are immensely underprivileged.  Therefore 
it is essential for organizations that are enough capable for resource mobilization to come in 
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frontward and actively work on the mission of poverty eradication as well as facilitate poor 
people. However Government has to perform as conductor for private and public sector 
collaboration and do the legislation in this regard. Most of the organizations, who are 
implementing micro credit program, are providing credit through one while the huge demand is 
still there for other products also like consumption loans and emergency loans that can 
be addressed through micro credit program. The organizations need to have multiple loan 
products, provide choice to the poor to select one of them according to their needs.  
This will help the organization in minimizing loan repayment delinquencies and also 
benefit of the programs will be very fruitful.  
 
Financial Transparency must be adhered by collecting and disseminating correct and 
accurate information. The sequence may be like; Step 1) Verification; Step 2) Analyzation; Step3) 
Judging and Comparison of Performance according to provided information. MFIs may extend 
their services to commercial mode on permanent basis, only if these institutes are working with 
proper infrastructure for instance, training facilities and Management Information System.  
In order to reduce operating cost of MFIs, appropriate technology consorting with 
systems and procedures must be introduced. One of the most crucial issues is monitoring of loan. 
MFIs should confirm effective monitoring system in institute. Such systems keep record and 
monitor proper utilization of loan as well as its optimum result. 
There must be diversified or broad range of products and services for development of 
microfinance. MFIs need to focalize the complete cycle of Business Development Services 
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instead of focusing on loans and recoveries only. In rural area major portion of loans of Micro 
Credit is to Agriculture sector which is usually vulnerable due to natural disasters such as floods, 
droughts therefore it requires proper attention and appropriate measures should be in place to 
manage the risk. Existing products of MF should essentially target poor in bottom. There is acute 
need of regulatory body that facilitates and support MF organizations for achieving their 
goal.  Pakistan requires prominent regulatory institute that provide not only the plate form to all 
MFIs  but support them for learning by sharing experience and make effective decisions for 
improvement of services. In Pakistan there is huge potential for female entrepreneurs while they 
contributing a nominal share in development of Pakistan’s Economy. Our female population is 
skilled and enriched with diversified skills such as, textile designing, stitching, manufacturing of 
small articles, handy crafts like embroidery, animal husbandry, honey farming etc. However this 
population requires market linkage. In order to take benefit from the skills of female 
entrepreneurs and let them to improve thie livelihood, Pakistan Government as well as private 
institutes should intervene and take necessary steps to support them for accessing markets. 
 
The clients should not only be given the loans but also be guided through with business 
plan ideas and basic education of business. MFI‘s need to understand that every client just like a 
commercial client has different needs, and henceforth, the needs should be catered to differently 
with different packages for the customers. To confirm the repayments, the MFIs should provide 
borrowers with the security in the form guarantees. The gaps between the borrower and the 
market should be lessened. To do so, the system should be upgraded regularly to ensure timely 
lapses. For the staff to be able to come down to the level where they communicate through to the 
170 
 
customers, they should be given incentives to be able to move the work further with enthusiasm. 
MFIs should build a database of borrowers. This is very important because, the MFIs should 
base their decisions on the solid economic basis.  
Micro-financing is made to help poor people, but in our country rates of interest on micro 
loans are decrease rate of interest. PRSP is not a serious effort at poverty alleviation political will 
of the government is translated in allocations, which appear far too in adequate. Government and 
micro-finance Institute should give the awareness to poor people that how micro-financing can 
improve their economic conditions. Government should improve the implementation of a 
regulatory framework. Government should try to empower a woman by giving them micro loans. 
Loan size should be increased enough to meet the requirements of borrowers. The people should 
be given more opportunities for loan attainment. Knowledge should be provided by MFIs to 
interested borrowers for the better utilization of credit. Interest rate should be decreased so that 
more and more applicants can avail micro finance facilities. The Government should assist the 
micro finance industry like the other industry it will increase the interest of people in micro 
finance banks. The state bank should revise the investment policy – 15% capital ratio and the 
lack of Competencies to increase in the capital are an impediment in the objective of the banks. 
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Figure 3.1 : Direct and Indirect Relation between Microfinance and Poverty 
 
Source : IFC by Thorston Beck, Chairman of European Banking Center and Professor of Economics at Tilburg University and CEPR fellow: available at 
http://ifcnet.ifc.org/ifcint/deveffectiveness.nsf/Content/home 
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Table 3.1: Problems and Solutions of Microfinance Program Services 
 
Problem Causes Possible Solutions 
Criteria for Participation of 
Poor People in 
Microfinance Programs  
Those people who are not able to repay are 
eliminated from the loan borrowing and savings 
services, means they cannot participate in 
microfinance programs.  
 
Most of the time poor people eliminate themselves 
from these services as they are worried because they 
assume that they are unable to repay the loans and 
will make problems for other group members.  
 
Sometimes the conditions for financial services of 
the microfinance programs are unacceptable for poor 
people. These conditions include:  
− They have some limitation to use the loan 
− Time consumption as they have regular 
meetings  
− Repayment time is very short 
− Restriction on saving access 
Guide poor people about the programs 
through different activities. 
 
Microfinance programs (MFP) should 
encourage their participants to add poor 
people in their groups to make the program 
strong and to reduce the poverty. 
  
Targeting poor people is very important, in 
this case MFP should make some strategies 
to target poor people and boost their 
confidence to participate in the program. 
 
Arrange training programs and asset 
building for poor people on providing them 
proper knowledge about new business, 
skills enhancement techniques, techniques 
to save money and decision making power. 
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Guarantee system for group lending and 
individual loans should not be complicated. 
It should be simple for poor people to 
increase the participation in microfinance 
program.  
Staff training programs and workshops are 
very significant to overcome the problem. 
As microfinance has female borrowers and 
they have to manage the time, hence 
meetings should be infrequent at least once 
a month. 
 
There should be less restriction on loan use, 
it should be flexible and depends on 
borrower.  
 
Time for repayment must be flexible and it 
should depend on the condition of 
borrowers, either he is able to repay in that 
time period or not as MFP has main 
objective to reduce poverty. 
MFP should provide easy access to credit 
and savings.  
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Problem Causes Possible Solutions 
Poor people cannot be 
better off.  
Deficiency in skills and Knowledge of 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Lack of social networking for new business. 
 
Lack of information about the market conditions. 
Not proper capital, as loan size of loans restricts 
your investment and scope. 
 
Sometimes markets have too many suppliers but 
demand is very low for that product.  
 
 
Training Programs are playing very vital 
role to improve the skills and knowledge of 
client to increase social networking. 
 
These training workshops enable the clients 
to enter in new market and compete with 
other. They train their client that how to 
sustain and improve their business.  
 
Microfinance Program needs to arrange 
workshops on asset building.  
Microfinance schemes need to increase the 
flexibility in size of loan and repayment 
strategy.   
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Problem Causes Possible Solutions 
Unsuccessful entrepreneur  Inadequate suggestions to clients for their new 
business.  
 
Incomplete or misleading information about market.  
 
Strict repayment penalties which can cause 
discouragement of clients.  
 
 
Risk always exists in establishing a new 
business and it’s really impossible to be 
removed. 
Although we can reduce the level of risk 
through different logical strategies.  
MFP should give proper and adequate 
suggestion about finding new prospects.  
MFP should assist them according to their 
budget and market condition.  
They should encourage them through 
flexible repayment system. They can give 
them some benefit on timely repayment 
which can encourage the clients to improve 
their strategies.  
Inequality Loan distribution 
Better off are getting more benefit than poor people 
 
 
As above 
The main eligibility criteria for MFP is the 
client should meet certain criteria, it means 
he should be poor. The financial services 
should serve only to poor people.  
MFP should give more priority to those who 
are really eligible for the loan. It means they 
should give more incentive to poor people.  
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Problem Causes Possible Solutions 
Gender Biased 
 
Provision of loans to men is not enough, although 
men have more opportunities for income generation.  
 
Decision making Power 
 
Men’s feel uncomfortable by female’s involvement 
in financial activities of home. 
Give equal chance to both of them in getting 
the loans from MFP.  
 
Arrange training session especially for 
female clients to enhance their social, 
economic and financial skills and their 
status.   
Improve their decision making power, boost 
their confidence and standard.  
  
Aware them about the market situations. 
Counseling for men to convince or motivate 
them to accept the women’s success in 
financial matters. 
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Table 3.2: Positive Impact studies of Microfinance on poverty Alleviation 
Author Study Design Description Microfinance Intervention Microfinance Model Recommendation 
Jonas Helth 
Lonborg & Ole 
Dahl 
Rasmussen 
(2014)  
 
Comparison of 
treatment and 
control group 
“Can Microfinance 
Reach the Poorest: 
Evidence from a 
Community-Managed 
Microfinance 
Intervention” 
 
Income level Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
To find the reason 
for drop outs from 
the program. 
 
Olaf Weber & 
Adnan Ahmed 
(2014) 
 
Propensity score 
matching to 
determine 
control and 
treatment group 
 
“Empowerment 
through Microfinance: 
The Relation between 
Loan Cycle and Level 
of Empowerment” 
 
Microfinance has significant 
effect on decision making 
which empowers the women.  
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
Increase the number 
of loan cycles 
Derin Kent & 
M.Tina Dacin 
(2013)  
Institutional 
Theory 
“Role of institutional 
logics in shaping the 
efficacy of 
microfinance” 
Microfinance helps to 
improve the enterprise 
development. 
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
- 
Katshushi S. 
Imai, Ganesh 
Thapa, Raghav 
Gaiha & 
Samuel Kobina 
Annim (2012) 
Panel and Cross 
sectional 
Analysis(Pooled 
OLS , Fixed 
Effect and 
Random Effect)  
A macro Perspective- 
Microfinance and 
Poverty 
Microfinance (Gross Loan 
Portfolio) significantly 
impact on poverty at macro-
level.  
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
Providing more 
funds to MFI of 
developing 
countries instead of 
government and 
developed financed 
institutions 
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Author Study Design Description Microfinance Intervention Microfinance Model Recommendation 
Robert J. 
Kauffman & 
Frederick J. 
Riggins (2012)   
 
Review the 
existing 
literature 
“Information and 
communication 
technology and the 
sustainability of 
microfinance” 
 
Outreach and Sustainability Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
- 
Tamgid Ahmed 
Chowdhury & 
Pundarik 
Mukhopadhaya 
(2012) 
 
Comparative 
Analysis 
between Non-
Governmental 
organization 
and 
Microfinance-
driven 
governmental 
Organization 
Projects 
Analyze the efficiency 
of Non-Governmental 
organization and 
Microfinance-driven 
governmental 
Organization Projects 
to improve the 
economic status 
Governmental Organization 
(GO) project positively 
effect on living standards 
than NGO’s.  
Group Lending Governmental 
Organization (GO) 
project need more 
focus on social 
well-being. 
  
C.Van Rooyen. 
R. Stewart & 
T.de Wet 
(2012) 
 
Summarize and 
evaluate the 
existing 
literature 
“The Impact of 
Microfinance in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A 
Systematic Review of 
the Evidence” 
 
Microfinance positively 
influence on income, assets, 
expenditure, education, 
health, living standard and 
saving. At the same time 
some studies shows no 
impact or negative impact.  
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
- 
Wisdom 
Akpalu, Samuel 
Regression 
Analysis 
“Access to 
microfinance and intra 
Enhance the  enterprise, 
women involvement in 
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
- 
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Erasmus Alnaa 
& Peter B. 
Aglobitse 
(2012) 
 
( Ordinary Least 
Square with 
Instrumental 
Variable)  
household business 
decision making: 
Implication for 
efficiency of female 
owned enterprises in 
Ghana” 
 
business and decision 
making process  
Stephen B. 
Deloach & 
Ericka 
Lamanna 
(2011) 
 
Instrumental 
Variable 
Estimation 
“Measuring the 
Impact of 
Microfinance on Child 
Health Outcomes in 
Indonesia” 
 
Microfinance positively 
effect on child health care, 
social capital, increase the 
knowledge about the 
nutrition 
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
No further 
recommendations 
Muhammad 
Amjad Saleem, 
Bakhtiar Khan, 
Muhammad 
Imran & Khair 
us Zaman 
(2010) 
Stratified 
Sampling 
(Regression 
Analysis)  
Microfinance has 
positively influence on 
living standard of D.I. 
Khan.   
 
Effect on educational level, 
health status and financial 
stability.   
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
Microfinance 
program should 
target poor people 
of the society.   
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Author Study Design Description Microfinance Intervention Microfinance Model Recommendation 
Adrian 
Gonzalez 
(2010) 
Panel data 
analysis 
“Is Microfinance 
Growing Too Fast?” 
Growth policy has significant 
impact on gross loan 
portfolio.  
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
 
Dean Karlan & 
Jonathan (2009) 
 
Treatment and 
Control group 
(Difference in 
Difference ) 
“Expanding 
Microenterprise Credit 
Access:  
Using Randomized 
Supply Decisions to 
Estimate the Impacts 
in Manila” 
Expand the access to borrow 
the loan and expand their 
business  
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
 
Dean Karlan & 
Jonathan (2008) 
 
 “Credit elasticities in 
less-developed 
Economies: 
Implications for 
microfinance” 
Size of loan is more reactive 
to make adjustment in loan 
maturity than interest rates. 
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
 
Shon R. Hiatt & 
Warner P. 
Woodworth 
(2006) 
 
 “Using Kruskal 
Wallis one-way 
analysis of 
variance test”  
“Alleviating poverty 
through microfinance: 
Village banking 
outcomes in Central 
America” 
 
Increased the economic and 
social status of Microfinance 
clients 
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
- 
Brett E. 
Coleman (206) 
Treatment and 
Control Group 
( Difference in 
Difference)  
“Microfinance in 
Northeast Thailand: 
Who benefits and how 
much?” 
Microfinance services have 
significant impact of welfare 
of household.  
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
Microfinance 
program has to set 
eligibility criteria 
and they have to 
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 prefer poorer people 
of the area. The 
main objective 
should be outreach 
and sustainability.  
Judith Shaw 
(2004)  
 
Household 
Survey data  
( Control and 
Treatment 
Group)  
“Microenterprise 
Occupation and 
Poverty Reduction in 
Microfinance 
Programs: Evidence 
from Sri Lanka” 
 
Microfinance Program effect 
on their occupational status. 
It effect positively on 
microenterprise occupation.  
Group and Individual 
Based Lending 
- 
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Table 3.3: Impact of Microfinance on Poverty Alleviation (A Critical Assessment) 
 
Author Study Design Description Microfinance 
Intervention 
Microfinance 
Model 
Recommendation 
Anis 
Chowdhury 
(2009) 
Working Paper 
(review the 
literature) 
“Microfinance as a 
Poverty Reduction 
Tool—  
A Critical 
Assessment” 
 
Microfinance Program 
modern strategies for 
entrepreneur which can 
influence on poverty is 
still a big question. But it 
gives small loans which 
can effect on their 
consumption and 
expenditure. Somehow the 
clients of microfinance are 
improving their social and 
economic condition.   
Group and 
Individual Based 
Lending 
Microfinance 
should concentrate 
on poor and 
follow the policies 
of government 
which can help to 
enhance the socio 
and economic 
status of poor 
people. 
 
 
 
 
 
